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Artificial Intelligence can be divided between symbolic and sub-symbolic
methods, with neural networks making up a majority of the latter. Symbolic
systems have the advantage when capabilities such as deduction and planning
are required, while sub-symbolic ones are preferable for tasks requiring skills
such as perception and generalization. One of the domains in which neural
approaches tend to fare poorly is cognitive control: maintaining short-term
memory, inhibiting distractions, and shifting attention. Our own biological
neural networks are more than capable of these sorts of executive functions,
but artificial neural networks struggle with them. This work explores the gap
between the cognitive control that is possible with both symbolic AI systems
and biological neural networks, but not with artificial neural networks. To do
so, I identify a set of general-purpose, regional-level functions and interactions
that are useful for cognitive control in large-scale neural architectures. My
approach has three main pillars: a region-and-pathway architecture inspired by
the human cerebral cortex and biologically-plausible Hebbian learning, neural
regions that each serve as an attractor network able to learn sequences, and
neural regions that not only learn to exchange information but also to modulate
the functions of other regions. The resultant networks have behaviors based on
their own memory contents rather than exclusively on their structure. Because
they learn not just memories of the environment but also procedures for tasks,
it is possible to “program” these neural networks with the desired behaviors.
This research makes four primary contributions. First, the extension of
Hopfield-like attractor networks from processing only fixed-point attractors
to processing sequential ones. This is accomplished via the introduction of
temporally asymmetric weights to Hopfield-like networks, a novel technique that
I developed. Second, the combination of several such networks to create models
capable of autonomously directing their own performance of cognitive control
tasks. By learning procedural memories for a task they can perform in ways
that match those of human subjects in key respects. Third, the extension of
this approach to spatial domains, binding together visuospatial data to perform
a complex memory task at the same level observed in humans and a comparable
symbolic model. Finally, these new memories and learning procedures are
integrated so that models can respond to feedback from the environment. This
enables them to improve as they gain experience by refining their own internal
representations of their instructions. These results establish that the use of
regional networks, sequential attractor dynamics, and gated connections provide






Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment








Professor Michael Dougherty, Dean’s Representative
© Jared Sylvester 2014
For L.P.
ii
Science is what we understand well enough to explain to a computer.
Art is everything else we do.
Donald Knuth
Forward to Petkovsek,
Wilf & Zeilberger, ‘A=B’





List of Tables vi
List of Figures vii
1 Introduction and Rationale 1
1.1 The galis Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Goals and Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Background 11
2.1 The Nature of Human Working Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Past Neural Network Models of Working Memory . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Past Neural Models for Cognitive Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Past Neural Networks for Sequence Processing . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Fast Weights & Gating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 Associative Memories & Temporally Asymmetric Weights 48
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.1 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.2 Measuring Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3 Human Behavioral Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Learning Instruction Sequences for Control 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 The ‘Store & Recognize’ Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.2 Model Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2.3 Control Module Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
iv
4.2.4 Control Module Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 The n-Back Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.2 Model Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4.1 Testing the galis Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4.2 galis as a general purpose framework . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5 Visuospatial Processing and Binding 138
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.1 Visual System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.2.2 Executive System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2.3 Motor System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.2.4 Experimental Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3 Further Details of the Card Matching Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.1 Location Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.2 Object Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.3.3 Working Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3.4 Conflict Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6 Learning, Improvement & Task Switching 176
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.2.1 The Wisconsin Card Sort Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.2.2 Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.2.3 Information Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.2.4 Visual System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.2.5 Working Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.2.6 Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7 Discussion 202
7.1 Significance and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205




3.1 Capacity of working memory model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Peak-to-peak transitions in correct order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1 Instruction sequences for Store/Recognize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 Sample inputs & outputs for Store/Recognize accuracy tests . . . . 92
4.3 Sample inputs & outputs for Store/Recognize capacity tests . . . . 94
4.4 Instruction sequences for n-Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1 Instruction sequences for Card Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.1 Types of learning used for the wcst model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.2 wcst input features and values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.3 Instruction sequences for wcst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
vi
List of Figures
3.1 Example stimuli for the asymmetric weight sequential memory . . 51
3.2 Sequential associative memory architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Ordering of wm recall with and without asymmetric weights . . . 59
3.4 Working memory model’s recall rate by position . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5 Comparison of wm model recall with human subjects . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 A memory divided into two conceptual partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2 Sample visual stimuli for Store/Recognize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Top-level architecture for the Store/Recognize task . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Compare module for Store/Recognize model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Sequence of operations to add an item to working memory . . . . . 81
4.6 Biasing attractor space to determine if a stimulus is in memory . . 83
4.7 Control module for Store/Recognize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.8 Accuracy on the Store/Recognize task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.9 Working memory capacity on the Store/Recognize task . . . . . . . . 94
4.10 Effect of decay on wm in the Store/Recognize model . . . . . . . . . 96
4.11 Top-level architecture for n-Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.12 Control module for n-Back, simple version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.13 Sequence of operations to process one stimulus for 3-back . . . . . . 108
4.14 Control module for n-Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.15 Comparison of model and human accuracies on n-Back . . . . . . . . 125
4.16 Model and human response times on n-Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.17 Accuracy when changing the value of n during a trial . . . . . . . . . 128
4.18 Sources of error on n-Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.1 Visual environment for the Card Matching task . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.2 Model architecture for the Card Matching task . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3 Model visual system for the Card Matching task . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.4 Model executive system architecture for the Card Matching task . 147
5.5 Detail of the conflict module architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.6 Symbolic model performance on Card Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
vii
5.7 Performance of humans, galis & symbolic model . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.8 Accuracy distribution for galis when matching 12 & 16 cards . . 166
5.9 Accuracy distribution for humans, galis & symbolic model (n=16) 168
5.10 Visually-weighted regression of Card Matching performance . . . . 170
6.1 Visual field for Wisconsin Card Sort Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.2 Model architecture for wcst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.3 Example object layer Self-Organizing Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.4 Schematic representation of wm contents for wcst . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.5 Effect of instruction refinement on performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.6 Performance distribution with & without instruction refinement . 197
6.7 wcst performance when trained with extraneous instructions . . 198




“Cognitive control” is an umbrella term for those executive cognitive systems
that manage other cognitive processes, such as working memory, planning,
attention, inhibition, and action selection. Building neural architectures ca-
pable of modeling cognitive control processes is increasingly recognized as an
important research direction for several reasons (Roy, 2008). First, improving
the performance of neural networks in domains at which symbolic systems
currently dominate will allow the strengths of neural networks, such as incre-
mental learning and pattern recognition, to be leveraged (Omlin and Giles,
2000). Further, the capability to perform higher level executive functions like
goal formation, planning and selective attention will make neural networks
more autonomous, and hence more useful, in the future. Finally, neural models
of human cognition may ultimately provide insight into human cognition and
its neurobiological basis.
While these potential benefits are evident, developing such architectures
has proven to be surprisingly challenging. Neural systems currently excel
at problems that are limited to their strengths but they often struggle with
problems requiring executive behaviors such as representing the goals and
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rules of a task or constructing and carrying out procedures (Marcus, 2001). In
contrast, symbolic AI systems face little difficulty with incorporating executive
behaviors (Simen et al., 2010), due to the ease with which they can bind
variables, create data structures, and perform global computations. This
divergence in ability is particularly odd since biological neural systems do not
experience the same difficulty that artificial neural networks do. For instance
a person can typically play a novel card game merely after hearing the rules
described, but a neural network might have to witness the game being played
thousands of times before it can play it on its own. Why are cognitive control
functions such as focusing on a goal state so easy for symbolic systems and
living beings, but so difficult for artificial neural networks? It stands to reason
that it should be just as possible for neural networks to perform these tasks as
it is for the biological counterparts from which they draw inspiration.
There has been increasing interest during recent years regarding biologically-
inspired computation that addresses these issues. Rather than just using neural
networks as tools for applications at which they excel (character recognition,
system control, etc.), many researchers are looking to understand the brain’s
computation from the bottom up, leveraging the link between neural AI systems
and the brain. Examples of this interest are recent conferences (bica, agi,
etc.), and research programs such as those as darpa and iarpa. The growing
interest in biologically-inspired computation has led to, among other things, the
development of pioneering neural models that explicitly incorporate aspects of
cognitive control, such as for managing working memory (O’Reilly and Frank,
2006) and for planning solutions to the Towers of London problem (Dehaene
and Changeux, 1997, 2000; Samadi et al., 2008).
2
However, many such neural models are hard-wired for the particular task for
which they are designed (Stewart et al., 2010), connection strengths are often
set by hand without a learning procedure, and local conjunctive encodings are
often used (e.g., Frank et al., 2001; Riachi et al., 2009; Varma and Just, 2006)
specifying the exact sets of possible inputs and outputs and making adaptation
to other situations, contexts or environments tricky. This specialization can
make neural network models of cognitive control difficult to build, because
each model requires not only parameter tuning and other human supervision,
but often construction from the ground up. Even small changes in the task
specifications can require large modifications to the architecture. For instance,
the model for solving the Towers of London problem in Dehaene and Changeux
(1997), while capable of an impressive amount of planning for a neural network,
is incapable of solving the very similar Towers of Hanoi problem, or even of
solving Towers of London using a method other than the greedy, depth-first
search it has been constructed to execute. What would be helpful is the
development of a general purpose, adaptive approach that, building on the
successes of past specific implementations of cognitive control mechanisms, can
be used for a broad range of applications.
This dissertation presents an approach to building neural models of cognitive
control called galis, for “Gated Attractors Learning Instruction Sequences.”
galis is intended to be a general-purpose, adaptive neurocomputational
architecture that learns how to perform tasks, including tasks that themselves
involve learning, within which models for specific tasks can be instantiated.
The goal is not to provide a veridical model of the neurobiology underlying
human cognitive control, but rather to take inspiration from the large-scale
organization of the cerebral cortex to create a general computational framework
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that can be used effectively to create a broad range of neural architectures
for specific tasks. Similarly, while I will refer to galis as a cognitive model
in the following, no claim is being made here that the galis framework is
an accurate model of human cognitive algorithms, although we will see that
at times its performance can align well with human data and can also make
testable, falsifiable predictions (e.g., see the results related to the n-Back task
in Section 4.3). All that is claimed is that the approach introduced here —
i.e., gated transient-attractor networks — provides a substantial contribution
to neurocomputational methods for executive control.
1.1 The GALIS Framework
While galis is not intended to be a neuroanatomical/physiological model
of the brain circuitry underlying cognitive control, it is strongly inspired by
contemporary views of the organization and functionality of primate cerebral
cortex. Specifically, galis is derived from three main hypotheses about how
cerebral cortex directs working memory, as follows.
The first hypothesis is that the cerebral cortex is organized as a distributed
network of interacting cortical regions. Such a hypothesis is supported by a
broad range of scientific evidence (Bressler and Menon, 2010; Sporns, 2011; van
Essen et al., 1992). The implication for galis is that all aspects of working
memory contents, both static information that captures task-specific details
and dynamic procedures for performing a task, are stored within a network
of model regions. In other words, model cortical regions must learn not only
the “facts” about a specific instance of a task (as in most neural network
systems), but also the procedure or “software” that is needed to perform that
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task. Thus while galis models have dedicated substructures to carry out
certain procedures, such as judging the similarity of two patterns, the behavior
of these models is largely based on the patterns that are learned by its control
memory. This focus on making behavior largely dependent on patterns stored
in the network’s memory, rather than on the network’s structure or “hardware,”
is a break from previous neural networks and is intended to make galis
models more generalizable: their behavior can be changed by adjusting which
sequences are learned rather than by adjusting the structure of the model
itself. This also allows a model’s behaviors to be dynamically modified during
task performance (Long et al., 1998) by adding or removing items from the
instruction memory rather than changing the network architecture, something
that is an important step toward more autonomous intelligent agents.
The second hypothesis is that each region in the cortical network can usefully
be viewed as an attractor neural network, i.e., as a dynamical system whose
activity is continuously being driven towards certain preferred states. Attractor
networks have been used previously in cognitive control models (e.g., Farrell
and Lewandowsky, 2002; Hoshino et al., 1997; Jones and Polk, 2002), but
usually they are limited to dealing with only fixed-point attractors. However,
if working memory is to accommodate procedural information that supports
cognitive control, it must also be able to store attractors that are linked together
as temporal sequences. In other words, a model region must be capable of
switching dynamically from one fixed point attractor state to another. Various
techniques have been used to add dynamism like this to attractor nets, including
dynamic thresholds, negative feedback, and Hebbian unlearning (Brown et al.,
2000; Horn and Usher, 1992; Katori et al., 2011; Tsuda, 2001; Winder et al.,
2009). Model cortical regions in galis consist of recurrently connected
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neural networks that use temporally asymmetric learning of intra-regional
connections weights in a fashion that supports storage of temporal sequences
of actions (Sylvester et al., 2011, 2010).
The third hypothesis is that each cortical region can not only exchange
information with other cortical regions in the form of activity patterns as is
done in many other neural networks, but can also gate other regions’ functions
and interactions. By gating here we mean that a cortical region can turn on/off
functions in other regions, or open/close the flow of information between other
regions, or enable/suppress learning. The claim here is that this is a core aspect
of cognitive control. Such gating interactions might be brought about in part by
direct connections between regions, such as the poorly understood “backwards”
inter-regional connections that are well documented to exist in primate cortical
networks (van Essen et al., 1992). However, these gating actions more likely
occur indirectly between biological cortical regions, being implemented via a
complex network of subcortical nuclei, including those in the basal ganglia
and thalamus (Frank et al., 2001; Sherman and Guillery, 2009; van Essen,
2005), and/or via functional mechanisms such as activity synchronization.
Synchronization has been postulated as an effective way to gate information
flow between cortical areas (Singer, 2011), and this may contribute to top-down
attention mechanisms (Womelsdorf and Fries, 2009). While gating has been
used in some previous models of working memory control, such past work has
generally incorporated explicit neuroanatomical models of hypothesized subcor-
tical nuclei and their interconnectivity to implement gating actions (e.g., Frank
et al., 2001; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). In contrast, in the galis framework
the details of implementing gating actions via complex subcortical circuity,
synchronized cortical oscillatory activity, or other mechanisms are suppressed.
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Instead, the framework assumes such mechanisms exist and implements them
as direct gating interactions between model cortical regions and the pathways
that inter-connect these regions.
In summary, inspired by the organization of the primate cerebral cortex,
the approach adopted in this dissertation to the problem of learned cognitive
control is to build a network of regional neural networks, linked together by
gated connections. galis models incorporate at least two different types of
memory systems: those that store task specific state information (task memory),
and those that store the actions and procedures necessary for performing the
task (control or instruction memory). Both types of memory are implemented
as discrete attractor networks and operate according to the same rules. The
adaptive gates throughout galis networks control how activity flows between
regions. In addition, gates are used to control when connection weights are
updated. By opening and closing its gates, a galis network can determine
when to learn and unlearn stimuli. In addition, galis also uses distributed
rather than local representations and Hebbian learning rather than error back-
propagation, both of which are intended to increase the biological plausibility
of the galis approach.
1.2 Goals and Aims
The central goal of this research is to develop a neurocomputational model of
cognitive control which retains some of the capabilities of symbolic systems,
in particular the ability to store procedures of behavior. I hypothesize that
the ability of neural networks to base their behavior on the contents of their
memory in addition to their overall structure will not only make them easier
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to build, but will make them more powerful by allowing them to apply their
own learning ability to the procedures they are executing.
To this end the following specific objectives guided this research.
1. Design and build a neural model of working memory using sequential
attractor networks. Specifically, augment the standard weights used with
an additional set of temporally asymmetric weights to allow an attractor
network to move from one basin of attraction to another in a particular
order. Test this model against human performance on the Running Span
task.
2. Using the techniques developed in achieving the first objective, construct
a multi-region model of cognitive control with dual memories: one for
sequences of external events and one for sequences of instructions for
completing the required task. Link these and other regions in the model
by gated connections, with the gates controlled by instruction memory
within the model itself. Validate this approach using models for both a
simple proof-of-concept task and the n-Back task. With respect to the
latter, the model should both match human performance and be flexible
enough to change which task condition it is performing during execution,
without any modification to model structure, parameters or weights.
3. Develop a visual system to extend the model from dealing with purely
abstract stimuli to those situated in a spatial environment. Split the
visual information about the external world into object and location
data (i.e., simulate ventral and dorsal visual pathways) and be able to
recombine and process it by binding the two sets of information together.
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This system is tested on a common childhood memory game against both
human subjects and a comparable symbolic model.
4. Extend the binding of object and location information from the previous
objective to handle multiple features, while also developing a system to
allow galis models to learn from their own experience based on binary
reinforcement signals from the environment. This is tested by creating a
network that performs the Wisconsin Card Sort Test on the basis of the
instructions it is given, testing to see whether it is able to perform at a
higher level after having taken the test several times.
1.3 Overview
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
background information about human working memory and neural network
models of it, neural networks for sequential processing more broadly, neural
models of cognitive control, and techniques used for gating and fast-weights.
Chapter 3 presents my model for sequential working memory using temporally
asymmetric weights. This technique underpins the overall galis model of
cognitive control, and the model of working memory provides an introduction
to both the types of tasks considered here and the methods used for them.
Chapter 4 presents galis models for two basic cognitive control tasks, both
using asymmetric weight attractor networks to store memories of external
stimuli and internal procedures. One of these tasks, the n-Back problem,
taken from cognitive psychology, is compared to human results from that
field. Chapter 5 discusses a galis model capable of binding ‘what’ and
‘where’ information together in order to carry out a memory test which requires
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proactive decisions in a visuospatial environment at the same level as human
subjects and a symbolic AI comparison model. Chapter 6 goes further by
presenting a galis model that can bind multiple features with different values
in another task from cognitive psychology — the Wisconsin Card Sort Test
(wcst) — and can perform this task at an increasing level as it gains experience.
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with a summary and discussion of the




This chapter briefly reviews a selection of prior research that is relevant to
the work in this dissertation. The chapter begins with a brief introduction
to working memory in humans. The following two sections describe some of
the neural network approaches which have been used for modeling working
memory specifically and cognitive control more broadly. The final two sections
of the chapter discuss neural network methods for sequence processing, and
the use of gating in neural networks.
2.1 The Nature of Human Working
Memory
Working memory is the ability to hold, monitor and manipulate information
needed for tasks in the mind (Durstewitz et al., 2000).1 Working memory is of
1 I use “working memory” to refer to the concept in Psychology and Cognitive Science,
which stands in contrast to the way the phrase is occasionally used in Artificial Intelli-
gence research for a database-like component which determines which production rules
will fire (Charniak et al., 2013). In this usage, the working memory is sometimes of
unlimited capacity, e.g., Forgy (1982) and Miranker (1987). See also Baddeley (2000a)
and Richardson et al. (1996), which both discuss the debated non-existence of capacity
limits in Newell and Simon’s influential 1972 work.
11
very limited capacity, short duration, and subject to both decay and interfer-
ence (Cowan et al., 2005); it must strike a balance between the ability to update
rapidly and the competing demand to remain fixed in the presence of spurious
or distracting information. The term was introduced by Miller et al. (1960) and
adopted by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) to differentiate between a unitary short
term memory store and the “three-component model” they introduced. This
model consists of three parts: the phonological loop, for handling sound and
language; the visuospatial sketchpad, for processing objects and locations; and
the central executive, serving as a control system (Baddeley, 2003). This tripar-
tite division has been widely adopted, with many offering further refinements
and divisions. The problem of how to store items in sequences is of particular
interest within the phonological loop. The visuospatial sketchpad has been
fractioned into two separate (Courtney et al., 1996; McCarthy et al., 1996;
Smith et al., 1995) but overlapping (Awh and Jonides, 2001) subparts, one for
objects and the other for spatial coding. The central executive plays numerous
potential roles, particularly the focusing, dividing and switching of attention
and the coordination between short term and long term memory. Baddeley’s
three-component model still underpins most of the research in computational
models of working memory (Baddeley, 2012; Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2003).
More recently Baddeley expanded his model by introducing a fourth com-
ponent, called the “episodic buffer” (Baddeley, 2000a). The episodic buffer
mediates between the other components of working memory and long-term
memory and serves to bind together information into coherent episodes. The
episodic buffer is also hypothesized to be under control of the central executive.
Not all theories of working memory subscribe to Baddley’s multi-component
model. Cowan’s “embedded process model” categorizes information into three
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hierarchical levels (Cowan, 1988, 1995). At the base there is all the information
in long-term memory, a subset of that is “active” at any point in time, either
consciously or not, and a subset of active information is being consciously
attended to. Working memory is not a separate function or apparatus, but the
set of “cognitive processes that retain information in an unusually accessible
state” (Cowan, 1999, p. 62). This is a qualitative model of working memory,
rather than a quantitative one from which detailed predictions can be made.
Several other models such as Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ics) and
Controlled Automatic Processing (cap2) take the opposite approach: rather
than positing a unified group of information and processing like Cowan, they
propose a proliferation of independent modules. The ics model (Barnard, 1985,
1999; Barnard and Teasdale, 1991) is built on a set of specialized subsystems,
each suited for a particular class of information such as acoustics or body
position. ics uses no centralized working memory or executive system. Barnard
claims that in theory each subsystem could be built using a neural network, but
that it would be computationally prohibitive. cap2 (Schneider, 1999; Schneider
and Chein, 2003; Schneider and Detweiler, 1987; Shedden and Schneider, 1990)
is a hybrid neural/symbolic model with a multitude of processing modules,
though it uses a purely symbolic executive system. cap2 is discussed further
in Section 2.3.
Working memory is distinct from long-term memory in several ways besides
its duration. While the capacity of long-term memory is effectively unbounded,
working memory has a very limited capacity, often of three to four items depend-
ing on the specific situation (Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005). Additionally,
long-term memory is driven by chemical synaptic change, especially long-term
potentiation. These synaptic changes occur over much longer time scales, often
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requiring repeated exposure to stimuli to form memories. In contrast, working
memory is generally viewed as being based on temporary electrical activity
patterns in neurons (Barak and Tsodyks, 2014; Dehaene and Changeux, 1989;
Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012; Zipser, 1991). Working memory capacity, unlike
that of long-term memory, is linked with general fluid intelligence (Conway
et al., 2002; Engle et al., 1999). Increased working memory capacity also has
implications for increased judgements of probabilities and ability to generate
alternative hypotheses (Dougherty and Hunter, 2003a,b).
Another key aspect of working memory is the need to balance rapid updating
vs. stable maintenance (Durstewitz et al., 2000; Goldman-Rakic, 1987). (This
is sometimes called the “stability-plasticity dilemma” in the neural networks
literature.) Long-term memories can be formed and updated very slowly.
However working memory must be plastic enough to respond rapidly to new
information yet stable enough to persist in the face of distraction. This is a
common issue that must be addressed when modeling working memory.
The pattern formed in working memory by an external stimulus can remain
active and stable even after the stimulus has been removed. In fact, such
patterns can remain stable in the presence of noise, or distracting stimuli.
The mechanism underlying this ability is unknown, though the most common
candidate is recurrent excitation within cell assemblies (Compte et al., 2000;
Zipser et al., 1993). Two other possibilities are “synfire chains,” which are
feedforward-connected loops of neurons (Diesmann et al., 1999), and single neu-
rons capable of bistable activity patterns (Guigon et al., 1995). (See Durstewitz
et al. (2000) for a review of these theories.)
Perhaps the most prominent method of resolving the simultaneous need for
flexibility and stability is to employ “active gating,” sometimes also known
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as “adaptive” or “dynamic” gating (Braver and Cohen, 2000; Frank et al.,
2001; O’Reilly et al., 1997, 2002). When such gates are open representations in
the working memory are free to update and when closed activity patterns are
protected from interference. This is captured in part by the lstm recurrent
neural network architecture, in which “memory cells” have nodes which can
close off their input or output as well as resetting the cell to “forget” the
value being remembered (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997). This enables a
memory cell to store values for an arbitrary length of time but also to change
stored values quickly. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the dopaminergic
system in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia is capable of modulating
behavior in a way very similar to active gating (Cohen and O’Reilly, 1996;
Hazy et al., 2007).
The previous section outlines some of the basic characteristics of human
working memory. Among these are a limited capacity, a short duration,
persistence in the absence of external stimulus or presence of distractions,
and the ability to rapidly update state. It is also widely hypothesized that
working memory is divided into functional components as well as being tightly
integrated with some sort of executive control processes, although the form of
the division as well as the nature of the executive are both debated. These
characteristics are all elements which should guide the construction of models
of working memory.
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2.2 Past Neural Network Models of
Working Memory
Attractor networks are often used to model working memory. Attractor net-
works are recurrent neural networks whose state dynamically shifts until settling
into a stable pattern, which may be fixed, cyclical, or chaotic. One such at-
tractor network model is that of Jones and Polk (2002), which uses real-valued
attractor networks for serial recall. One positive aspect of this model is the
degree to which it gives three important assumptions about neural cognition,
namely the use of intra-layer recurrent connections, distributed representations,
and Hebbian learning. Jones and Polk’s model is composed of three sections:
a “position” network, an “item” network, and a set of “association” networks.
The position network stores patterns representing ‘first,’ ‘second,’ and so on,
while the item networks trains the actual items being stored. A sequence is
stored by training the connections between the position and item networks. It
is the learned correlation between the position and item patterns which make
recall possible. The association networks exist to strengthen the attractors in
the item network through excitatory connections. Each association network is
responsible for the memory of a single possible item. For example, a model
which was tasked with remembering sequences of letters would have one associ-
ation network whose only memory is ‘A’, another whose sole memory is ‘B’,
and so on. This is the major weakness of this model: an additional layer is
needed for every item which might potentially be stored.
Kesner et al. (2000) identifies four uses for attractor networks in the brain.
These are: (i) short-term and working memory by maintaining activity patterns;
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(ii) separation or orthogonalization of input patterns; (iii) pattern association
through correlational learning, and; (iv) temporal pattern completion using
asymmetric connection strengths. My proposed work makes use of all four of
these. Note that temporal pattern completion is a form of pattern recognition
more generally, in that assembling a full sequence from partial subsequences is
way of restoring full patterns from partial or noisy versions, which attractor
networks are widely recognized to do.
It is worth mentioning two other notable models of working memory which
use local encoding, especially for the phonological loop and serial recall. One
is the “Competitive Queueing Model” (Burgess and Hitch, 1999), which repro-
duces a wide range of experimental findings about serial recall, but at the cost
of high complexity. This was simplified by the “Primacy Model” (Page and
Norris, 1998), which accounts for slightly less of the experimental observations
(such as grouping effects) but has the benefit of far fewer free parameters.
The “Start-End Model” (Henson, 1998) exceeds the explanatory power of the
Primacy Model, but requires that the list length be known in advance, which is
an unrealistic assumption since humans are more than capable of remembering
lists without prior knowledge of the list length, for instance in tasks such as
Running Memory Span (Bunting et al., 2006).
oscar is a model of working memory for phonological serial recall that does
use distributed representations, however its recall is governed by setting a collec-
tion of oscillatory timers to the same values they had when the items were first
trained, and it is unclear how this would function in a biological system (Brown
et al., 2000). Another drawback of oscar is shared by todam, which is also
a neural network model using distributed representations (Lewandowsky and
Murdock, 1989; Li and Lewandowsky, 1993). In order to output which item
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is being recalled both models must convert back into localist representations
in order to combat the noise that their associative memories generate as a
result of interference. Having to use modules with local codings of all possible
inputs somewhat undermines the use of distributed representations in the first
place. Additionally, none of the prior four models display much in the form
of a cognitive control system. Instead each is governed exogenously, being
commanded when to store items and when to switch to recall mode.
All of these approaches to working memory modeling thus far have had the
aim of representing or understanding biological cognitive systems. Pascanu and
Jaeger (2011) takes a different approach, building a working memory model for
use in a signal processing task. Their model is based on reservoir computing,
using an Echo State Network (Jaeger, 2001) augmented with special output
nodes they call “WM-units.” These nodes have trainable connections both from
the reservoir and between themselves, and fixed recurrent connections back to
the reservoir. The WM-units are used to keep track of the number of open curly
braces in a stream of handwritten text, while the standard output units identify
which letter is currently being presented. Since the distribution of characters in
the input stream is a function of the nesting level of the braces, the WM-units
provide valuable contextual information for the character recognition. This
is an interesting application of the concept of working memory since it fits
the commonly used cognitive definition — “the ability to transiently hold and
manipulate goal-related information to guide forthcoming action” (Durstewitz
et al., 2000) — even though the point of the model is not to do cognitive
modeling.
The models described above have several common limitations. The first
of these is a lack of internal cognitive control. They rely on some external
18
force to direct them to add items to memory or to recall them from memory.
Secondly, many of these models use local encoding, which is neither biologically
realistic, good at generalization, or able to scale well. Finally, even some of the
models which use distributed representations suffer from scaling problems since
they require additional units, and often whole additional layers, in order to
encode more values in memory. Basing galis on a network of gated sequential
attractor networks overcomes these limitations. galis’s control module is able
to guide the rest of the network’s activity in performance of the tasks it has
been trained on without relying on exogenous control instructions. Gating is
used not just as a method of balancing the stability and plasticity of working
memory representations, but also to direct the flow of information and the
shape of attractor landscapes. Finally, the attractor network approach frees
the model from having to devote additional substrate for each new item added
to memory since the attractor network can hold multiple patterns in memory.
2.3 Past Neural Models for Cognitive
Control
Compared to artificial neural networks, symbolic AI systems excel at modeling
executive behaviors like decision making due to the ease with which they can
do things like searching, representing working memory, and variable binding.
And yet biological neural systems are completely capable of these sorts of
executive functions. This section outlines some of the attempts to build neural
networks which are capable of performing tasks requiring cognitive control. In
addition to the benefits of bringing the capabilities of the neural paradigm
closer in line with the symbolic one, and potentially shedding light on some of
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the more mysterious, higher functions of human cognition, exploring neural
network models of goal-directed behavior has another advantage. By improving
on some of the inherent weaknesses of neural systems one could make better
use of some of their strengths, such as their natural facility with generalization
or partial pattern matching.
One of the dominant forms of non-neural cognitive models is the “produc-
tion system,” exemplified by such architectures as act-r (Anderson, 1996;
Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998). Production systems take
the form of if-then rules. Productions are activated or “fired” whenever their
preconditions are met. While powerful, the current symbolic implementations
of such systems have little basis in biological reality and map poorly onto the
known functioning and structure of the brain. Neurally-based architectures
have some other advantages over symbolic ones besides their correspondence to
biological systems. For instance, neural networks can deal with partial matches
with ease. Neural representations are also easier to learn than symbolic ones,
since the “discrete and fragile” nature of the latter causes them to be more
brittle, making iterative improvements to representations difficult (O’Reilly
and Busby, 2002, §2.1).
There have been several efforts to bridge the gap between symbolic and
neural systems. cap2 is a hybrid system, using both neural components,
such as associative memories, and symbolic components, such as buffers and
production rules (Schneider, 1999; Schneider and Chein, 2003; Schneider and
Detweiler, 1987; Shedden and Schneider, 1990). It is difficult to tell how much
of each paradigm is used, since the executive system is described as potentially
being an Elman-style Simple Recurrent Network but also described elsewhere
as being implemented as a symbolic rule system (Schneider and Oliver, 1989,
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p. 7). Other control modules, such as the “Episodic Store,” are also symbolic.
What neural modules are used are trained with Error Backpropagation. One
of the key control modules, the “Goal Processor,” is inherently sequential, like
that of galis. It influences the operation of other modules by adjusting gain
parameters, which can be seen as a primitive form of gating. Details on how
the system operates are scant, however.
act-rn took a different approach to reconciling neural and symbolic pro-
duction system by attempting to re-implement act-r with neural components
while maintaining the same overall organization and operation (Lebiere and
Anderson, 1993). act-rn required an extra node for every “chunk” of infor-
mation in its declarative memory as well as an extra node for every production
rule it knew. As a result of these and other drawbacks act-rn has been
declared to be “not of practical use” by its own creators (Jilk et al., 2008,
p. 202). One interesting aspect of act-rn is the way it handled goals in a
real-valued Hopfield memory. When a subgoal is identified the goal memory
learns the subgoal’s correlation with the current goal. When the current goal
is complete, this correlation can be used to retrieve the parent goal. The
correlation between the two is then unlearned, returning the goal memory to
roughly the same state it had before the subgoal was added.
act-rn was not unique in mimicking the structure of a symbolic production
system using neural building blocks rather than crafting the architecture from
a neural perspective from the start. One such endeavor was the Distributed
Connectionist Production System (dcps), which was built as a demonstration
that a coarsely-coded neural network can implement a restricted set of simple
production rules, including a limited amount of variable binding (Touretzky
and Hinton, 1988). This is achieved through a set of five modules, four of which
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are a modified form of Boltzmann machines. The memory module is composed
of simple latches, and these nodes do no computation of their own. The other
four — used to isolate particular clauses in the production rules, represent
the current rule and bind variables between clauses — all employ competitive
dynamics. The connections in and between modules were hard-coded into
the network rather than being trained. Additionally the system contained no
control elements: all executive functioning was external to the model.
dcps was later the basis of a connectionist model for symbol processing
named “BoltzCons” (Touretzky, 1990). BoltzCons is similar to dcps in
structure but it is designed for manipulating Lisp-style data structures and
symbol processing rather than production rules. Using competition between
nodes BoltzCons implements associative memory version of linked lists, stacks
and trees. Also like dcps all connections are hardwired in advance and
executive function is exogenous.
There have been attempts at building neural models capable of implementing
production system-style rules that do not mimic the top-level functioning and
organization of symbolic architectures (Kiela, 2011; Kriete et al., 2013; Lamb,
2008; Townsend et al., 2014). One such a system is given by Simen et al. (2010),
which uses leaky integrator nodes to represent populations of neurons (see also
Simen and Polk, 2009). By setting the weights on the recurrent self-connections
of these nodes to wii > 1.0 they behave like bistable switches. The discrete
behavior of these switches can then be used to build assemblies which implement
a production rule. The input weights to the assembly recognize the antecedent
of the rule, and the switch node can then be flipped on or off to signify the
consequent. One drawback of this system is that it requires one assembly for
every rule in the system. Another problem is that there is no known learning
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rule to learn the appropriate connection strengths, so the system must be
hard-wired by hand.
In contrast to the attempts to replicate production system architectures
with neural building blocks, Dehaene and Changeux (1997) presented an all-
neural model, sometimes called dc97, capable of solving Towers of London
problems. The network is organized into three hierarchical levels, one each
for “gestures,” such as pointing to a location, “operations,” such as moving a
particular disk, and “plans,” for higher level abstraction such as determining if
a goal condition has been met. The patterns in each layer are kept stable by a
combination of competitive dynamics and recurrent excitation. One criticism
of dc97 is that it uses a very local conjunctive coding scheme, which is both
undesirable from the perspective of biological fidelity and can lead to problems
of combinatorial explosion as more entities must be encoded. dc97 also has
no learning procedure, making it hard-wired for performing only Towers of
London tasks; it is incapable of generalizing to even similar problems such as
Towers of Hanoi.
Polk et al. (2002) also criticized dc97 for being “method-specific” because
it implements only greedy depth-first searches of the state space, albeit with
some look-ahead capability. In that paper, Polk et al. present their own model
of the Towers of London task, which is built around Hopfield networks. Each
variable used in the model gets its own Hopfield net, and each network is trained
using Hebbian learning so that all possible values of the corresponding variable
are attractor states of the network. Production rules are then implemented
by training the connections between the antecedent and consequent variables’
networks. For instance, a rule if color=red then size=medium would involve
connections from the color network to the size network which biases the latter
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towards the medium state whenever the former is near the attractor red. This
system can accommodate goals by introducing extra biases on the consequent
networks which further deforms the attractor landscape, enlarging the attractor
basins corresponding to the desired outcomes. The major drawback with this
system is that it requires a layer of nodes for every variable. This both scales
poorly with task complexity and locks the model in to representing just the
task it was designed for.
Another alternative to the depth-first search of dc97 goal-seeking is the
approach of Schmajuk and Thieme (1992). It was built for maze navigation,
but can be applied to any problem describable by a directed state graph. Their
model is divided in two components, the “cognitive system,” which builds a
topological map of the space by linking adjacent locations, and the “action
system,” to handle action selection. The cognitive map builds heteroassociative
correlations between “places” and “views,” which are the locations immediately
adjacent to the current place. These associations are then used to make
predictions about what the results of taking certain paths will be. It is possible
to make long-range predictions by feeding the output view back in to the map
as a place and repeating the process.
Schmajuk and Thieme’s model has a particularly interesting property: it
exhibits “latent learning,” which is the ability to learn about the environment
in the absence of any reinforcing rewards (Tolman and Honzik, 1930). If it
is allowed to wander through a maze without any reward being present at
the goal it still builds a cognitive map of the environment. Then when it
is re-introduced to the maze with a reward present it is able to act on the
knowledge previously acquired. Few models are able to successfully learn both
with and without reward signals.
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Many control architectures fall prey to a homuncular fallacy: their proposed
solutions to the problem of cognitive control themselves require an external
controller (van Veen and Carter, 2006). If the controller itself needs to be
controlled, as if driven by a homunculus, then as many questions are raised as
answered: what is controlling the homunculus? Addressing this issue was the
motivation behind the pbwm model (O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). It combines
modules inspired by the prefrontal cortex and subcortical structures, especially
the basal ganglia, using actively gated connections to implement an actor-
critic architecture for reinforcement learning. This method, called the pvlv
algorithm (“primary value, learned value”), is inspired by Pavlovian learning
in psychology and is an alternative to TD-learning (O’Reilly et al., 2007, 2014;
but see Houk, 2007). It is used to enable the basal ganglia module to learn
when to gate connections.
Though this learning system goes a long way to sidestepping the problems of
homuncular control by allowing the control dynamics to emerge, the architecture
used for these models is very hard-wired to the particular task at hand and
relies on conjunctive, local representations. For instance, in their model of the
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (wcst) there is a single prefrontal cortex (pfc)
node each for the shape and line dimensions, and the ventral tegmental area
was represented by another solitary node (O’Reilly et al., 2002; Rougier et al.,
2005). O’Reilly and colleagues have made occasional efforts to address this
reliance on local representation, such as O’Reilly and Busby (2002). However,
three of the six modules in that model still used local representation. In the
modules that did use distributed representations, objects were encoded by
activating just two of eight nodes, rather than the one of eight that would be
used for local encoding.
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galis differs from pbwm in several ways. First of all, pbwm uses firing
rate neurons, while galis uses a more abstract paradigm in which each node
represents the combined, often binary activity of a group of neurons. Secondly,
galis makes a stronger commitment to distributed representations. pbwm
and galis also differ in their approach to gating. pbwm’s gates are based
on the binary state of an intra-node latch, while gates in galis modulate
the input entering a node using continuous values. pbwm uses gating for
shielding the contents of working memory from update, while galis uses
gating for controlling flow of information between modules more generally,
including inputs, outputs, and biasing attractor networks, in addition to
updating working memory. Finally, it is my goal for galis to require fewer
task-specific changes to its architecture than pbwm does.
The pbwm model of Chatham et al. (2011) is a particular contrast to the
work I present in Section 4.3. The authors present a model of a sequential
memory task called n-Back, but the inputs to their model consist of both
the letter to be remembered and that letter’s serial order.2 So while the
galis model described in this dissertation receives a stream of stimuli such
as ASDFSG. . . no matter what the value of n is, Chatham et al.’s pbwm
model receives A1S2D1F2 S1G2. . . if it is supposed to perform 2-back but
A1S2D3F1 S2G3. . . if the task is 3-back. Structuring the inputs this way
removes some of the burden from the model to determine which prior stimuli
the current one should be compared to. In addition, it uses an iterative
approach to training, while galis use one-shot Hebbian learning. Further, the
PBWM model prevents interference between memories by learning to explicitly
over-write old memories with the new ones which occur at the same position in
2 q.v. § 4.3 for an explanation of n-Back.
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the period (so that, for instance, G3 displaces D3 in the example above), while
galis uses weight decay and Hebbian unlearning to minimize interference
from older, irrelevant stimuli.
Kaplan et al. (2006) developed a biologically-motivated model of cognitive
control for the wcst which used a Hopfield network as a working memory
and gating to control maintenance and updating. Though it was capable of
modifying behavior in response to feedback from the environment, it is limited
by its extremely small size and local encoding: the entire working memory was
composed of only four nodes.
Morton and Munakata (2001) present a neural network model of cognitive
control which adopts an “active-latent account,” dividing control mechanisms
and memory into two types. Active representations in the pfc can overcome
habituated, latent ones in the posterior cortex. Morton and Munakata link
active representations to activity patterns which can be maintained even in
the absence of their antecedent stimulus, and latent representations to weight
changes. Flexibility of control is related to the relative strengths of active and
latent representations. Their model generalizes well, being able to model both
the wcst and a verbal interpretation task with minimal architectural changes,
but representations are extremely localized.
There is neuroanatomical evidence of “loops” running from the pfc to the
basal ganglia to the thalamus and back to the pfc. These loops have been the
subject of various models, for instance Amos (2000) assigns the pfc module
to maintain information including the most recent stimulus and the currently
operative rule, and the basal ganglia modules to integration of pfc outputs
and gating possible actions. (The thalamus serves as an output in this model,
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as it does not project back to the cortical layer.) It also uses local coding, with
one neuron per feature-value pair in the wcst.
Another loop-based model is Monchi and Taylor (1999), which presents a
spiking neuron model designed specifically to align with fMRI data (Monchi
et al., 2001). While the architecture used can be fairly easily adapted to both
Delayed Response Tasks (Petrides, 1994) and the wcst, which shows some
versatility, it is both locally coded and hard-wired to the task selected, with
all weights and connections set by hand, without learning algorithms. This
model can also be artificially “lesioned” in order to study such neurological
abnormalities as schizophrenia and Parkinson’s disease (Monchi, 2000).
Dehaene et al. (1998) created a neural model of cognitive control for the
Stroop task based around a “global workspace” for effortful mental operations.
This is a limited implementation of Baars’ global workspace theory (Baars,
1983, 2002), which revolves around consciousness and awareness. Dehaene et
al. postulate two different types of computational “spaces”: specialized ones
for roles like perception and motor control, and a general space to mobilize
or suppress the specialized modules. This formation also relies heavily on a
gating concept, with only some nodes of some modules being granted access
to the global workspace. Using semi-supervised learning, this model can
learn to perform the Stroop task without any special rule coding units or
pre-programmed behaviors. However, once again local encoding were used
and the architecture is specific to Stroop. Furthermore, once the network has
learned to perform Stroop, it could not learn another task.
The problem of action selection recurs in all executive systems. Many neural
network approaches are based on Gurney et al. (2001a,b), which deals with a
model of action selection based on the basal ganglia (e.g., Beiser and Houk,
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1998; Frank, 2005; Stewart and Eliasmith, 2011). A signal is selected through
an off-center, on-surround pattern of activation caused by the combination
of diffuse excitatory connections with concentrated, topographic inhibitory
connections. (Off-center, on-surround is the opposite arrangement of that
used for typically used for selecting winners, such as in self-organizing maps.
However the basal ganglia have inhibitory output so it is the least active signal
which designates the action to be selected as low basal ganglia output will
lead to disinhibition of the corresponding action.) Interestingly, the selected
action is output twice: once to the pfc via the thalamus, so that it may be
acted upon, and once back to the basal ganglia. It is hypothesized that this
second output is used to adjust the action selection process itself, but the exact
mechanism for this is unclear.
In order to select from a set of actions it is necessary to have already
learned something about them and their expected outcomes. Fortunately, the
basal ganglia has also been linked to a reinforcement learning process (Barto,
1995; Cohen, 2008; Rivest et al., 2004). There is a particularly close alignment
possible between the actor-critic model of TD-learning (Sutton, 1988) and the
functioning of the basal ganglia.3 By adding in circuits analogous to cortical
regions, Botvinick et al. (2009) recently built a model capable of “hierarchical
reinforcement learning,” which allows the network to learn reusable subroutines
called “options.” This temporal abstraction is very helpful for alleviating the
temporal credit assignment problem.
The actor-critic framework is not the only version of TD-learning linked
to the basal ganglia. Walsh and Anderson (2010) examine three differed TD-
3 There is an impressive degree of correspondence between the actor and the dorsolateral
striatum and between the critic and the ventral striatum and dopaminergic system (Doya,
1999).
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learning models, actor-critic, Q-learning and sarsa, all of which are supported
by different neural evidence. (Respectively, neuroimaging studies (O’Doherty
et al., 2004), dopamine levels in rats (Roesch et al., 2007), and single cell
readings in monkeys (Morris et al., 2006).) It was Walsh and Anderson’s opinion
that the Q-learning model accounted best for both neural and behavioral data.
Finally, it is worth noting the work of Eliasmith and colleagues (Eliasmith,
2013; Eliasmith et al., 2012). They have built models of numerous tasks using
spiking neuron implementations of Holographic Reduced Representations (hrr;
Plate, 1995, 2003b), which is a type of Vector Symbolic Architecture (vsa;
Gayler, 2003). VSAs represent symbols as high dimensional vectors, such
as points on a unit hypersphere. Individual vectors can be combined in two
different ways, superposition (+) and binding (⊗). The superposition of
two vectors is accomplished through vector addition and gives a result which
is similar to both operands. The binding operation is done with circular
convolution and gives a result which is dissimilar to both operands. In addition,
there is an approximate inverse function (∗) which allows vectors to be unbound.
All of these operations can be computed with spiking neural networks, but
there is no learning rule to do so. Rather, the appropriate weight matrices are
determined analytically in advance and hard-coded into the system (Eliasmith
and Anderson, 2003). Crucially, all of these operation produce outputs which are
the same dimensionality as their inputs. This allows operations to be combined
to produce structured representations, such as attribute-value bindings. For
instance, a binding of X to attribute A1 and Y to A2 could be represented by
a vector R = A1 ⊗X + A2 ⊗ Y . To get the value of A1, simply bind R with
the inverse A∗1.
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This general system has been used for the Wason card task (Eliasmith,
2005), sequence memory (Choo and Eliasmith, 2010), production rules (Stewart
et al., 2010), Raven’s Matrices (Rasmussen and Eliasmith, 2010), and Towers
of Hanoi (Stewart and Eliasmith, 2011). While this is a very impressive
range of complex problems this approach is capable of addressing, there are
some weaknesses as well. One of these has been mentioned already: there
is no learning rule to produce the transformations necessary for the binding,
superposition and inverse operations. Another is related to recovering values
from attribute-value bindings. Binding with the inverse of the attribute yields
only an approximation of the value being sought. Recovering the actual value
requires a “cleanup memory” (Stewart et al., 2011) to remove excess noise. In
order to do this the cleanup memory must be pre-trained with all the atomic
symbols that could potentially be recognized, limiting the model to a distinct
vocabulary of symbols. Furthermore, there needs to be a separate set of nodes
dedicated to recognizing each symbol in memory. There are other aspects
of several of these models which requires the size of the model to scale up
in proportion to behavioral complexity. For instance, each rule necessary to
perform the Towers of Hanoi task needs its own assembly of nodes. Finally,
these models entail a great deal of computational complexity. The Towers of
Hanoi model, for instance, uses 150,640 leaky-integrate-and-fire spiking nodes,
each of which processes a 128-dimensional vector.
Unlike the models discussed at the beginning of this section, namely act-
rn, dcps and BoltzCons, galis is not attempting to recreate a symbolic
architecture with neural components. Neither is it a hybrid model, using both
neural and symbolic systems when convenient, like cap2. Rather, galis
is an attempt to model executive function from the ground-up, drawing on
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neurobiology rather than production systems for inspiration. Many similar
neural models of cognitive control, such as dc97, the work of Simen and Polk,
and that of Eliasmith and colleagues, suffer from a common problem related
to scaling. Each of these systems requires an additional set of nodes for every
stimulus (e.g., Jones and Polk, 2002; Stewart et al., 2011) or rule (e.g., Simen
et al., 2010; Stewart and Eliasmith, 2011) the model must respond to. This
leads to several issues. The first is a computational problem, because such
models scale poorly to more complex tasks and environments. The second
is the conflict that arises with what we know of biological neural networks,
which make heavy re-use of substrate (Anderson, 2010). The third is the
brittleness this introduces to the model. The designer must know in advance
how many symbols will be in the input set, or how many actions will be required
to perform the task. galis avoids these issues by not requiring such linear
increases in the neural substrate with every additional behavior.
There is another common limitation of biologically-inspired models of
cognitive control, such as those O’Reilly and colleagues as well as the work
of Dehaene et al. (1998), which is a that they are very specific to the task
being modeled. This hard-wired nature is often combined with, or sometimes
a consequence of, the local, conjunctive encoding schemes used. galis relies
on distributed representations and a more general architecture which should
minimize the number of changes needed to model different tasks. This also
allows other advantages of distributed representations included ease of learning
and noise resistance.
galis does not yet incorporate features of the many models which use
analogs of the basal ganglia or thalamocortical loops for action selection or
reinforcement learning. However, this could be added in future expansions.
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None of the models which do use these subcortical approaches are coupled
with attractor networks like galis is. Other authors take the basal ganglia
and thalamic nuclei to be the locus of gating activity, but gating can also be
seen to be a result of interactions between these subcortical elements and the
cortex. At least for the time being I am abrogating these biological details and
treating gating as if it were a cortical function (indirectly, via a subcortical
mechanism), making the basal ganglia and thalamus implicit in galis.
Finally, I believe galis is unique in using a memory not just to store a
record of past inputs, but also storing the instructions needed to execute a
task. Many models have weight matrices which encode the mappings necessary
for a task, but as far as I know none of them encode the task instructions
in the states of nodes. By processing both memories of inputs and memories
of procedures using the same techniques galis adopts a form of code-data
equivalence.
As a consequence of this explicit task memory, galis learns to perform
tasks rather than having behaviors hard-coded into the model itself. Because
different behaviors result from different instruction memories, which in turn
result from different training data, there is much more possibility for generality
and flexibility. For instance, galis should be useful in studying transfer effects
between tasks, since the difference between two models of different tasks will
lie primarily in the contents of their instruction memories and less in their
architecture, making them much more comparable.
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2.4 Past Neural Networks for Sequence
Processing
This section is limited to just those studies which are relevant to either the
subject of my work (executive functions of cognition) or the methods I employ
(principally temporally asymmetric learning). For a more comprehensive review,
see Kremer (2001).
Within the psychological domain neural networks have become a major
way to model serial recall (Brown et al., 2000; Burgess et al., 1999; Page and
Norris, 1998; Pascanu and Jaeger, 2011; Ponzi, 2008; Verduzco-Flores et al.,
2012). However, these models do not agree on a unified theoretical perspective.
The most common approaches can be divided into inter-item, ordinal and
positional theories (Henson and Burgess, 1997). The latter two approaches are
sometimes called “context-based” accounts. Inter-item models associate items
in the sequence with each other and manage recall by “connecting the dots”
between consecutive items. For this reason the most common of these theories
are called “chaining” models. Ordinal models such as Page and Norris’ (1998)
Primacy Model store sequences along a single dimension such as the overall
strength of their representation, so that the first item is the most active, the
second item is the next most active, and so on. Positional models associate
items with some context information such as a unique pattern indicating its
ordinal position (Anderson and Matessa, 1997), its relative distance from the
start or end of the list (Henson, 1998; Houghton, 1990), or the state of an
oscillatory neural timer at the moment the item was presented (Brown et al.,
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2000; Burgess et al., 1999). These three subtypes of positional models are
called absolute, relative and temporal, respectively.
Inter-item accounts, typically based on recurrent neural networks, have
better support from the neuroscience data, but context-based accounts have
better support from the behavioral data. The recurrent neural network model
of Botvinick and Plaut (2006) is an attempt to reconcile this by creating
an inter-item system that matches some important behavioral observations
which earlier chaining accounts could not. While it does meet this goal, it
does so using Backpropagation Through Time with teacher forcing, which
is not very biologically plausible. Botvinick and Plaut’s method is to train
a modified Simple Recurrent Network to store and echo back any sequences
to which it is exposed. The stimuli presented during trials are represented
only by the network’s activity and not by its connection weights. Rather
than the network’s weights learning the particular sequence as it is presented,
they learn the behavior “store this sequence and then repeat it as output,”
in advance over the course of tens of thousands of training samples. Note
that local encodings are used for the input and output, though not for the
internal, hidden representations. The authors claim that the local encoding
is not necessary, but it is unclear to what degree the model relies on it. If
distributed representations were used it is possible that a prohibitive amount of
training would be required because of the concomitant increase in the number
of potential patterns that the network would have to learn to process (Plate,
2003a).
As mentioned previously, attractor networks are commonly used to model
working memory (e.g., Maniadakis et al., 2012). While this approach is effective
and has generated substantial theoretical and experimental analysis, it is
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typically limited to maintaining only a single pattern at a time in short-term
memory. This restriction makes sequence processing difficult. In response
to these and other concerns, a number of oscillatory memory models have
been created and studied during the last several years. In these models,
items in memory are typically represented as rhythmic network activity in
which multiple memory patterns are simultaneously present in the same neural
substrate. This is possible because the networks activity oscillates between
activity states representing different stored patterns.
A diverse set of oscillatory memory models exists. Some are based on theo-
ries about the mechanisms underlying theta/gamma activity in specific brain
regions such as the hippocampus or neocortex (Hasselmo et al., 2002; Ingber,
1995; Koene and Hasselmo, 2007; Lisman and Idiart, 1995), others use individ-
ual spiking neurons (Raffone and Wolters, 2001), while still others have adopted
more abstract approach such as Wilson-Cowan oscillators (Chakravarthy and
Ghosh, 1996; Hayashi, 1994; Wang, 1995).
A particularly simple and elegant approach to creating oscillatory sequence-
processing memories is based on minimally modifying Hebbian associative
memories having fixed-point attractor states so that they become oscillatory.
For example, Horn and Usher (1991, 1992) produced a simple oscillatory
memory by introducing “dynamic thresholds” into Hopfield networks (Amit,
1989; Hopfield, 1982). With this approach, whenever a node has a particular
activity level±1, the threshold of that node gradually changes so that eventually
the node switches its activity level to the complementary value. When such a
network is presented with an input that is a superposition of multiple stored
memories, it oscillates between activity states that represent these individual
memories, thereby indicating its recall of the memories in parallel. Similar
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behaviors have been produced based upon Hopfield networks modified to use
dynamic synapses (Pantic et al., 2002) or negative feedback with asymmetric
connection weights (Brown et al., 2000).
Horn and Usher’s approach was extended by Winder et al. (2009) and
Reggia et al. (2009) to include rapid decay of connection weights. This weight
decay allows the network’s activation to be influenced by the order in which
stimuli are presented, something that is not the case with classical Hopfield
networks. While the combination of dynamic thresholds and decay enabled
networks to match the position-specific recall rates of human subjects, the
order in which the stimuli were recalled by the model was arbitrary.
The Serial-Order-in-a-Box (sob) model is an alternate approach to storing
sequences in attractor networks (Farrell and Lewandowsky, 2002). Items are
stored using decreasing learning rates, so that the earlier an item appears in
the sequences the larger its basin of attraction will be. When the network is
put in a random state, it is likely to be drawn to the first, largest basin. Rather
than using dynamic thresholds to induce a transition to another attractor,
the networks weights are adjusted after each item is recalled to suppress
the most recently recollected pattern. This adjustment of weights after each
item is recalled has several drawbacks, including making rehearsal difficult.
Additionally, sob requires that items be represented by orthogonal patterns.
One technique that has been used to capture sequential patterns is tempo-
rally asymmetric weights (Abbott and Blum, 1991; Blum and Abbott, 1996;
Rao and Sejnowski, 2001). This is a Hebbian learning process which bases
connection strengths not on the correlation between concurrent activity in
pairs of nodes, but on the consecutive activity of those nodes. That is, learning
is based on a the correlation between the current activity and other nodes’
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activity during the prior time step. Often these models deal with the timing of
spike trains in spiking neuron models (e.g., Abbott and Song, 1999; Gerstner
et al., 1993). Rao and Sejnowski (2001) and Dayan (2002) also link asymmetric
weights to temporal difference learning. These studies have support in recent
neural experimental evidence (Bi and Poo, 1998, 2001; Markram et al., 1997;
Zhang et al., 1998).
Schulz and Reggia (2004) took a very different approach, modifying a self-
organizing map (som) to represent sequential information using temporally
asymmetric weights. The input to each node in the map is a function of the
current stimulus as well as the activity state which resulted from the previous
inputs. Weight updates are defined in such a way as to correlate these two
components of input using one-shot Hebbian learning. This is one of several
modifications made to soms to enable sequence processing, and many of the
other approaches are reviewed in that paper.
Hoshino et al. (1997) also adopt an approach using temporally asymmetric
Hebbian learning, but do not use it to form a separate weight matrix. Rather,
weights are generating using the sum of both standard and asymmetric Hebbian
learning components. This technique is used to form networks whose dynamics
take the form of “itinerant attractors,” in which the network’s state moves in
state space between different attractor basins, each one of which represents
one stored pattern (Tsuda, 2001). By adjusting the relative contributions of
the symmetric and asymmetric learning, the network will either move between
attractors in the order they were trained or in a random order, like sob. One
drawback of this approach is that the weight matrix must be modified in order
to induce a transition from one basin to another. This is done by reducing
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the size of the current attractor basin using anti-Hebbian learning so that the
network transitions into a different one.
Dealing with sequence processing is central to galis, since neither percep-
tions nor actions occur in isolation, but rather are inextricably embedded in the
sequence of perceptions and actions which occur around them (Elman, 1990).
Just as some AI researchers focus on agents situated in physical environments,
I believe cognition must be situated in a temporal environment. I approach
this serial nature of cognition by integrating methods used in many of the
models discussed in this section. I adopt an inter-item approach, exemplified
by psychological research such as that of Botvinick and Plaut’s, in contrast
the the context-based approaches of many qualitative models. However, I
expand on Botvinick and Plaut’s work by using distributed representations and
correlational learning, which are both more biologically plausible, less fragile,
and better able to generalize than the local representations they employ. I
also draw on attractor network models like sob, as well as the past work in
computer science and neuroscience in using temporally asymmetric learning to
process sequences. By combining these methods with attractor networks I can
harness their ability to generalize and restore full patterns from incomplete
versions and use this to build robust representations of sequences.
2.5 Fast Weights & Gating
Error backpropagation is a very successful type of artificial neural network
learning technique, shown to achieve both high accuracy and good general-
ization capability on many tasks. However, there is very little evidence for
error propagation signals in biological neural networks. Additionally, back-
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propagation is by nature a slow training method, requiring highly repeated
iterative presentation of each training stimulus. As such, it makes a poor model
for biological short term working memory, which does not require long-term,
repeated exposure of a stimulus in order to insert it into memory. Indeed,
working memory is defined in part by its ability to be rapidly updated. It is
important, therefore, to examine other neural network models which allow for
near instant training and fast updating of weights.
The most commonly known technique in this category is “one shot” Hebbian
learning. This is a learning technique often used in Hopfield networks to form
associative memories (Hopfield, 1982). Only a single presentation is required to
store a stimulus in memory. The downside to this rapid storage is that stored
stimuli can interfere with previous memories, especially if multiple stimuli are
sufficiently similar. As a result Hopfield networks have a small but variable
memory capacity, with capacity being a function of the particular items being
stored and the network size. This restriction is not unlike biological working
memory however.
One of the earliest fast-weight paradigms is presented by Hinton and Plaut
(1987). Their system had two weights on every connection, both trained by
error backpropagation. One would have a much higher learning rate than the
other, however, resulting in much faster adjustments. The effective weight
at any point in time would simply be the sum of the fast and slow weights.
Hinton and Plaut outline several applications, but concentrate on presenting a
method for reducing the interference that training a network on new patterns
has on the patterns already stored. This is an interesting concept, but the “fast
weights” are really only fast in comparison to the slow ones from this model,
as they still trained over hundreds of epochs.
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Kak has developed a neural network paradigm requiring only a single
training step for each input called the “Corner Classification” method (Kak,
1993, 1998, 1999).4 The training method for CC networks requires only a
single pass through the training data with minimal computation at each step
to determine connection strengths. The major drawback is that a distinct
hidden node is required for each training sample. Such local representation
is reminiscent of “grandmother cells,” and a large number of nodes would be
required for a complicated problem domain. (Note that training is very quick in
relation to the number of nodes, so large networks are more feasible than they
would be using a different training method.) CC networks can generalize but
only within a fixed-width hypercube around each training sample. Additionally
the radius of generalization is constant for the entire network. Finally, CC
networks operate only on binary data, and are best at two class discrimination
problems, though tasks with more classes can be handled by building several
networks in parallel, each of which is trained to recognize a single class.
More recently Kak extended CC networks to a model called “Fast Classifier
Networks” which allow for real-valued input and different degrees of generaliza-
tion in different subregions of the input space (Kak, 2002; Tang and Kak, 2002).
FC nets retain the ability to train quickly, though they need two passes through
the training data rather than one. The first is used to sets weights in the
network and the second is used to determine what the radius of generalization
will be for each hidden node. The requirement for a hidden node per training
sample is retained. The other major change is the addition of a “Rule Base,”
4 This is not to be confused with the corner classification problem, a data set used to test
neural networks. Roughly speaking, Kak’s corner classification method converts every
problem into an instance of the corner classification problem, and so the problem and
the method share a name.
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making FC nets a hybrid connectionist-symbolic model. The function of the
Rule Base, which contains only two rules, is to determine whether the network
will act according a single nearest neighbor or a k-nearest neighbor model when
evaluating each test sample. The former occurs when the test stimulus is within
the generalization region of a hidden node, otherwise the latter is used. As
such FC networks are a connectionist implementation of the statistical nearest
neighbor technique, and gain their fast training time in a similar way to the
“lazy” method of nearest neighbor techniques.
The Restricted Boltzmann Machine is similar to a stochastic version of
Hopfield nets in that they are associative, energy minimizing networks. The
rbm has also been interpreted as a Product of Experts model, with each hidden
node in the rbm being equivalent to one expert (Hinton, 2002). Tieleman
and Hinton (2009) proposed a training technique for rbms which incorporated
the rbm’s usual, slowly changing weights with a supplementary set of fast
weights which learn and decay more rapidly. Only the standard weights are
used to define the energy landscape the network is acting within, while the
fast weights are used to define a temporary “overlay” on that landscape. The
Markov Chain Monte Carlo method which is used to sample the network’s state
for training purposes then operates on this temporary overlay. The energy
landscape defined by the normal, slow weights is updated gradually and with
decreasing velocity, allowing the network to settle into an attractor basin. The
landscape of the fast weights is more dynamic, allowing the mcmc sampling
to converge closer to the probability distribution of the network quickly.
“Competitive activation dynamics” is an alternative to lateral inhibitory con-
nections for inducing competition between nodes in connectionist models (Cho
and Reggia, 1993; Reggia et al., 1992, 1988). Rather than using internode
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connections which explicitly act to create inhibition, this paradigm allows
nodes to compete with each other for the activation of upstream nodes. Thus,
a node’s input is not just dependent on its inputs and associated connection
strengths, but also on its own current activity. This creates a “rich-get-richer”
dynamic in which activation is allocated to one or a few winning nodes and
drained from others. This can be accomplished by having two sets of connection
strengths: a set of fixed “resting weights” and another set of “fast weights”
which are redefined every time step (Reggia and Edwards, 1990).
Schmidhuber (1992) presented a technique for fast weights involving two
parallel feedforward networks. One network — called the “fast” network —
is trained to associate the desired inputs and outputs, as usual, while the
second network — the “slow” network — is trained to adjust the weights
of the fast network. The slow network’s outputs are the weight changes
the fast network requires to properly map inputs to outputs. This allows
extremely rapid updating of the fast network’s weights, allowing for high levels
of plasticity and dynamic response, but without upsetting the stability of the
overall system, because the slow network’s weights are still comparatively static
and stable. This slow network/fast network arrangement makes possible a form
of temporary variable binding, which is a problem artificial neural networks
often struggle with. The weights within the fast network bind the inputs,
acting as variable addresses or slots, to the outputs, acting as the potential
values of the variables. The slow network acts as a controller to rapidly update
which fast network outputs (values) are responsive to which fast network inputs
(addresses), thereby changing the value of the stored variable. This technique
was also used to evolve controllers for a difficult pole-balancing task (Gomez
and Schmidhuber, 2005).
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Schmidhuber’s fast weight networks can be seen as a precursor to the Long
Short-Term Memory (Bakker, 2002; Gers and Schmidhuber, 2000; Hochreiter
and Schmidhuber, 1997). The Long Short-Term Memory (lstm) is a recurrent
network for sequential memory which relies on gating. It combines fast training
and efficient learning using a specific architecture. The key feature of this
architecture is a hidden layer composed of “memory blocks.” Each block
has three gates: one controls input to the block, another controls output,
and another wipes the state of the block (Gers et al., 2000). These gates
allow units’ effects to be changed very rapidly in response to inputs. lstm
training possesses two important properties: locality in both space and time,
meaning that weight updates are not dependent on global information about
the network nor on information from arbitrarily far in the past. However, this
lstm learning procedure can only be used on the very specific architectures,
in particular lstm networks can not have multiple hidden layers in parallel.
Recently, a generalized version of lstm, called lstm-g, has been developed
which allows more flexibility in architecture, as well as architectures which
vary during trials (Monner and Reggia, 2013, 2012). One of the key advances
which makes this possible is a shift in how gating is used. Rather than gates
being applied to the states of nodes within memory cells, they modulate the
connections between them. As mentioned in Section 2.1, lstm was part of
the inspiration for the pbwm model of working memory and cognitive control.
Gating is the key feature of pbwm which enables the switch between active
maintenance and rapid updating of activity patterns (O’Reilly and Frank, 2006;
O’Reilly et al., 2002). Several papers by O’Reilly and colleagues identify gating
as a major area of cognitive control research (O’Reilly, 2006; O’Reilly et al.,
2010).
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The Mixture of Experts (Jacobs et al., 1991b) and Hierarchical Mixture
of Experts (Jordan and Jacobs, 1994) methods take the gating approach to
fast weight changes further by gating entire networks rather than individual
connections. The Mixture of Experts architecture is composed of multiple
“expert networks” in addition to a “gating network.” The expert networks are
trained like standard feedforward neural networks (often multilayer perceptrons
using error backpropagation). The gating network however is trained to learn
which of the expert networks is likely to be most accurate for a given input
vector. The outputs of the gating network are then used to combine the outputs
of the expert networks, weighting the final Mixture of Experts output towards
the expert network judged most likely to be correct for the current input. The
Hierarchical Mixture of Experts architecture is similar to Mixture of Experts
but is arranged in a tree structure. Multiple gating networks are used to select
the expert network in the tree most likely to be successful for the current input.
Though weights in the composite network may not be changed rapidly, the
behavior of the network can be made to change rapidly based on the output of
gating networks. If one gating network outputs a zero signal to the gate of a
particular subnetwork then the weights of that subnetwork may as well all be
zero, behaviorally. Similarly a high gating signal serves to magnify the output
of the subnetwork to which it corresponds.
These frameworks have been used for many different machine learning
problems such as document classification (Ruiz and Srinivasan, 2002) and
control of industrial plants (Ronco et al., 1998; Ronco and Gawthrop, 1997).
In the latter, gated modular networks such as Mixture of Expert systems were
found to be especially useful when the environment requires abrupt changes by
the controller. In this respect, controlling an industrial plant and controlling a
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cognitive system are more similar than they may at first seem, in that they both
require a balance between stability and rapid response to external changes.
One other application that is of particular interest for my research is the use
of a Mixture of Experts architecture to perform a “what/where” task (Jacobs
et al., 1991a). For each input the network is asked which of nine three-by-three
patterns is present on a five-by-five grid as well as which of nine possible
locations the pattern is centered on. One network successfully learned to
specialize on each subtask. This is a good demonstration of the ability of
gating to combat interference and distinguish between object and location
information. However, I believe the simplicity of the networks involved — the
gating “networks” in one case were no more than output nodes with biases —
leaves much to be expanded upon.
Unlike many other models of cognitive control, galis uses exclusively one-
shot learning. This is not only biologically plausible in many situations, but
also side-steps one of the major computational costs of many neural networks
that use backpropagation techniques, which can take hundreds or thousands of
iterations. In addition to connections trained with one-shot learning, which
have an inherrent “fastness” to them, galis incorporates three other aspects of
fast weights. The first is present in galis in the form of its gated connections.
These gates move beyond those in or pbwm by taking continuous values,
including negative ones, instead of being in binary open or closed states. The
second aspect is fast-weights of the form presented in Schmidhuber (1992).
This underlies my approach to parallel visual pathways in Chapter 5. The third
is learning methods added to handle set shifting and instruction refinement
in Chapter 6, which are more similar to the type discussed in Tieleman and
Hinton (2009) Numerous neural networks have made use of one of these fast
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weight techniques, especially to solve problems related to the trade-off between




Associative Memories Based on Temporally Asymmetric
Weights
3.1 Introduction
Recurrent connections combined with the appropriate dynamics enable oscilla-
tory neural networks to produce rhythmic activity patterns. Such oscillatory
activity could potentially represent multiple stored patterns simultaneously,
rather than the single pattern of a typical fixed-point attractor neural network,
and without requiring the addition of hidden “delay” layers used by many
recurrent neural networks for sequence processing. However, retrieving these
stored patterns in the same order as they were observed — or any other desired
order — has proven challenging. The goal of this chapter is to address this chal-
lenge through the use of temporally asymmetric weights in attractor networks
to create an auto-associative memory that can learn sequences of patterns.
This is done in the context of modeling human working memory, one of the
fundamental cognitive control capabilities. A model is built which will form
the basis of all the memory systems in the remainder of this dissertation. It is
capable of matching the recall performance of human subjects on a standard
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cognitive psychology memory task (Running Memory Span), it reproduces
the recency effect humans exhibit in working memory, and it displays similar
position-specific recall rates.
There has been increasing interest in recent years in the development of
oscillatory neural network models for a variety of tasks. In contrast to fixed-
point attractor networks, which are typically limited to activating a single
pattern in memory at a time, oscillating networks have dynamics characterized
by recurrent connections leading to persistent rhythmic activity. This allows
multiple patterns to be held in the same short-term memory concurrently as
the model’s state persistently switches between them.
A large variety of oscillating neural models exist. For example, some are
based on underlying theta/gamma activity in the hippocampus or neocor-
tex (Hasselmo et al., 2002; Ingber, 1995; Koene and Hasselmo, 2007; Lisman
and Idiart, 1995), while others use individual spiking neurons (Raffone and
Wolters, 2001). Other more abstract approaches have also been used, for
example Wilson-Cowan oscillators (Chakravarthy and Ghosh, 1996; Hayashi,
1994; Wang, 1995). For further examples, see Section 2.4.
The focus here is on modeling short-term working memory, which is active
over periods of time on the order of several seconds. A key characteristic
of working memory is that it has a very limited capacity, unlike long-term
memory (Baddeley, 2000b). Recent studies suggest that this capacity is capped
at around four items (Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005). More specifically the
concentration is on working memory for sequential tasks, or those for which
the serial order of stimuli is important.
An elegant and parsimonious approach to oscillating working memory
models is based on simple modification of Hebbian associative memories with
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fixed-point attractors to make them oscillatory. For example, Horn and Usher
(1991) developed a basic oscillatory memory by adding “dynamic thresholds”
into Hopfield networks. With this approach, the thresholds used to determine
the next activity state of a node are continuously changing such that it becomes
increasingly difficult for a node to remain in the same state, and eventually it
switches its activity state to the complementary value. When such a network
is trained with multiple input stimuli it will oscillate between activity states
representing these stored memory patterns.
Recently the Horn and Usher model was extended to include a weight decay
term so that the order of input pattern presentations could affect the network’s
recall (Reggia et al., 2009; Winder et al., 2009). This allows the network to
accurately model the recency effect observed in human working memory on
running memory span tasks. Stimuli which were presented later in the input
sequence were more likely to be successfully stored and recalled by the network
when using weight decay.
While this memory model was able to match the position-specific recall
rates of human subjects, the order in which the stimuli were recalled was
arbitrary. In this chapter, the oscillatory weight decay network is augmented to
enable it to recall inputs in the order presented. This is achieved by introducing
a second set of temporally asymmetric weights into the model. By doing so the
network is induced to oscillate between stored memory states in the desired
order.
More specifically, in the work presented here temporally asymmetric Hebbian
learning is used in oscillatory networks for the first time. Adaptation occurs in
a fashion inspired by experimental evidence that synaptic efficacy in biological
cortex and other brain structures is “temporally asymmetric” (Bi and Poo, 2001;
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Figure 3.1. Stimuli to the model consist of 35 binary-valued in-
puts, conceived of as letters (such as the ‘P’ shown here) for ease of
visualization and interpretation.
Markram et al., 1997; Zhang et al., 1998). That is, synapses are strengthened
(LTP) if presynaptic activity precedes excitatory post-synaptic potentials by
20-50ms, and weakened (LTD) if the time course is reversed. The model
presented here, when extended in this fashion, not only captures the recency
effect of the original model (Winder et al., 2009) but also now largely retains
the sequential order in which the stimuli were presented.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Model Description
The model uses a fully connected network of N linear threshold units. Each
node takes a binary value ai ∈ {−1, 1}. The stimuli used are in effect arbitrary
sets of N bits, although they are treated as being individual letters from A to
Z for ease of interpretation. Figure 3.1 shows an input to a 35 node network
interpreted as the letter ‘P.’
The operation of the model occurs in two phases: first a temporal sequence
of input stimuli are presented and the weight matrices learned according to
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 below, and then the model is allowed to oscillate between
states according to Equations 3.3 and 3.5 for a predetermined total number of
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Figure 3.2. Architecture of the sequential associative memory. Only
the connections of one node are shown. Nodes are interpreted as
being arranged in a 5×7 grid; here they are offset so that depicted
edges are not collinear to enhance legibility. Solid grey lines represent
connections between nodes which have both symmetric and asymmet-
ric weights. The dotted black line from the highlighted node to itself
indicates that this self-connection has only asymmetric weights.
iterations. One iteration, or time step, corresponds to asynchronously updating
every node once in random order.
3.2.1.1 Training
There are two sets of connection weights, W and V. Both are N×N matrices
composed of real values, and are initialized to zero before learning. The first of
these, W, is the same symmetric weight matrix used in previous version of this
model (Winder et al., 2009). The entries of W are updated as each stimulus is
presented according to:







where kd is a decay rate (0 ≤ kd < 1), and δij is Kronecker’s delta, which
ensures that weights on self-connections are fixed at zero. This is, at it’s core,
the same Hebbian weight change rule used in many previous neural network
models. The difference is the addition of the decay term kd that reduces the
influence of older stimuli in favor of more recent ones.
The new element of this model is the incorporation of a second weight
matrix V. The purpose of V is to allow the model to recall stimuli in the same
order they were presented. In order to accomplish this, V is trained with a
temporally asymmetric learning rule






inspired by the learning method used in some past neural networks for processing
temporal sequences (Schulz and Reggia, 2004). This is similar to the Hebbian
learning with decay given in Equation 3.1, but it associates the activity of
node i during the presentation of stimulus at time t with the activity of all
other nodes j during the presentation of the previous stimulus at time t− 1
in the sequence. This introduces a sense of temporal ordering to the weight
matrix, potentially making it possible to recall the stimuli in order rather than
randomly as was previously done. Note that the decay term is still present,
although the Kronecker’s delta factor is no longer used as it is desirable for
a node’s activity to be influenced by its activation state in the previous time
steps.
3.2.1.2 Recall
After learning and before recall the network is initially set in a random activity
state. It is not necessary to prime the network with a partial or noisy version
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of any of the input patterns. The calculation of inputs to each node is modified
from the prior model to account for both sets of weights. The input to node i












where the constant coefficients βW and βV are used to weight the relative
contributions of W and V (0 ≤ βW, βV ≤ 1). θi is a dynamic threshold used to
insure that the network oscillates between states rather than coming to rest at
a fixed attractor. Its calculation has been simplified from previously, however,
with it now being updated according to the following two rules. Every time
step, θi decays according to θ
t+1
i = (1− kθ) θti . In any time step in which the
state of node i has remained unchanged from the previous time step a factor
of kwa
t





(1− kθ) θti + kwati ati = at−1i
(1− kθ) θti ati 6= at−1i
(3.4)
This moves θi in the direction of the activity state of node i, making it more
difficult for node i to remain in the same state. Both kθ and kw are constants
chosen in advance, with 0< kθ < kw < 1. We use kθ = 0.09 and kw = 0.175 in the
following computational experiments, although similar values gave qualitatively
similar results. Equation 3.3 has been simplified from the model it is derived
from by dropping the Ki biasing term derived from Horn and Usher (1991).
This was previously used to account for the potentially uneven distribution of
active and inactive nodes across potential stimuli and current network state.
Computational experiments revealed that it added computational complexity
to the model without significant impact on performance.
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After the input to each node is calculated, the node’s state is updated
according to the following rule.
ati =





−1 hti < 0
(3.5)
This is also a simplification of earlier models, which used a stochastic updating
process. We have found that the deterministic rule given above performs
roughly the same with this and similar data sets and significantly reduces
computational cost.
3.2.2 Measuring Recall
We assess the network’s recall by calculating the Hamming distance dλ between







∣∣aλi − ai∣∣ (3.6)
The greater the distance dλ between ~a and ~a
λ, the lower the similarity sλ = 0.85
dλ
will be. A value of sλ = 1.0 indicates a perfect match between ~a and ~a
λ. We
call any such time step a “recall peak” for λ. An exponential function was
used to define sλ in order to emphasize the difference between some pairs of
inputs with small Hamming distance between them. The choice of 0.85 in the
definition of sλ is essentially arbitrary, chosen because it produced visually
reasonable results. Values such as 0.7 or 0.9 work just as well.
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In order to compare versions of the model as to whether they successfully
recalled the stimuli in the same order as they were presented, a record is made
of the transitions from one recall peak to the next and this is used to generate a
single scalar value. We count the proportion of these peak-to-peak transitions
which occur between one stimulus and the stimulus which was presented to
the network immediately following. A transition from the fourth-back to the
third-back stimulus would be counted as a correct transition, while one from
the third to the fourth, or fourth to second, would not. A higher proportion of
such correct transitions is indicative of the recall being more well ordered in the
sense that the model is cycling through the stimuli it recalls in the same order
as they were initially presented. Transitions following the one-back stimulus
(i.e., the final stimulus) are ignored because there is no “next” stimulus to
correctly transition to.
The recall phase of the model lasts for hundreds of time steps, each one
potentially generating the recall of a stimulus. This lengthy series of activity
must be distilled into a single ordering of the inputs, in which each unique
stimulus appears no more than once. This is accomplished by consolidating
any consecutive time steps in which the network peaks for the same stimuli.
(Neither human subjects nor the model were ever presented with duplicates of
the same stimulus, so there was no cause for the model to report seeing the
same stimulus repeated.) So, for instance, if a stimuli sequence of ‘ABCDE’
were to result in the network oscillating between the states ‘BCCCDDE’ then
the recalled sequence would be taken to be ‘BCDE,’ and the second through
fifth stimuli would be considered to have been remembered correctly. The
requirement to remember the stimuli in the appropriate position is the same as
what human subjects are faced with when doing running memory span tasks.
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Previous versions of the model were not subjected to this requirement; any
recall peak for a stimulus was enough for it to be considered correctly stored.
3.2.3 Human Behavioral Data
Previously collected human behavioral data (Winder et al., 2009) on the
Running Memory Span task was used for comparison with the new model’s
performance, following the designs of Pollack et al. (1959) and Bunting et al.
(2006). The data was obtained from 38 adult subjects, all of whom completed
the task satisfactorily. They were shown a rapidly presented, two per second
sequence of 12 to 20 randomly ordered stimuli under computer control, and were
asked to remember the most recent six items in the order of their presentation.
Subjects indicated the stimuli that they recalled by clicking on a subsequent
graphical display of all possible stimuli. Recall was measured by assessing
accuracy of recall as a function of stimulus position. A stimulus was counted as
accurately recalled only if: (i) it was presented in the retention window (e.g.,
the last six items, depending on instructions), (ii) it was correctly recalled
by the participant; and (iii) it was recalled in the same position as it was
presented, counting backwards from the final, most recent stimulus. Any item
presented prior to the retention window that was recalled was considered a false
positive, as was any item that was not presented at all but which was recalled.
Any item from the retention window that was not recalled was considered a
miss. Any item that was presented in the retention window, but which was
recalled in the incorrect position was also counted as wrong (e.g., if the last six
items presented were ABCDEF and the subject recalled DCBFEA then only
E was counted as correct). A total of twelve trials were conducted for the task
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with each subject requiring roughly 20 minutes per trial; no time restrictions
were placed on subject responses. All 38 subjects completed the task.
3.3 Results
The model’s recall was evaluated on the basis of both accuracy and peak-to-
peak transitions occurring in the correct order, as described in the previous
section.
In addition to comparing the model’s performance to human subjects, it
was also compared to a previous model for this task (Winder et al., 2009) which
uses dynamic thresholds but not asymmetric weights. Figure 3.3 shows an
example of the effect that introducing asymmetric weights has on sequential
recall. A plot of peaks in similarity for each of the stimuli presented is shown. In
Figure 3.3(a) recall occurs without temporally asymmetric weights. As a result
the ordering of the peaks is largely random, with the network moving between
four stored memory states without regard to their original presentation order.
In contrast, Figure 3.3(b) shows recall with asymmetric weights. Recalled
memory patterns are much more ordered in their progression, with activity
tending to proceed from earlier to later input patterns. This ordered retrieval of
stored memories is much closer to the human behavioral task described above
than was the earlier model which used only temporally symmetric weights.
Table 3.1 shows the number of stimuli successfully stored and recalled by the
network for various values of βW and βV when the network is presented with a
sequence of six inputs. In constructing Table 3.1, five hundred random sequences
were used for each simulation, and the network was allowed to oscillate for 250
time steps, with kd = .15. The cell corresponding to βW = 1.0, βV = 0.0 is
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(a) without asymmetric weights V
(b) with asymmetric weights V
Figure 3.3. Plot over time of when the values of similarity s reached
their peaks for the eight stimuli during an example run of the model.
Black marks indicate when s reached the maximum possible value
of 1.0 and thus were counted as present, while gray marks indicate
when s exceeded 0.8 but did not reach 1.0. The lines between activity
peaks indicate transitions that occurred in the same order as the
stimuli were presented. The first 150 time steps of the recall phase are
shown here. Figure 3.3(a) is without asymmetric weights (βW = 1.0,
βV = 0.0), and Figure 3.3(b) is with asymmetric weights (βW = 0.5,
βV = 1.0). In the former, one can see that the oscillatory states
alternate between the four recalled memory patterns for the 4th, 6th,
7th and 8th stimuli (F, J, D and E). Note that these peaks largely
occur in an arbitrary order. In the latter case, the network state
alternates between the five most recent stimuli, i.e., it has a propensity
to recall input stimuli in the same sequence as that in which they
were presented.
equivalent to running the network without any influence from the asymmetric
weights. The best results were achieved with βW = 0.5, βV = 1.0, which gave a
capacity of 2.26 items and with βW = 0.25, βV = 0.75, which gave 2.22 items.
For comparison, human subjects had a memory capacity of 2.73 items.
Furthermore, asymmetric weights increase position-specific recall perfor-
mance in addition to increasing the total memory capacity relative to baseline
(βV = 0). Figure 3.4 shows the recall rate at each stimulus position for networks
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Table 3.1. Number of stimuli recalled.
βV
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00 — 1.13 1.38 1.46 1.54
0.25 1.18 1.84 2.01 2.22 2.12
βW 0.50 1.44 1.91 1.89 2.04 2.26
0.75 1.72 1.88 1.95 2.02 2.08
1.00 1.76 1.90 1.93 1.93 1.85
Table 3.2. Proportion of peak-to-peak
transitions in correct order.
βV
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00 — 0.81 0.86 0.93 0.87
0.25 0.56 0.71 0.71 0.83 0.78
βW 0.50 0.50 0.70 0.68 0.79 0.85
0.75 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.75 0.78
1.00 0.53 0.61 0.67 0.74 0.71

























Figure 3.4. Recall rates for each position with and without tempo-
rally asymmetric weights. Five hundred random stimuli sequences
were run using a decay rate of kd = 0.2. Networks with asymmetric
weights enabled used βW = 0.5, βV = 1.0.
both with and without asymmetric weights. Asymmetrically weighted networks
were significantly more likely to retain the three most recent inputs.
Figure 3.5 shows that the network is capable of modeling human recency
behavior on Running Memory Span when using asymmetric weighting by
properly tuning the decay parameter, βW and βV. The model provides close
matches for human performance on both 6-back and 12-back running span
tasks. (For the former kd = 0.05, βW = 0.5 and βV = 1.0 and for the latter
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human subjects (6 stimuli)
model results (6 stimuli)
human subjects (12 stimuli)
model results (12 stimuli)
Figure 3.5. Comparison of the position-specific fraction of recalled
simuli by the model and human subjects for both 6-back and 12-back
tasks.
kd = 0.075, βW = 0.63 and βV = 0.37) Fitting data derived from human subjects
is a simple matter of tuning these three coefficients, which was accomplished
here with a simple iteratively-refined grid search, minimizing the rmse.
In addition to having higher total and position-specific capacity, asynchro-
nous weighted networks also retained the ordering of the input sequence more
effectively. Table 3.2 gives the proportion of peaks in similarity s that occur
in the correct order, using the same parameters as Table 3.1. That is, those
that progress from the fourth-back to the third-back, for example. A high
proportion of such transitions is achieved when the synchronous weights are
ignored completely (i.e., when βW = 0), but note that the number of stimuli
recalled by such networks is significantly lower. The fewer items stored at
all, the easier it becomes to get them into the correct sequence. Limiting the
results to those networks which stored more than two of the six stimuli on
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average, we again find that βW = 0.5, βV = 1.0 gives the best result with 85%
of the peaks in s transitioning correctly, compared to between 50 and 56% for
the fully temporally symmetric networks, regardless of βW.
3.4 Discussion
This chapter adds to the growing range of current models of short-term memory.
It explains some of the richness of human memory behavior, for instance the
limited memory capacity and recency effect in sequential recall tasks, but
does so while remaining parsimonious in its design. There is no need to
explicitly specify lateral inhibition in order to provoke competition between
stored patterns, such as in Haarman and Usher (2001). In contrast, competition
is allowed to arise from the process of Hebbian learning and dynamic thresholds.
Further, we do not use different structures for different phases of the memory
process. There is no complex architecture of learning and recall units, or
structures to explicitly guide the recall process (Frank et al., 2001; O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006). Rather, a single substrate of identical nodes is all that is
needed. The two weight matrices used in the model are also trained with
nearly identical rules, and are treated identically during recall. There is also
no need to introduce extra layers or nodes to provide temporality of network
activity, or to introduce recurrent connections or back-propagation between
layers (Botvinick and Plaut, 2006). Multiple patterns, along with their order
of appearance, can be stored on the same neural substrate simultaneously.
For the limited range of data considered here, this model did not need
to maintain a unified record of the entire sequence of stimuli. Correlations
between temporal events can be reconstructed by the network during recall in
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order to preserve the entire sequence, despite the network only being aware
of the immediately preceding stimulus during training. The model’s temporal
“awareness,” such as it is, only exists in a thin temporal slice. Similarly, during
the recall phase, each change of a node’s activity is only dependent on the
immediately preceding state of the network. Of course, with more complex
data additional processing mechanisms may be needed.
While this model appears similar to “chaining,” it is important to recognize
that it does not suffer from one of the principle weaknesses of chaining as a
technique for storing sequences: that a single error in recall will break the thread
connecting consecutive items, causing the model to be unable to continue with
the rest of the sequence. My approach, like that of Botvinick and Plaut (2006),
sob (Farrell and Lewandowsky, 2002), and todam (Li and Lewandowsky,
1993), avoids this issue by using distributed encodings of items on a single
substrate and embracing noisy, stochastic processing. To borrow an analogy
from Li and Lewandowsky (1993), if the memories in traditional chaining
are like beads on a string, galis’ sequence memory is like superimposing
several photographs on a single frame of film. A small error would break the
thread, causing the rest of the beads to be lost, but a small piece of the film
being damaged does not significantly impact the rest of the memories. The
inherently stochastic nature of the network’s activity means there is little harm
in being “knocked out” of sequence as the model is able to pick up the trail
again (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2003). (In fact, the initial state of the network
is already out of the desired sequence. It is initialized to a random pattern,
and not a noisy or partial version of the first pattern in the sequence or a
special start-of-list marker, as is common.) From this initially random state
the network is able to progress through the sequence, occasionally going astray,
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but even then tending back towards the proper ordering because the errors
occur in only some of the nodes, not an entire item representation as would be
the case in a localist model.
Note that other difficult conditions for chaining, such as duplicate stimuli,
repetitions, and interleaving confusable and non-confusable items, were not
present in the tasks that human subjects performed, and so were left out of the
model’s training as well.1 It would be instructive to test these conditions in the
future. Despite the challenge they present, work such as Botvinick and Plaut
(2006) shows that recurrent neural networks as a class are capable of handling
such situations. Furthermore, Botvinick and Plaut partially attributed their
success on those difficult conditions to the way their model encoded each item
independently of the way other items were encoded. The attractors in my
model of sequential recall maintain a similar independence which I believe may
allow them to capture some of the same behavior, although this hypothesis is
untested.
1 See Baddeley (1968) and Henson et al. (1996) for discussion of conditions which are
difficult to account for using only chaining models.
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4
Learning Instruction Sequences for Control
4.1 Introduction
The asymmetric weights approach for sequential memory presented in the
previous chapter expands the capabilities of attractor networks in a valuable
way, and in doing so captures some interesting properties of sequential working
memory. The goal of this chapter is to build a cognitive model which uses this
technique to not only learn sequences of stimuli from the external environment
but also to learn sequences of instructions required to perform its task. To
accomplish this, multiple networks of the type described in the previous chapter
are linked together to form a network of “regions and pathways” that is
controlled using gated connections — that is, by using connections between
regions whose behavior can be controlled by a third network. In addition,
the associative memories discussed in the preceding chapter are enhanced
to allow them to store multiple sequences in the same substrate or region
concurrently. This approach, termed galis for “Gated Attractors Learning
Instruction Sequences,” is demonstrated in this chapter by building models
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for two different tasks: one called Store/Recognize, of my own design, and one
called n-Back, which is commonly used in cognitive psychology.
The model of the prior chapter successfully captures many aspects of human
working memory. However, it still relies on exogenous control: the occurrence
of all weight changes, updates, recollections, accuracy assessments, etc., are
controlled by the modeler, not by the model itself. In order to make control
internal to the model I have linked a number of such attractor networks together,
in addition to other regional modules, using gating. This expanded system
uses sequential attractor networks not just to learn memories of perceptual
stimuli, but also to learn memories of the steps needed to perform tasks.
In order to make the algorithm for a task more tractable it is beneficial
to be able to decompose it into multiple, smaller subroutines. Each of these
subroutines then has its own sequence of instructions used to execute it. This
allows for more modular algorithms but introduces the (non-trivial) requirement
that a sequential attractor network store more than one sequence at a time.
This is accomplished by a modification to the learning procedure given in
Equations 3.1 and 3.2: a separate set of weights is learned for each constituent
sequence in the same way that the weights were learned in prior versions for a
single sequence. The weights are then averaged together so that only a single
set of weights is needed no matter how many sequences are being stored. This
independent training of each sequence ensures that both the weight decay and
the asymmetric weights operate only within a sequence and not between them.
(For instance, the first element in the second sequence will not cause decay in
the storage of the last element of the prior sequence.)
This leaves the problem of controlling which of these several sequences
is recalled. To address this, the network is conceptually divided into two
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partitions. (It is still fully connected, but the states of each set are interpreted
as representing different things. See Figure 4.1.) Which of the trained sequences
is recalled can be controlled by adjusting the input to one of these sets to
provide context information to the network. The nodes used to provide this
context are termed the “cue” nodes. They have values associated with each
sequence so the network can reproduce it when necessary. The other nodes are
termed the “response” nodes; they are used to encode the items the sequences
are composed of. This arrangement makes it possible to form memories of
multiple sequences concurrently, even if sequences share elements in common.
This last point is crucial if such networks are going to be used in an executive
control system. The response to multiple situations may require some of the
same steps be taken, so it is important that learning multiple sequences not
rely on them having disjoint sets of elements (cf. Botvinick and Plaut, 2002).
For example, imagine a system which has been trained to prepare cups of coffee
and tea. If the system was midway through making a cup of coffee and had
just added sugar, you would want it to avoid following this by adding lemon,
the next step in preparing tea. This is a danger because because the addition
of sugar is a step in both procedures.
The rest of this chapter is organized in to three sections. The first of
these covers a galis model for the Store/Recognize task, which I designed
to serve as a introduction to how galis approaches cognitive control. The
next section expands on this to present a model for n-Back, which is a popular
task in cognitive psychology, and compares results from this model to those
from human subjects. The chapter concludes with a discussion of galis and
cognitive control.
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Figure 4.1. A depiction of a memory divided into two conceptual
partitions. In the previous chapter, as well as most of the literature,
auto associative memories are depicted in a rectangular grid so that
we may easily visualize their contents pictorially. In truth, nodes have
no locations; any arrangement is equally valid. The layout of nodes
above emphasizes the “divided” nature of the memory introduced in
this chapter to store multiple sequences. Its nine nodes are still fully
connected, and could be interpreted as representing a 3×3 bitmap,
or the binary string 1011001112 = 359. (Darker nodes = 1; lighter
nodes = 0; reading top-to-bottom, left-to-right). However we can
also interpret it as representing two different numbers: 101102 = 22
(left column) and 01112 = 7 (right column). In this way a network
with a single, fully-connected set of weights can simultaneously be
seen as forming an autoassociative memory of long patterns and
a heteroassociative memory of two shorter patterns. I exploit this
throughout the remained of this dissertation to use one set of nodes to
represent which sequence is being recalled, and the other to represent
the items in that sequence.
4.2 The ‘Store & Recognize’ Task
Store/Recognize is a task designed as the first test of the galis control
system (Sylvester et al., 2011). This task is a first attempt to establish the
basic idea of the galis control system works, before moving on to real-world
problems and tasks from cognitive psychology. Store/Recognize was designed
to be straightforward and easy to understand while still demonstrating some
important features. Specifically, the Store/Recognize task was designed so
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Figure 4.2. Three of the visual input patterns V used for the
Store/Recognize task. The inputs are patterned after the IBM CGA
typeset, as seen in Chartier and Boukadoum (2006). Light and dark
squares denote a values of -1.0 and 1.0, respectively.
that the control system would have to consider two different inputs, make
two different decisions based on them, one after the other, add inputs to
working memory, and search the contents of memory for a given pattern and
recognize when it is present. In addition, the general process the model uses
to address this task is roughly the same as that needed to address the n-Back
problem discussed later in this chapter and the Card Matching task, discussed
in Chapter 5. This task provides a good first illustration of how galis works
that will facilitate understanding how these more complex tasks are addressed.
The Store/Recognize task consists of a series of visual inputs S, each paired
with an instruction M to either commit the stimulus to working memory or to
evaluate whether that stimulus is already in memory. These are termed the
“load” and “evaluate” modes. (For the purposes of this task, M is treated as
an input, but from a wider perspective it is a piece of contextual information
about the task to be carried out being received from elsewhere in the brain,
not from the external world like S.) Each visual stimulus is a bipolar pattern
of length 49, which for convenience and ease of interpretation are visualized as
a 7×7 grid of pixels with each stimulus again taking the form of a lower case


















Figure 4.3. The galis model for the Store/Recognize task. Thin,
solid arrows denote one-to-one connections. The recurrent connections
of the memory layer are fully connected. Dotted lines are the outputs
of the control module. Note that the number of boxes in the each
layer is an approximation only, and does not faithfully represent the
number of nodes used in the model. Details of the Compare and
Control Modules can be seen in Figures 4.4 and 4.7.
After receiving a visual stimulus and a mode (S,M), the model processes
the stimulus until producing an output by activating one of three output
nodes (Figure 4.3). When M = load the model should activate the complete
node, to signify that it is done storing the stimulus. When M = evaluate the
model should output either present or not present, depending on whether the
stimulus has previously appeared. In the latter case, the model should also
store the stimulus in memory before signaling its output. This means that
when a pattern which has not previously been presented is evaluated twice, the
correct output is not present the first time, but present the second, so output
is dependent not just on the current input but also on input at previous times.
Output is produced only when the model has finished processing the input
(S,M), rather than at every time step. It may take a varying number of time
steps from initial observation of an input until an output is produced, depending
on the particular input, the prior state of the model, and the efficiency of
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the model’s performance. For instance, more time steps are needed when
M = evaluate and a visual input is not found in memory than when it is found,
since the former requires storing the new visual input while the latter does not.
Once an output is produced a new pair of inputs is presented and processing
continues.
4.2.1 Model Overview
The galis model for the Store/Recognize task is composed of six components,
which can be seen in Figure 4.3. They are the visual input layer, the mode
input layer, the output nodes, the memory layer, the compare module, and the
control module.
Nodes in the visual input layer take values in {−1, 1}, and are set externally
to represent the visual stimulus V being presented in the current stage. As
such, the layer consists of 49 nodes.
The mode input, also set externally, encodes the current system goal.
Rather than using a local representation with a single node or pair of nodes to
differentiate load from evaluate inputs, a bipolar pattern of length twenty four
is used to represent each mode. This more accurately reflects the fact that this
input would be provided to the control module from another brain region, and
such connections use coarse, distributed representations rather than localized
ones. The specific patterns used to represent load and evaluate are random
bipolar patterns chosen in advance.
Three linear threshold units are used for output. There is one each for
complete, present, and not present. For each of these, an input xi ≥ 1 will
produce an output of one, otherwise output is zero.
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The memory layer is a discrete Hopfield network forming an auto-associative
memory. Hopfield networks are often used for long-term memories, but the
memory layer of this model represents working memory, with limited capacity,
high plasticity, and close integration with executive systems. The working
memory nodes are bipolar valued, and the size is the same as that of the input
layer. Training of the memory layer is accomplished with standard one-shot
Hebbian learning with weight decay






where kd is a decay rate (0≤ kd < 1) and δij is Kronecker’s delta, which ensures
that weights on self-connections are fixed at zero (Winder et al., 2009). The
weight matrix for the memory layer is termed WM, to differentiate it from the
weight matrices needed within the control module, W and V. Note that the
Store/Recognize task only requires remembering the set of stimuli which have
been seen, not the order they were seen in. As such only a single, symmetric
weight matrix is used to store the memory of external stimuli. In contrast, both
symmetric and asymmetric weights are used in the memory of instructions
since these must be recalled in order.
Input to each node i in the memory layer is composed of the influence of all
other nodes in the layer along with a gated connection from the topologically
corresponding node in the input layer:




where gin is the value of the gating node mediating the input-to-memory
connections, in i is the state of node i in the visual input layer, wij is the








Figure 4.4. The compare module. Thin, solid arrows denote one-
to-one connections. Thick arrows denote full connections.
and aj is the state of node j in the memory layer. State updates to the working
memory are the same as Equation 3.5 in the previous chapter.
ati =





−1 hti < 0
(4.3)
The visual input-to-memory connection is used to enable the memory to be
influenced towards or away from the current stimulus. When the gate is fully
open (gin = 1), the state of the memory is forced to become the same as the
input layer. When the gate closes (gin = 0), there is no influence from the input
layer and the memory layer operates as a standard auto-associative memory.
The factor of two is necessary to ensure that the inputs coming through the
gate are able to overwhelm the influence of the intralayer connections and
effectively force the state of the memory.
The fifth component of the model is the compare module, which is used to
judge the similarity between the current state of the input and the memory
layer. It is composed of three layers, as seen in Figure 4.4. The first layer is
the same size as the memory and visual input layers, and receives one-to-one
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connections from each of those components. The state of nodes in this layer is
the product of the states of the corresponding nodes in the input and memory
layers.
The second layer of the compare module has two nodes, both of which take
as input the sum of the nodes of the first layer, divided by the size of the input
layer. (This produces a value proportional to the inner product of the input
and memory layers’ states.) One of the second layer nodes adopts a state of
one if its input is above a certain threshold — for this model and set of inputs
a value of 0.9 is used — and zero otherwise, while the other node outputs one
if its input is below that threshold and zero if it is above. The state of this
two node layer is then multiplied by a fixed weight matrix to produce a 32-bit
bipolar pattern which serves as input to the control module. The patterns
output by the compare module are static and pre-defined random ones, like
the load and evaluate patterns.
The compare module outputs these 32-bit patterns for two reasons, one
theoretical and the other practical. From a theoretical standpoint, the brain
rarely uses local encodings to transmit data between regions, and so it is more
plausible to design the model to use a distributed representation of the compare
module’s output. Regarding practicality, the patterns the control module uses
internally are on the order of several hundred bits long. It aids the necessary
mapping from the compare module’s output to the control module patterns
if the former is already thirty two bits long rather than two. In addition,
the control module must learn to recognize whether the compare module is
indicating a high or low similarity between working memory and visual input.
This discrimination is easier in higher dimensions.
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The final component is the control module, which is used to direct the
operation of the rest of the model. It takes inputs from the mode input layer,
and compare module. The control module has three outputs to the complete,
present, and not present nodes, as well as four other outputs, called “gate
control signals,” which operate gates in the rest of the model. For example,
one of the control module’s outputs manipulates the gate between the input
layer and memory layer, controlling how much the former influences the latter.
The core of the control module is a second discrete Hopfield attractor
network, called the “Instruction Sequence Memory” (ism). Unlike the working
memory attractor network mentioned above, this network is modified to use
temporally asymmetric weights, allowing it to store sequences of patterns.
(Refer to Chapter 3 for more details. Call the symmetric weights W and the
asymmetric weights V.) Each stored pattern corresponds to a particular action
the network may take, or more specifically, to a particular set of signals to
open and close different gates to different degrees. A sequence of these actions
taken together corresponds to the steps needed to address a particular situation.
For instance, when presented with a new visual stimulus when M = load , the
model must take three actions sequentially: first, make the state of the memory
layer match that of the visual input layer by fully opening the input-to-memory
layer gate, then update WM to store the new pattern in memory, and finally
output complete and prepare the model for a new input.
The control module has two other sections besides this temporally asym-
metric attractor network which are called the “encoder” and “decoder.” They
serve to translate the inputs to the control module into the particular patterns
stored in the instruction sequence memory, and then translate the response of
the instruction sequence memory into the control module’s final outputs. This
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pre- and post-processing is done primarily to mitigate the effects of noise and
to enable the control module to convert between inputs, stored patterns, and
outputs of different dimensions.
4.2.1.1 Control Outputs and Gating
The control module manages the behavior of the model through a system of
gates. The outputs of the control module are used to open and close these
gates, which in turn modulate the flow of activity between different layers. In
addition to the opening and closing of gates, the control module also activates
the three output nodes.
The four gates which control the flow of activity throughout the model can
be seen in Figure 4.3. They are:
1. a memory input gate between the visual input layer and memory layer,
so that the memory’s current state can be biased towards or away from
the current stimulus;
2. a memory training gate which controls when the working memory updates
its weight matrix WM;
3. a compare output gate which modulates the output of the compare
module, so that it is possible to notice or ignore the similarity between
input and memory state, and;
4. a control input gate which controls the encoder, so that the control
module can control when it updates its own state.
When a gate is open it allows information to flow through it like an open valve
in a pipe. (In contrast to an open switch in an electrical circuit, which would
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prevent flow.) A gate’s state is given by
gt = kgg
t−1 + st (4.4)
where kg is a decay term, here equal to 0.5, and s
t is the current value of the
control module output governing this gate. The effect of gates is multiplicative,
such that their downstream activity is a product of their incoming activity
and their current state gt. Control module outputs have values in [−1, 1],
so with kg = 0.5 gates will have states in [−2, 2]. This allows gates to have
more nuanced effects than binary states of “open” and “closed.” Like Stewart
and Eliasmith (2011), a gate can have an amplifying effect on its incoming
value (gt > 1.0), a damping effect (0.0 ≤ gt < 1.0), or an inhibitory effect
(gt < 0.0). Being able to use the same system for both attending to an input
(i.e., amplification) and inhibiting that input is appealing, since the two effects
have been described in the cognitive psychology literature as antipodal (Engle
et al., 1995).
The exception to this is the memory training gate. Because updating the
working memory weights is a discrete decision —WM is either updated or not
in any time step — the working memory gate has a threshold. Its state gt is
calculated the same way, and WM is updated when g
t > 1 and not updated
when gt ≤ 1.
In some of the situations listed there are many connections being mediated
by the same gate. For instance, the connection between the input and memory
layer is one-to-one. You may think of each of these 49 connections as having its
own gate, with each gate having an identical value. The effect is the same as a
single, “master” gate controlling all 49 connections based on a single output
from the control module and so I adopt the convention of referring to the
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parallel opening and closing of these 49 connections as if there was a single
gate present.
4.2.2 Model Operation
The control module is trained before the task begins, so that the instruction
sequence memory already contains the appropriate pairings of conditions and
responses. The encoder and decoder are also trained before the task begins.
Training the control module occurs only once for this task, and once the task
begins its weights remain unchanged. The memory layer, in contrast, begins
the task in a blank, untrained state, and has its weights updated multiple times
as the task progresses.
During each step of processing the model goes through the following opera-
tions.
If the model activated any of the three output nodes in the previous time
step, a new stimulus will be presented, otherwise the inputs from the previous
step are retained. Next, the state of the main memory is updated according to
Equations 4.2 and 4.3. Then the output of the compare module is updated
to reflect the new state of memory and the potentially new state of the input
layer.
Next, the control module’s encoder is updated if the gate regulating it is
open. If it is not open, the encoder input will be the same as the previous time
step, and so its output will be unchanged, and thus the downstream layers
in the control module will receive the same inputs as the previous time step.
This prevents the control module from switching to a new sequence of actions
before the previous sequence has concluded, as this gate is opened only at the
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end of a sequence, setting the stage for the next sequence of actions to begin
in the following time step.
The encoder’s output, whether it is the result of new inputs from an open
gate or not, is then fed in to the cue nodes of the sequences memory. The
instruction sequence memory is then updated to produce the next response
pattern. This response pattern is processed by the decoder to select a particular
action, which then outputs the gate control signals which compose that action.
The newly produced gate control signals are used to update the gating
values according to Equation 4.4. If the gate responsible for training the main
memory is open (i.e., its state is greater than 1.0), then those weights are
updated at this point and the weight update gate has its value reset to −1.0.
Finally, the three output nodes are updated according to their associated
control signals. If any output is activated, all three have their values reset to
−1.0, and a new stimulus will be presented to the model during the next time
step.
4.2.3 Control Module Operation
There are four different situations to which the model as a whole, and thus
the control module, must respond. Each has an associated sequence of actions
which form the desired response. Note that there are many-to-one associations
between situations and responses, that is, the same action may be a member
of more than one sequence. A listing of the situations and their associated
response sequences can be seen in Table 4.1.
The first situation occurs when the model is given a new visual stimulus
and M = load . In that case the model must store the current input in memory
and then activate the complete output node. This is accomplished by first
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Table 4.1. Instruction sequences stored in control module’s ism.
Sequence Action
1. load stimulus 1. open input-to-memory gate, strongly
biasing memory state towards the input




4. open input-to-memory gate, slightly bi-
asing memory state towards input
5. close the input-to-memory gate, remov-
ing the bias to the memory
8. open the output gate of the compare
module
3. stimulus present 6. output “present”
6. output “present”
4. stimulus not present 1. open input-to-memory gate, biasing
memory state towards the input
2. train the memory layer (WM)
7. output “not present”
fully opening the input-to-memory gate, forcing the state of the memory to
match the input layer. Next the control module opens the gate which allows
the memory module to update WM, storing the current pattern in memory.
Finally, the “complete” output node is activated and the gate which allows the
control module to update its input is opened. This series of actions is depicted
visually in Figure 4.5.
The second situation occurs when the model is presented with a stimulus,
M = evaluate and the control module is not receiving any input from the
compare module. The first action in the associated sequence opens the input-
to-memory gate. The added input to the memory layer nodes reshapes the









































































































































Figure 4.5. The series of actions to store a pattern in working memory. The
process takes three time steps, but it has been unpacked here into six stages for
clarity. (a) A new pair of inputs (S,M) is presented, and the control module input
gate is open. Because M = load , the controller determines that it must execute
sequence 1 in Table 4.1. (b) The first step is to open the memory layer’s input gate.
At the same time, the control module input gate is closed to prevent the controller
from switching sequences before the current one completes. (c) Input from the visual
layer causes the state of the working memory to match the visual input S. (d) To
store S as an attractor state, the memory training gate is opened. (e) Now when
the biasing input is removed S persists as the state of the working memory. (f) The
complete output node is activated and the control module’s input gate is opened so
that it can select a new sequence of actions in the next time step.
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of the pattern in the visual input layer. (Imagine the memory layer’s attractor
landscape as a rubber sheet, with the attractors being depressions in the sheet.
The additional activity from the visual input layer is like a force pushing down
on the sheet, creating an additional depression into which the activity state
will fall.) The second action closes the input-to-memory gate, removing the
bias from the memory module. If the input pattern has previously been stored
in memory then the memory state should remain in that basin of attraction
when the bias is removed since it will be in an energy minima. Conversely, if
the pattern has not been previously stored, then when the memory is updated
in the next time step the state should shift to a pattern which has already
been stored. (See Figure 4.6 for a diagram of this process.) The final step of
this sequence is to open the output gate of the compare module in order to
judge whether the memory layer has remained in the same state or changed to
a different one.
This sequence is followed by either the third or fourth sequence, depending
on the output of the compare module. If the compare module indicates that
the memory state and input layer match each other, then sequence 3 is begun,
otherwise 4 is started.
Sequence 3 is simple, as all that needs to be done if the memory and input
layers match each other (i.e., the input pattern has previously been stored in
memory) is to activate the present node. There is, however, a small wrinkle.
Note that response 6 appears consecutively in response to cue 3 in Table 4.1.
This is an artifact of the instruction sequence memory. It has difficulty recalling
degenerate sequences of length one, since their is no prior pattern to associate
with in order to train V. It is only necessary for the control module to output
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Figure 4.6. How biasing the attractor landscape is used to determine if a pattern is
in memory. Each curve is a one-dimenstional representation of an attractor landscape,
with the state-space along the horizontal axis, and the effective energy along the
vertical. On the left is an attractor landscape with basins of attraction at x = 3 and
x = 4. On the right is another attractor with basins at x = 2 and x = 3. In both,
the present state of the network, represented by a small circle, is initially x = 3. At
time t+ 1 both networks receive biasing inputs at x = 4, which deforms the attractor
landscape as if the energy at x = 4 had been lowered. As a result at time t+ 2 both
networks change their state to x = 4. At time t + 3 the biasing input is removed,
returning the attractor landscape to its prior condition. Because x = 4 is a basin
of attraction in the network on the left, the state of that network remains at x = 4.
However, x = 4 is not an attractor in the network on the right, so it shifts its state
to x = 3. This allows galis to determine if x = 4 was a prior attractor state of the
network: if it was an attractor then biasing the network at x = 4 temporarily will
shift the network into that state even when the biasing input is removed, but if it
was not an attractor then the network will not stay in the state after removing the
input.
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response 6 a single time in order to successfully activate the present output
node, but it must be trained on a sequence consisting response 6 two times.
If the state of the memory does not match that of the input layer then the
current input pattern has not been found in memory. In this fourth and final
case the model must first store that pattern in memory, and then activate the
not present output node. This occurs in the same way as the first sequence,
though not present is output instead of complete.
4.2.4 Control Module Architecture
A diagram of the control module’s internal structure can be seen in Figure 4.7.
It is composed of three subcomponents. The principal of these is the instruction
sequence memory which is used to store the actions needed to respond to each
circumstance. The other two components are an encoder and decoder, which
are used for pre- and post-processing to convert the inputs of the controller
into the patterns stored in the instruction sequence memory, and then from
those patterns into the signals the control module outputs.
4.2.4.1 Instruction Sequence Memory
The instruction sequence memory is a discrete associative memory modified
in two ways. The first is the incorporation of temporally asymmetric weights,
which makes sequential recall possible, as shown in Chapter 3. The second is a
conceptual division of the nodes into two sets, the “cue” and “response” nodes.
The role of the cue nodes is to provide the necessary context information
to the response nodes to enable them to produce a series of outputs based on
a single input. The state of the cue nodes corresponds to the situation the













Figure 4.7. The control module. Thick arrows denote fully con-
nected layers, while thin arrows denote one-to-one connections. The
number following the name of each layer is the number of nodes it
contains.
of the actions which should be taken for the current context. The network
will be trained on multiple sequences, so the cue nodes provide the context
information necessary to prompt the network to reproduce the correct sequence
in the response nodes.
As an example, one pattern the cue nodes may take corresponds to having
M = evaluate and having the compare module indicating that the state of the
main memory and input layers are approximately equal. In the event that cue
is given, the proper response is to output the series of three response patterns
which will lead to the model activating the present output node. (Sequence 3
in Table 4.1.)
There are four different cues and eight responses used for Store/Recognize.
Because some responses are associated with more than one cue (that is, the
same action is required in more than one circumstance), there are actually ten
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total patterns stored in the instruction sequence memory. Each of these ten
is the concatenation of a cue pattern with one of the responses required for
it. This combined pattern, along with the others derived from the same cue,
together form a sequence the memory is trained to recall.
Like the patterns chosen to represent the inputs and results of the compare
module, the patterns chosen to represent each cue and response are random
bipolar strings.
Although the instruction sequence memory is divided into cue and response
groups the network is fully connected. The difference is that cue nodes receive
an extra input from the encoder to bias their state towards the encoder’s output.
Additionally, only the state of the response nodes is read by the decoder. The
galis model for Store/Recognize uses 200 cue nodes and 120 response nodes.
Learning in the ism is again based on the methods successfully used in
Chapter 3. Specifically, the ism has two weight matrices, W and V, both of
which are trained in advance of running the model on the memory tasks. The
former is a typical weight matrix for an autoassociative memory, trained with
one-shot Hebbian learning with weight decay, as defined in Equation 4.5.






(Note that the coefficient for decay in the instruction sequence memory is
denoted kD, and is distinct from the decay term kd used for the main memory
in Equation 4.1, which can take a different value.) The second weight matrix,
V, also uses Hebbian learning but associates the state of a node not with the
current states of other nodes, but with the other nodes’ previous states. The
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learning rule is given in Equation 4.6.






As mentioned in Section 4.1, in order to allow the instruction sequence
memory to store multiple sequences, a change was made from the prior chapter
regarding how W and V are formed from these individual weight updates.
For each sequence l to be stored, a separate Wl and Vl matrix are generated
according to Equations 4.5 and 4.6. Once all Wl and Vl matrices have been
calculated they are then averaged together to get the final W and V matrices.
This batch learning-like process is done because decay should only have an effect
on intra-sequence ordering of patterns, not the order the sequences themselves
happened to be trained in.
Updating the state of the instruction sequence memory occurs in two stages,
the first governed by the asymmetric weights, and the second by the symmetric
weights. This two-part update process is a change from the previous work of
Chapter 3, in which the effects of both W and V were combined in a single
input calculation. When both W and V are used simultaneously they can
work at cross purposes. V is pushing the network towards the next attractor,
while W is fighting to keep it in the same attractor basin. The new process
helps the network to proceed from one state to the next in a much more orderly
and predictable progression.







j − θti + eti (4.7)
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where ei is the input from the encoder (ei = 0 when i is a response node), and
θi is a dynamic threshold that is used to keep the network from settling into
any one attractor basin. If a node’s state has not changed in the previous
time step, θi rises (if ai = 1) or falls (if ai = −1), which means node i will
require inputs with increasingly larger magnitudes to remain in the same state.
More specifically, at every time step, θi decays according to θ
t+1
i = (1− kθ)θti .
In any time step in which the state of node i has remained unchanged from
the previous time step a factor of kwa
t
i is also added to θ
t+1
i . (This process is
formalized in Equation 3.4 supra.) Here kθ = .02 and kw = 0.0125.
The input hi is then used to update the state of each node according to
Equation 4.3. Using only V to update the network serves to move the network
state from the current attractor basin to the basin associated with the next
pattern in the sequence.
After updating both ~a and ~θ, the updating process begins again, this time






j − θti + eti (4.8)
This helps the network to settle further into the new attractor basin it was
pushed towards by V in the previous stage. This new input is then used
to update ~a according to Equation 4.3 again (though the conditionals are
predicated on fi, not hi this time). Finally, ~θ is updated according to the rules
given above once again.
4.2.4.2 Encoder
The encoder is responsible for translating between the inputs to the control
module — the output of the compare module and the mode input layer — and
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the cue portion of the patterns stored in the instruction sequence memory. It is
necessary to translate between them since the size of the input vector doesn’t
match the number of cue nodes. (There are 56 of the former and 200 of the
latter.) By using more dimensions in the instruction sequence memory the
stored patterns are more distinct from each other, and thus can be stored with
less interference.
The encoder is composed of three layers of bipolar nodes, depicted in
Figure 4.7. This architecture could possibly be made simpler, but only at the
expense of more complicated dynamics. As is, each piece of the encoder has its
own separate role for which it is specialized. Combining layers would disrupt
this specialization of labor, which would in turn lead to interference between
the functions being carried out.
There are 56 nodes in the first layer (one per input) and they receive input
from outside the control module. The second and third layers have 200 nodes,
one per cue node in the instruction sequence memory. The connections between
the first and second layers are trained by way of standard one-shot Hebbian
learning, which forms the two layers into a heteroassociative memory. The goal
is to be able to produce the correct cue pattern when given the corresponding
mode vector and compare module output.
The third layer is a standard autoassociative Hopfield network with one-
to-one outputs to the instruction sequence memory cue nodes. It has a full
set of intralayer connections which have been trained by one-shot Hebbian
learning to recognize cue patterns. These connections serve to move the state
further into the current activity basin, i.e., closer to the cue pattern that the
heteroassociative process produced. This helps to mitigate errors in the result
of the first two layers. By training only on the cue patterns and not the control
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module’s inputs or response patterns the Hopfield network in the encoder
specializes in cue pattern memory, and avoids interference which can arise in
either the initial layers of the encoder or the instruction sequence memory.
Combining layers of the encoder would eliminate this specialization of roles
and reintroduce interference between these operations.
The encoder’s auto-associative memory layer is carrying out a redintegra-
tion process, which is the recovery of a pattern from a partial copy (Stuart
and Hulme, 2009). Many cognitive models require that a pattern retrieved
from memory be redintegrated in some way (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2003),
including clarion (Sun, 2006) and the “clean-up” memory of Eliasmith and
colleagues (presented in (Stewart et al., 2011) and used in (Choo and Eliasmith,
2010), among others). Attractor networks have been used for this purpose
before, including Lewandowsky (1999) and Kesner et al. (2000).
As mentioned, the control module is capable of using gating to regulate
itself. This is done by gating the inputs to the encoder. When this gate is
open activity flows from the compare module and mode input layer to the
encoder’s input layer, and is then operated on as described above. When the
gate is closed the encoder does not receive input and the state of its input layer
remains unchanged from the previous time step. This in turn means that the
encoder’s output will be the same as the previous time step, so the instruction
sequence memory will be operating on the same cue pattern as it did in the
previous time step. This is done to prevent the instruction sequence memory
from switching to the next sequence before the previous sequence in completed.
The encoder input gate is opened as part of the final action of a sequence. This
has the effect of allowing the control module to ready itself in the next time
step to begin processing a new sequence of actions.
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4.2.4.3 Decoder
The decoder is composed of two layers. The first, called the action selection
layer, has eight binary nodes — as many as there are response patterns. It is fully
connected to the response nodes of the sequences memory. These connections
are trained by one-shot Hebbian learning to associate each response pattern
with a single active node in the action selection layer.
In order to help ensure that only one node will be active, the action selection
layer also has a set of recurrent connections. This sets up a competitive dynamic,
with every node reinforcing its own activation while inhibiting that of the other
nodes. Since the Hebbian weights from the response nodes to the action
selection layer have already produced an activity pattern which is close to
having a single winner, only a single step of these competitive dynamics is
needed to make one node maximally active and all other nodes off.
The action selection layer then feeds in to the control module’s output layer,
which generates the actual control signals used to adjust the gates in the model.
This is accomplished using a weight matrix which, in the current version of the
model, is hand-coded in advance to produce the desired behavior. The outgoing
weights from each action node are equal to the value that the corresponding
control module output should have when that action is taken. For instance, if
action i necessitates fully opening the first gate, partially closing the second,
and leaving the others unchanged, action node i’s outgoing weights would be
(1,−0.25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
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Table 4.2. Inputs and desired outputs for a run of the first set of experiments.
Stimulus # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Visual Input A B A X Y X
Mode Input load load evaluate evaluate evaluate evaluate






A series of computational experiments was conducted to evaluate this basic
galis model on the Store/Recognize task. The first set of experiments uses
random series of six inputs where the first and third as well as fourth and
sixth visual inputs match, for example, ABAXYX. Details are in Table 4.2.
Five hundred iterations using random visual stimuli were run. The model was
judged based on the accuracy of each of the six outputs for each run, as shown
in Figure 4.8.
The average accuracy across all responses in all trials was 90.6%. Predictably,
the sixth input is the most difficult to respond to correctly, because it requires
the stimulus to have been identified as not present on its first presentation, and
thus stored in working memory, for it to be correctly identified as present later.
Varying the decay rate kD in Eqs. 4.5 and 4.6 governing the control module’s
instruction sequence memory indicated (surprisingly) that small, negative decay
rates performed the best. With a negative value of kD previous items in a
sequence are amplified rather than weakened. This amplification enlarges the
basin of attraction for earlier patterns in a sequence, making it easier for the
memory to run through a sequence from the beginning. With a very small,
negative decay rate (−0.05), the average accuracy increased to 93.8%. The





















Figure 4.8. The proportion of runs for which the model gave the
correct output for each of the six stimuli in the 1-3 and 4-6 matching
version of the Store/Recognize task. The dark bars are for runs using
a decay in the controller’s instruction sequence memory of kD = 0,
while the light bars used kD = −0.05. (Note that the vertical axis
does not begin at 0.0.)
equivalent to the gain terms that have been used to produce a primacy effect
in models of serial recall previously (e.g., Choo and Eliasmith, 2010).
The capacity of the working memory layer was also tested by performing
a varying number of load operations, from one to eight, followed by a pair of
evaluations. The first evaluation queried the model to see if it recalled being
presented with the first stimulus, and the second evaluated a novel stimulus.
This should produce an output of present followed by not present. For example,
to test the model’s ability to remember four items, the visual stimuli could
have been ABCDAZ (Table 4.3). For these experiments there was no decay
in working memory (kd = 0 in Equation 4.1). Figure 4.9 shows the accuracy
of the model on the former evaluation. The model was also very successful at
correctly identifying the final input as novel; accuracy on that question ranged
from 93.2% to 96.5% and was independent of the number of stimuli loaded.





















Figure 4.9. Results of the capacity tests. After loading one through
eight stimuli into working memory, the first item loaded was evaluated.
Shown is the proportion of runs which correctly identified that stimuli
as having been previously seen.
Table 4.3. Example inputs and outputs for a run of the capacity experiments.
Stimulus # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Visual Input A B C D A Z
Mode Input load load load load evaluate evaluate
Correct response complete complete complete complete present not present
under 50% when seven items have been loaded. This corresponds well with
measures of human working memory, which have found four items to be a
typical capacity level Cowan (2001).
As mentioned, the above capacity experiments do not use any decay in
the working memory. Biological working memory tends to exhibit a “recency
effect,” in which more recent items are more likely to be successfully recalled
than older ones. In order to model this, I have run further capacity tests with a
decaying working memory. The results can be seen in Figure 4.10, which shows
the degree to which galis is able to recall each of six stored inputs for varying
values of kd. When kd = 0.0 the model does equally well recognizing the first of
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the six stimuli it has seen as it does the last. In the absence of decay this is to
be expected, since the earlier stimuli interfere with the latter exactly as much
as the latter interfere with the former. When decay is introduced (kd = 0.05),
older memories are degraded as each new input is trained. As a result a recency
effect emerges, and galis is better able to recall more recent stimuli. As kd
is increased (kd = 0.10) further the model is able to recall the more recent
stimulus very reliably, but at the cost of having mostly forgotten about the first
stimulus. This relationship between interference and decay is consistent with
our earlier studies of working memory described in Chapter 3 (see also Reggia
et al., 2009; Sylvester et al., 2010). The memory capacity of this architecture
is maximized when there is a trade-off between interference and decay: too
much decay and items deteriorate too soon; too little decay and the older items
remain in memory interfering with newer ones.
4.3 The n-Back Task
The prior section described a proof-of-concept galis model to demonstrate
that cognitive control is possible using independent recurrent networks, sequen-
tial attractors, and gated connections. This section continues by presenting a
second galis model capable of performing a more difficult, real-world work-
ing memory learning task that is widely used in cognitive psychology. Some
lessons learned during the development of the previously presented model were
incorporated when constructing this one, resulting in some small changes to
galis.
In an n-Back task, the participant is presented with a stream of stimuli and
























Figure 4.10. The effects of decay in the working memory. Without
decay the model is equally able to recall any of the six stimuli it
has been trained on, without regard to the order in which they were
trained. When working memory decay is introduced the model gains
the ability to recall more recent stimuli at the cost of making recalling
older stimuli less likely.
For example, in a 3-back task the bold letters in the following sequence would be
considered matches: VHZVXOL IOSAJXAO. Following each letter (except
the first n), the participant must give either a match or no-match response.
The n-Back task is of significant interest in cognitive psychology (Owen et al.,
2005). It is commonly used in brain imaging studies (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2009;
Watter et al., 2001), correlated with general intelligence (Jaeggi et al., 2008),
and used for training to improve working memory capacity (Jaeggi et al., 2010,
2011; but see Sprenger et al., 2013, Thompson et al., 2013).
In order to best explain the galis model for the n-Back task, which is more
complex than that of Section 4.2, the model’s description has been split up into
two sections. Section 4.3.1 gives an overview of each component of the galis
model for n-Back, then describes how it operates to process stimuli, and finally
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covers the internal structure of the control module. The intent is to present an
intuitive description that makes evident how the galis model for n-Back is
similar to that for Store/Recognize, and to also highlight the variations due
to the different tasks. Having provided a description of the function of the
model’s components, further technical details are given in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Methods
4.3.1.1 Top level architecture for n-Back tasks
The galis model for performing n-Back tasks consists of several interacting
regions, as seen in Figure 4.11. They are the visual input layer, the n-input
layer, the output nodes, the memory layer, the compare module, the context
module, and the control module. While there are some differences, overall the
functionality is similar to the Store/Recognize task galis model described in
the preceding section, as will be evident in the following description.
Nodes in the visual input layer are set externally to represent the visual
stimulus being presented during the current time step. Visual stimuli take the
form of 128-bit, randomly selected bipolar patterns. Patterns are generated
such that each input has an equal chance of being either 1 or -1. There are no
constraints placed on inter-pattern distances. For ease of discussion we refer to
visual stimuli as “letters,” as in the example sequence given above.
The n-input layer is a second input layer which is used to specify the current
goal of the model. This module is a stand-in for goal-related information that
may be represented biologically in the rostral prefrontal cortex (Charron and
Koechlin, 2010), and which could be added in a future extension of galis.






















Figure 4.11. The galis model as used for the n-Back task. Thin,
solid arrows denote one-to-one connections. The working memory
layer is fully recurrently connected (broad arrow). Dotted lines are
the outputs of the control module. Note that the number of boxes
pictured in each layer is an approximation only, and does not faithfully
represent the number of nodes used in the model.
particular version of n-Back the model should currently be performing (i.e.,
the current value of n). One of five different distributed patterns is used to
indicate whether the model’s current objective is to perform 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, or
5-back. The five specific patterns used are random bipolar patterns chosen in
advance. Note that the model learns to execute all five versions. Which version
is executed in a specific situation depends only on changing this input, not on
retraining or reconfiguring the model in any way. While the input layer used
for this example selects only among the relatively limited set of five versions of
n-Back, ultimately the same input mechanism could be used to select between
a wider array of tasks and objectives.
Two linear threshold units are used for model output, one each for match
and no-match, indicating whether the present stimuli is the same as the one
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n steps previously. The inputs to both nodes are gated. They can only be
activated when the control module has opened the Output gate.
The working memory layer is a discrete attractor network forming an auto-
associative memory, along the lines of those described earlier in this dissertation.
Like biological working memories, the galis working memory layer has limited
capacity (McEliece et al., 1987), high plasticity via one-shot learning (Sandberg
et al., 2003), and close integration with executive systems. Additionally, the
working memory layer has been modified from standard Hopfield networks to
include dynamic thresholds, weight decay and temporally asymmetric weights
as outlined in the previous chapter to enable it to recall a temporal sequence of
stored patterns in a specified order rather than randomly. The working memory
layer is the same size as the visual input layer, and its nodes are bipolar valued.
It is treated in more depth in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2.1.
As with the Store/Recognize task, the compare module is used to compare
the visual input layer to the current state of the working memory, to assess if
the current stimuli and recalled stimuli match. Depending on the similarity
between the two, it will send activity to one of the two output nodes. Please
refer to Section 4.3.2.4 for details.
The context module allows the control module to keep track of what stage
of processing it is in. Processing each new stimulus occurs in two stages,
called start and finish. During the start phase, the new stimulus is added to
the working memory contents. During the finish phase the working memory
contents is searched to determine if that new stimulus is a match with the
n-Back item. The control module adjusts, via the Context Gate, the state of
the context module to indicate the current stage. This state information can
then be output back to the controller, allowing the controller to affect its own
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inputs in the following time step and giving it greater flexibility than if it were
to respond only to the current input.1 In effect, this gives the controller the
ability to select its own short-term sub-goals to be carried out in the following
time step, similar to the Endogenous Goals layer of codam (Korsten et al.,
2006). Details are given in Section 4.3.2.5.
The final component is the control module, which is responsible for directing
the operation of the rest of the system. It takes input from the n-input layer
and context module, and its outputs drive the six gates which govern flow
of activity and updating of weights throughout the rest of the model. Just
like with the Store/Recognize task, the core of the control module is a second
discrete attractor network, called the “instruction sequence memory” (ism).
Like the working memory attractor network, the instruction sequence memory
stores sequences using temporally asymmetric weights. But where the working
memory module stores visual stimuli, the control module stores the actions
necessary for completing a task. Both the working memory and ism are based
on the same weight update, input and state update rules. Reusing the same
principles for both data and instruction storage makes galis particularly
parsimonious. However, the ism has been modified to store multiple sequences
concurrently. Each sequence corresponds to a particular set of actions the
model may need to perform during a task. For instance, with n-Back, one such
sequence of actions would be used to add a new stimulus to working memory.
Each component action takes a single time-step of the simulation to execute,
1 The context module could be considered as part of the control module, but we indicate
it separately here to facilitate explanation. In addition, separating the two increases
the modularity of galis models by allowing the control module to be agnostic about










Figure 4.12. Slightly expanded control module showing its gated
input encoder and output decoder which function as heteroassociative
memories. (See Figure 4.14 on page 116 for full detail.)
and corresponds to a particular set of signals to open and close different gates
to different degrees.
The control module has two other components besides the ism, an input
“encoder” and output “decoder” (see Figure 4.12). They serve as heteroas-
sociative memories that translate the inputs to the control module into the
particular patterns stored in the ism, and then translate the response of the
ism into the controller’s final outputs. This pre- and post-processing is done
primarily to mitigate the effects of noise and crosstalk and to enable the control
module to convert between inputs, stored patterns, and outputs of differing
dimensions. Details on the control module can be founds in Sections 4.3.2.2
and 4.3.2.3.
Control Outputs and Gating. The control module again manages the behavior
of the model through a system of gates. The outputs of the control module are
used to open and close these gates, which in turn modulate the flow of activity
between layers and regulate the weight updates in the working memory layer.
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The six gates which control the flow of activity throughout the n-Back model
can be seen in Figure 4.11. They are:
1. the Memory Input gate, between the visual input layer and working
memory layer that biases the memory’s current state towards or away
from the current stimulus;
2. the Output gate which controls the flow of activity from the compare
layer to the output nodes;
3. the Memory Training gate which controls when the working memory
learns a new pattern;
4. the Memory Unlearning gate which controls when the working memory
removes a pattern from memory;
5. the Context gate which regulates the state of the context module; and
6. the Encoder Update gate which governs the inputs to the control module,
so that it can decide whether it updates its own state.
When a gate is open it allows information to flow through it like an open
valve in a water pipe (in contrast to an open switch in an electrical circuit,
which prevents flow). A gate’s state is given by
gt = kg g
t−1 + st (4.9)
where kg is a decay term, here equal to 0.5, t is the current time step, and
st is the current value of the control module output governing this gate.2
2 Here t and t−1 denote the current and previous time step in the simulation, respectively.
This is true of all equations except Eqs. 4.17 & 4.18, in which τ and τ−1 are used in
their place to refer to the training epoch rather than the time step. This is by necessity,
since the control module learning which these equations describe occurs before the
simulation itself is run, i.e., before there are time steps as such to be counted.
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The effect of gates is multiplicative, such that the downstream activity of a
gated connection is a product of its incoming activity and its current state g.
Gates have values in [−2, 2], so gates have more nuanced effects than binary
states of “open” and “closed.” A gate can have an amplifying effect on its
incoming value (g > 1.0), a damping effect (0.0 ≤ g < 1.0), or an inhibitory
effect (g < 0.0). Being able to use the same system for both attending to an
input (i.e., amplification) and inhibiting that input is appealing, since the two
effects can be viewed as antipodal (Engle et al., 1995). An exception to this
continuous behavior are the two gates which control learning and unlearning
in the working memory. Because updating the working memory weights is a
discrete decision — a weight matrix is either updated or not in any time step —
these gates have a threshold. Their state is calculated the same way, and the
weights are updated when g > 1 and not updated when g ≤ 1. All gates are
initially closed when the model begins.
In some situations there are many connections being mediated by the same
gate. For instance, the connections between the input and memory layer are
one-to-one. These may be thought of as 128 individual connections each having
their own gate, with each gate having an identical value. The effect is the
same as a single “master” gate controlling all 128 connections based on a single
output from the control module, and so we adopt the convention of referring to
the parallel opening and closing of these 128 connections as if there is a single
gate present.
4.3.1.2 Working Memory
The working memory layer is a discrete attractor network incorporating dy-
namic thresholds and temporally asymmetric weights that permit it to process
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temporal sequences as described in Chapter 3 as well as Reggia et al. (2009)
and Sylvester et al. (2010). The dynamic threshold keeps the network from
becoming stuck in any single attractor basin during recall by incrementally
increasing the amount of input a node must have in order to stay in the same
state. This allows multiple patterns to be activated serially during recall rather
than having the network settle on a single pattern, as is typically the case with
the fixed-point attractor dynamics of standard Hopfield networks.
The temporally asymmetric weights are formed using a one-shot Hebbian
learning rule which correlates a node’s activity with the activity of the other
nodes during the presentation of the previous input rather than the current
one, unlike with typical Hopfield networks. By using correlations between
both concurrent and consecutive activity there is the potential for representing
more structured information (Cowan, 1999). In particular, the asymmetric
weights are used here to ensure that the network not only switches between
attractors in its state space, but does so in an order corresponding to that in
which the input patterns were presented. Section 4.3.2.1 provides details on
weight learning rules, calculating inputs and updating states.
In addition to adding patterns to working memory, the network also has
the capability to “unlearn” or partially “forget” stored patterns. This is
accomplished using an anti-Hebbian learning rule (Hopfield et al., 1983). One
could think of the unlearning procedure as the addition of an “erase” command
to complement the typical “load” and “store” functions already present. In the
case of n-Back, for example, patterns more than n steps back in the sequence
are no longer needed. Unlearning these patterns reduces the interference they
cause, making it easier to recall more recent stimuli. While this model was able
to perform n-Back tasks without needing to unlearn these older stimuli, initial
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experiments indicated that unlearning significantly increased performance due
to reduced interference.
4.3.1.3 Model Operation
Each run of the model is divided into two phases: Controller Initialization
and Task Execution. In the Controller Initialization phase, the control module
learns the instruction sequences necessary to perform the task using one-
shot Hebbian learning. This is so the ism contains the appropriate pairings
of conditions and responses when the task is begun. This training of the
control module occurs only once, and after the Task Execution phase begins
its weights remain unchanged. The working memory layer, in contrast, begins
in a blank, untrained state, and has its weights updated multiple times as the
trial progresses through the Task Execution phase. While the associations
being learned in the control module are determined by the human modeler,
the learning that the working memory engages in during the task is entirely
guided by the model itself, with the model determining when to add or remove
a pattern from working memory.
During each step of processing in the Task Execution phase the model
goes through the following operations, directed by the control module. If the
model activated either output node in the previous time step, a new stimulus
will be presented, otherwise the inputs from the previous step are retained.
Next, the state of the working memory is updated. Then the output of the
compare module is updated to reflect the new state of working memory and
the potentially new state of the visual input layer. Following this the state of
the context module is updated.
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Next, the control module’s encoder is updated if the Encoder Update gate,
which regulates it, is open. If it is not open, the encoder input will be the
same as the previous time step, and thus the downstream layers in the control
module will receive the same inputs as the previous time step. This prevents
the control module from starting recall of a new sequence of actions before
the previous sequence has concluded. (Each action is one of the elements in
the sequences stored in the control module, and corresponds to one particular
operation necessary to carry out the task, as explained below.) This occurs
because the Encoder Update gate is opened only at the end of a sequence,
setting the stage for the next sequence to begin at the following time step.
The encoder’s output, whether it is the result of new inputs from an open
gate or not, is then used as input for the ism. Once the ism is updated the
decoder selects an action and outputs the gate control signals which compose
that action. These newly produced gate control signals are used to update the
gating values according to Equation 4.9. If either the learning or unlearning
gates are open, then weight updates of the working memory layer occur. If the
Output gate is open then either output node may be activated, depending on
the state of the compare module. If either is activated then a new stimulus
will be presented in the following time step, proximately corresponding to a
self-paced stimulus presentation.
4.3.1.4 Controller Functionality
As with the Store/Recognize task, the Controller Initialization phase occurs
before the model is presented with any inputs or produces any outputs. For
the n-Back model, the network learns to perform the task for n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The model is always trained to do all five versions, so training is identical
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no matter which versions the model will ultimately perform during the Task
Execution phase, when the n-input layer specifies which of the five different
versions the model will perform. This makes the model capable of switching
between versions of n-Back during trials, as dictated solely by its inputs and
without any other adjustments being made.
For the n-Back task, during the Controller Initialization phase the control
module learns six instruction sequences (Table 4.4; WM = working memory).
One of these six sequences adds a new stimulus to working memory when it
is executed. The other five each correspond to one of the five possible values
of n. Each of these five sequences steps back through the working memory’s
record of the recent visual stimuli the appropriate number of items and then
evaluates whether the current stimulus matches the one recalled. Which of the
six instruction sequences is executed is determined by the control module’s
inputs, which come from the context module and the n-input layer. (See
Section 4.3.2.2 for further information.)
To illustrate how the trained control module works during the Task Exe-
cution phase on a concrete sequence of inputs, consider a sequence of stimuli
ASDFG, with A being the first stimulus and G the last. Figure 4.13 illustrates
the step-by-step actions that occur in processing the single input pattern G,
where the n-input value is 3. The goal is for the model to generate the correct
no match output since G does not match the 3-back stimulus S. In order to
evaluate if G matches the 3-back stimulus (which in this case is S), The model
must first add G to its working memory and then recover the 3-back stimulus
from its record. This requires stepping backwards through the sequence it has
learned, from G to F to D and finally to S.
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(f) end of step t+4 (f) beginning of step t+ 4
Figure 4.13. Step-by-step operation of the n-Back model to process one input
stimulus G. (See text for details.)
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1. open memory input gate, strongly biasing memory state
towards input
2. train the working memory layer; switch to finish context
2. current stimulus
matches 1-back?
3. open output gate; switch to start context; unlearn WM
3. current stimulus
matches 2-back?
4. delay (i.e., update the state of WM, but nothing else)


















3. open output gate; switch to start context; unlearn WM
In Figure 4.13(a) a new stimulus G is presented for time step t, n-input is
set to 3, and the Encoder Update gate is open as indicated by the shaded label
in the illustration. Recall that an open gate allows the flow of activation in the
same way that an open valve in a pipe allows the flow of fluid. Because n=3,
the controller determines that it must execute the first instruction sequence in
Table 4.4 (“add stimulus to working memory”). The working memory state
is depicted as A because that is three stimuli before the stimulus which was
just processed (F). By the end of time step t (Figure 4.13(b)), the effects
of action 1 can be seen: the Encoder Update gate has been closed to allow
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sequence 1 to finish executing, and the working memory state has become
the same as the visual input because the Memory Input gate is open. At the
end of t + 1 (Figure 4.13(c)), the Memory Training gate has been opened,
updating the working memory weights, the Context gate has been closed,
changing the context to finish, and the Encoder Update gate has been opened
to allow a new sequence to be selected in the next time step. At the end of
t + 2 (Figure 4.13(d)), a new instruction sequence has been selected (“does
the current stimulus match the one from three back?”). The Memory Input
gate is closed, allowing the working memory to recall the previous item in
memory. The Encoder Update gate is closed again to allow the instruction
sequence to complete. In Figure 4.13(e) the gates remain unchanged as the
working memory recalls the preceding item again. In Figure 4.13(f) the working
memory steps back a third item in memory. The Output gates are opened,
allowing the compare module to activate the no-match node since the input
pattern G fails to match the working memory state S, generating the correct
output for this stimulus. The Memory Unlearning gate is opened to forget S
now that it is no longer relevant to the task. The Context, Memory Input and
Encoder Update gates are switched to ready the model for a new stimulus in
the following time step. Other values of n would lead to similar behavior, only
with a different number of delaying steps until the match step in Figure 4.13(f)
is done.
4.3.2 Model Details
This section provides some further details on the n-Back model that are relevant
for its operation but not necessary in order to understand its overall structure.
Two systems are particularly highlighted here as they differ most from the
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model of the prior section. The first is the working memory, which differs
because it must process sequential memories to perform n-Back, which it did
not need to do to for the Store/Recognize task. Second is the controller. The
controller architecture used for Store/Recognize is slightly simplified for ease
of explication, whereas for n-Back it is more refined. Further details on the
controller are provided here since this is the form that will be used in the final
two chapters.
4.3.2.1 Working Memory
The working memory layer is based on the temporally asymmetric attractor
approach developed in Chapter 3. It uses two weight matrices to store items in
the sequence as well as their order. The first weight matrix, WWM, is trained
with standard one-shot Hebbian learning with the addition of a weight decay
term so that older memories are supplanted by more recent ones:





j (1− δij) (4.10)
Here kWM is the decay rate (0 ≤ kWM < 1) and δij is Kronecker’s delta, which
ensures that weights on self-connections are fixed at zero. The second weight
matrix, VWM, also uses Hebbian learning but associates the state of a node
not with the current states of other nodes, but with the other nodes’ previous
states. This introduces a sense of temporal ordering to VWM, making it possible
to recall the stimuli in order rather than randomly. The learning rule is given
by







The decay term is still present, although the Kronecker’s delta factor is not
as it is desirable for a node’s activity to be influenced by its own previous
state. Updating the state of the working memory layer occurs in two stages,
the first governed by the asymmetric weights, and the second by the symmetric
weights. When both WWM and VWM are used simultaneously they can work at
cross purposes. VWM is pushing the network towards the next attractor, while
WWM is fighting to keep it in the same attractor basin. The two-stage process
adopted here helps the network to proceed from one state to the next in a
more orderly and predictable progression.
Activation updating begins by first calculating the input hti to each node i
using VWM and the previous network state along with a gated connection from
the topologically corresponding node in the input layer. Using only VWM to
update the network serves to move the network state from the current attractor






j − θti + 2 gtin inti (4.12)
where vij is the strength of the temporally asymmetric connection from node j
to node i both in the memory layer, aj is the state of node j in the memory layer,
gin is the value of the gating node mediating the input-to-memory connections,
in i is the state of node i in the visual input layer, and θi is a dynamic threshold
that is used to keep the network from settling permanently into any one
attractor basin. If a node’s state has not changed in the previous time step,
the magnitude of θi increases, which means node i will require inputs with
larger magnitudes to remain in the same state. This is done according to the
same procedure as for Store/Recognize (see § 4.2.4.1 as well as Equation 3.4),
and the same parameter values are used — namely kθ = .02 and kw = 0.0125.
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The input hi is then used to update the state of each node according to the
same step function used previously (i.e., Equations 3.5 and 4.3).
After updating both ~a and ~θ, the updating process begins again, this time
using WWM and the current network state to calculate the input f
t
i according






j − θti + 2 gtin inti (4.13)
This helps the network to settle further into the new attractor basin it was
pushed towards by VWM in the previous stage. The asymmetric weights suffice
to get the network into the next attractor basin; the symmetric weights impel
it into the bottom of that basin, reducing the noisiness of the recall. This new
input f ti is then used to update ~a according to Equation ?? again (though the
conditionals are predicated on fi, not hi, this time), and ~θ is updated once
again.




























Here N is the number of nodes, while n is the same as the lag n in n-Back. The
at−1j term in Equation 4.11 has been replaced in Equation 4.15 by the summation
because the goal is not to disassociate the current state of the memory from
the state immediately preceding it, but from the pattern which was trained
preceding the current one. Because VWM is trained to make the memory move
toward the previously trained pattern, we can use it to approximate the pattern
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trained prior to the current state. The factor of 1/2n−1 is used so that unlearning
is more aggressive when shorter sequences need to be retained.
4.3.2.2 Controller Operation
In the Task Execution phase, processing each visual stimulus occurs in two
stages. The objective of the first stage is to add the new stimulus to working
memory. This situation is indicated by the context module outputting the
start pattern. If the context module is outputting start, then sequence 1 in
Table 4.4 will be executed, regardless of the value of the n-input layer. Adding
a new item to working memory is accomplished through two actions (numbers
1 & 2 in the table). The first action opens the Memory Input gate, so that the
state of the working memory will be biased towards the current visual stimulus.
The second action updates the weights WWM and VWM to add the current state
to working memory, and switches the context module to the finish mode so
that when the control module updates in the next time step it knows that the
working memory has already been trained.
The objective of the second stage in processing a visual stimulus is to
evaluate whether that stimulus matches the one presented n steps ago. This
requires stepping back through the working memory’s record of events, which is
accomplished by allowing the working memory’s dynamics to run n times. Due
to the effect of the temporally asymmetric weights, the state of the network
should shift to the previously trained item each time it updates. The sequence
to carry this out is selected based on the value of the n-input layer as well as
the context module outputting the finish pattern. For clarity, we describe how
this works in detail only for 3-back since extrapolation to the other versions of
the task is straightforward.
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Checking whether the current stimulus matches the stimulus three items ago
requires three actions (numbers 5, 4 & 3 in Table 4.4) executed consecutively.
The first two actions each delay the controller for a time step, which gives the
working memory the opportunity to update its state twice. During each of these
updates the asymmetric weights should move the network to the previously
trained stimuli. The third action does three things: open the Output gate so
the comparison between the current memory state and visual input can be
output, unlearn the current state of the working memory since it is no longer
relevant to the task, and switch the context module back to start so that in the
next time step the controller will know that processing the current stimulus is
complete and it is time to begin the first phase of processing the next stimulus.
(There are multiple delay actions with identical effects listed in Table 4.4
because the ism cannot be trained to repeat the same pattern a set number
of times, such as a sequence like α, α, α, δ. It can, however, learn α, β, γ, δ.
By defining β and γ to cause the same controller outputs as α— that is, if
you define them to be three different tokens all of the same type — you can
reproduce the effects of training the sequence α, α, α, δ. The four different
actions labeled “delay” all have the same effect, but each is represented as a
distinct bipolar pattern. Using this type/token distinction, the number of total
time steps the working memory delays can be controlled by using a different
number of these delay tokens in the instruction sequence for each value of n.)
4.3.2.3 Controller Architecture
A diagram of the control module’s internal structure can be seen in Figure 4.14.
It is composed of three subcomponents. The principal of these is the instruction
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Action Selection (7)!
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INSTRUCTION SEQUENCE MEMORY (512)!
Output to Gates!
Figure 4.14. The control module. Thick arrows denote fully con-
nected layers, while thin arrows denote one-to-one connections. Fol-
lowing the name of each layer is the number of nodes it contains in
the example presented in this paper. One-to-one connections from
the Encoder Auto-associative layer terminate on the cue nodes of the
instruction sequence memory, while full connections terminate on the
response nodes.
circumstance. The other two components are the encoder and decoder, which
are used for pre- and post-processing to convert the inputs of the controller
into the patterns stored in the instruction sequence memory, and then from
those patterns into the gating control signals the control module outputs.
Instruction Sequence Memory. The instruction sequence memory is a discrete
autoassociative memory that uses temporally asymmetric learning in addition
to standard Hebbian learning to process sequences (Chapter 3, supra; also
Sylvester et al., 2010). This allows it to store which actions make up the
response needed for the task, and also the order in which those actions must be
carried out. The ism has one important difference from the working memory
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layer, however: it has been modified to store multiple sequences at the same
time. This is accomplished by way of a conceptual division of the nodes into
two sets, the “cue” and “response” nodes. (The working memory module could
also be augmented in this way, for instance to model a dual n-Back task (Jaeggi
et al., 2010), but it is not necessary for this model.)
The role of the cue nodes is to provide the necessary context information
to the network to select from among the stored instruction sequences. The
state of the cue nodes corresponds to the situation the model is facing. The
response nodes are responsible for storing the actual items in each sequence,
and thus selecting an action from those in the given instruction sequence. Each
instruction sequence and each action are represented internally by random
bipolar strings. For n-Back there are six different instruction sequences and
seven actions, outlined in Table 4.4. Because an action can belong to more
than one sequence there are a total of seventeen patterns stored as attractors
in the ism (one for each row of Table 4.4).
Although the ism is divided into cue and response groups, its nodes are fully
connected. The difference between the two types of nodes lies in their inputs
and outputs. Only the state of the response nodes are output to the decoder
and the cue and response nodes receive different inputs from the encoder.
Cue node i’s external input ei comes from one-to-one topographic connections
from the corresponding node in the encoder auto-associative memory. These
connections allow the cue pattern which has been chosen by the encoder to
be passed on to the cue nodes. Response nodes, on the other hand, are fully
connected to all nodes in the encoder auto-associative memory. The weights
on these connections are trained using one-shot Hebbian learning to associate
each cue pattern with the first response pattern in that sequence. The purpose
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of the connections between the encoder and response nodes is to bias the ism
towards the first pattern in the sequence. This is only desirable when a new
sequence is being selected, so the gate on these connections is kept closed at
all other times. This way the encoder influences the response nodes only in
time steps when the controller determines that a new sequence is supposed to
be selected, and is ignored otherwise.
The external input to ism node i is defined by
ei =





uikaenck i ∈ {Response}
(4.16)
where aencj is the state of node j in the encoder auto-associative memory, uik
is the connection strength from node k in the encoder auto-associative memory
to node i in the instruction sequence memory, enc is the set of nodes in the
encoder, and gctrl is the value of the Encoder Update gate.
Like the working memory, the ism also has two weight matrices, WISM and
VISM. The former is trained using standard Hebbian learning and the latter
using temporally asymmetric learning, defined by the following rules:





j (1− δij) (4.17)






where τ is the training epoch. Here ~a is simply the concatenation of a cue and
response pattern which make up one of the seventeen distinct actions listed
in Table 4.4. Unlike kWM, kISM can be positive or negative. When negative,
it acts as a gain rather than decay. A positive value decreases the strength
of earlier items in a sequence. This is desirable when trying to reproduce
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serial position effects in human memories of external stimuli, but there is no
particular reason for earlier items in the instruction sequence to be diminished.
Negative values, which serve to amplify earlier items, have surprisingly been
found to be beneficial for the ism.
Other than taking input from the encoder rather than the visual input
layer, the dynamics of the ism are the same as those of the working memory.
The same two-part update process as the working memory layer (using first
the asymmetric and then the symmetric weights), although Eqs. 4.12 and 4.13
are redefined as follows to accommodate the differences in the external input,












j − θti + eti (4.20)
Both the state ~a and dynamic threshold ~θ of the ism are updated in the same
way as they are in the working memory.
Encoder. The encoder is responsible for selecting an instruction sequence to
execute by translating between the inputs to the control module and the cue
portion of the patterns stored in the ism. Both the inputs to the encoder and
the connections between the encoder and the ism response nodes are gated.
They are opened as part of the final action of a sequence, which allows the
control module to ready itself in the next time step to begin processing a new
sequence of actions. When the Encoder Input gate is open activity flows from
the context module and n-input layer to the encoder’s input layer. When this
gate is closed the encoder does not receive input so the state of its input layer
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remains unchanged from the previous time step. This in turn means that the
encoder’s output will be the same as the previous time step, so the ism will be
operating on the same cue pattern as it did in the previous time step. This
is done to prevent the ism from switching to the next instruction sequence
before the previous sequence in completed. The encoder-to-response-node
connections are mediated by the same gate value, since they should should
influence computation when a new sequence is being started and be ignored
otherwise.
The encoder is composed of three layers of bipolar nodes (Fig. 4.14). This
architecture could possibly be made simpler, but only at the expense of more
complicated dynamics. There are 96 nodes in the first layer (one per input) and
they receive input from the output of the context module and the n-input layer.
The second and third layers have 320 nodes, one per cue node in the ism. The
connections between the first and second layers are trained by one-shot Hebbian
learning, forming the two layers into a heteroassociative memory which can
produce the correct cue pattern when given the corresponding n-input vector
and context module output.
The third layer is a standard autoassociative Hopfield network which outputs
to the ism. It has a full set of intralayer connections which have been trained
by one-shot Hebbian learning to recognize cue patterns. These connections
serve to move the state further into the current activity basin, i.e., closer to the
cue pattern that the heteroassociative memory recalled. This mitigates errors
resulting from the first two layers. By training only on the cue patterns and
not the control module’s inputs or response patterns, this layer specializes in
cue pattern memory, and avoids interference which can arise in the preceding
and following layers.
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This autoassociative memory is carrying out a “redintegration” process, us-
ing prior knowledge to help reconstruct a pattern from a partial copy (Baddeley,
2007). Many cognitive models require that a pattern retrieved from memory
be reconstructed in some way (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2003), including
clarion (Sun, 2006) and the “clean-up” memory of Eliasmith and colleagues
(presented in (Stewart et al., 2011) and used in (Choo and Eliasmith, 2010),
among others). Attractor networks have been used for this purpose before,
including Lewandowsky (1999) and Kesner et al. (2000).
Decoder. The decoder is responsible for translating the patterns represented
in the ism response nodes into the signals used to drive gate activity. This
is accomplished through a competitive layer which serves to select a single
response action and a set of Hebbian-trained weights which learn to produce
the desired gate outputs for each action. It is composed of two layers (Fig. 4.14).
The first, called the action selection layer, has seven binary nodes — as many as
there are response patterns.3 It is fully connected to the response nodes of the
ism. These connections are trained by one-shot Hebbian learning to associate
each response pattern with a single active node in the action selection layer.
In order to help ensure that only one node will be active, the action selection
layer also has a set of recurrent connections which create competitive dynamics,
with every node reinforcing its own activation while inhibiting that of the
3 While using one node per action is a violation of galis’ commitment to using distributed
representations, there is some basis for their use in this situation. Distributed systems
using localized nodes for action selection is relatively common (e.g., Amos (2000)). This
is partially because it is an effective and convenient arrangement, but also because
action selection has been linked to the basal ganglia (Gurney et al., 2001a; Redgrave
et al., 1999; Schroll et al., 2012), and the basal ganglia have up to one thousand times
as many inputs as outputs. This topology suggests that information is being condensed
or integrated in some way, which is what occurs in the decoder. While we are not
attempting to explicitly model the basal ganglia here, we still do not wish to ignore the
role the cortico-basalganglio-thalamic loops play in action selection.
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other nodes. Since the Hebbian weights from the response nodes to the action
selection layer have already produced an activity pattern which is close to
having a single winner, only a single step of these competitive dynamics is
needed to make one node maximally active and all other nodes off.
The action selection layer then feeds in to the control module’s output layer,
which generates the gate control signals. The weights on these connections also
use one-shot Hebbian learning to learn the desired gate control signals. For
instance, if action i necessitates fully opening the first gate, partially closing
the second, and leaving the others unchanged, action node i’s outgoing weights
would be (1,−0.25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
4.3.2.4 Compare Module
The compare module is composed of two layers. The first is the same size as
the memory and visual input layers, and receives one-to-one connections from
each of those components. The state of nodes in this layer is the product of
the states of the corresponding nodes in the input and memory layers. The
second layer has two nodes, both of which take as input a value proportional
to the inner product of the input and memory layers’ states. One of the second
layer nodes adopts a state of one if its input is above a certain threshold —
here equal to 0.9 — and zero otherwise, while the other node outputs one if its
input is below that threshold and zero if it is above. These two nodes drive
the model’s output nodes.
4.3.2.5 Context Module
Within the context module, two linear threshold units, one each for start and
finish, are each fully connected to a set of 32 nodes. The start node activates
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when the Context gate’s state is less than one, the finish node when it is
greater than one. The weights on these connections are randomly selected
binary patterns. By raising or lowering the gate’s value above or below the
threshold the control module can select one of the two patterns for output.
While the context module may seem complex for its relatively simple function,
we note that this is largely due to the commitment to using a gating-based
mechanism and the desire to maintain modularity between the control and
context functions.
4.3.3 Results
After the galis n-Back model was trained to perform n-Back tasks of varying
lengths (n=1 through n=5), it was given sequences of 30 + n stimuli. The
first n are “preparatory stimuli,” and the response to these is ignored. This is
done for two reasons: primarily, because this is the way human subjects are
evaluated, and secondarily, because the first stimuli present a boundary case
to the model for which it was not given special behaviors to handle, namely,
attempting to recall a sequence which is longer than the one it has stored. For
each trial, ten stimuli would be generated, and the sequence of inputs would
then be drawn from these ten. A subset of all possible stimuli was used because
trials with human subjects often use limited sets of stimuli such as the digits
0–9 (Schoofs et al., 2008) or eight rotational positions around a circle (Hockey
and Geffen, 2004). Of the stimuli following the preparatory period, one third
were randomly selected to be matches. The following is a sample sequence used
for the 3-back version of the task with matching stimuli emphasized.
ADJAEFDKJCKAHFAHGDFGDKACKHCAGJAGK
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A is the first stimulus in the sequence and K is the last. Each sequence was
generated without any “lures” (matching stimuli which are one position off
from the target location, for instance a match four positions back when doing a
3-back task). Lures were excluded for two reasons. The first is that the human
data we were attempting to match (Watter et al. (2001)) did not use lures.
The second is that we wished to remove one potentially confounding factor
in order to concentrate on investigating the control module’s basic ability to
govern the model.
In Figure 4.15, the model’s performance is given, and is also compared
to that of human subjects, on 1-, 2- and 3-back tasks. Human data is taken
from Watter et al. (2001), which is typical of human results reported in the
literature. The model results are the average accuracy across all 30 stimuli in
250 random sequences. The error bars in Figure 4.15 represent the standard
error of the mean. Two different variations of the model were tested. Model V
used variable working memory decay rates (the larger n was, the smaller the
decay rate used, so that for larger n values the working memory attempted to
store more stimuli), while Model C used the same decay rate for all values of
n.4
Both models show that, as n increased from n=1 to n=5, response accuracy
decreased monotonically. For n=1, 2, 3 both models’ results are not significantly
different than human performance at the level of p = .05; however the overall fit
for Model V was closer. This is possible because different decay rates are most
suitable for recalling sequences of different lengths (Chapter 3). A lower decay
4 Specifically, in terms of the parameters given in §4.3.2, Model V used kWM = .350, .300,
.225, .150, .075 for n=1 through n=5, respectively, while Model C used kWM = .2625
for all versions. These values were chosen via iterative deepening depth-first search. In















Figure 4.15. Accuracy for human subjects and the computational
model for all five versions of n-Back. Human results were not reported
for n=4 and n=5. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. Model V used different working memory decay rates (kWM)
for each n, while Model C did not vary decay. The dashed horizontal
line indicates the accuracy that would be expected if one randomly
selected responses in a proportion matching that used to generate the
stimuli — i.e., outputting “match” according to a Bernoulli process
with p=1/3. (Note that the vertical axis does not begin at 0.0.)
rate in the working memory layer allows longer sequences of visual stimuli to
be successfully stored without deteriorating away. A higher decay rate removes
older items from memory, reducing interference and improving the ability to
recall shorter sequences. This accords with previous investigations into the role
of decay on attractor net working memories, where it has been hypothesized
that humans may adjust a working memory decay rate in order to control
the length of sequences that they are attempting to remember (Altmann and
Gray, 2002; Winder et al., 2009). The additional degree of freedom in Model V
may account for it’s improved fit compared to Model C. However, it should be
noted that this freedom is not necessary for Model C to produce a statistically
significant match with human performance.
Figure 4.15 does not show human results for n= 4 and n= 5 because
they are not reported in Watter et al. (2001). This is common, as human
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subjects typically find them to be extremely challenging (Owen et al., 2005).
Nonetheless, the galis n-Back model is trained to perform 4- and 5-back,
and the simulation results are shown as model predictions. If humans really
can adjust working memory decay to adapt to longer sequences, Model V’s
performance leads us to predict that subjects taking Watter et al.’s version
of n-Back for n= 4 and n= 5 would see their performance drop off linearly
to approximately 76.3% and 70.7%, respectively. Higher values of kWM have
more of an impact on larger values of n, since decay is compounded. Keeping
kWM = .2625 in Model C therefore disproportionally impacts performance for
n= 4, 5, reducing Model C’s accuracy on 5-back to no better than chance.
(Since one third of stimuli are matches, a strategy of random guessing would
result in an expected accuracy of 66.6%.) If humans cannot adjust working
memory decay to suit the task then we would predict that their accuracy on
Watter et al.’s version of 4-back to fall to 72.7%, and for human subjects to
be unable to perform 5-back at better than random accuracy. Both Model
V’s and C’s errors in these more demanding versions of n-Back appear to be
caused by the difficulty of recalling sequences of this length from the working
memory layer, rather than from improper retrieval of the instruction sequences
from the ism.
The galis n-Back model exhibits a response time which is approximately
linear in the value of n. When a new stimulus is presented the model requires
two time steps to execute actions 1 and 2 in Table 4.4, and n additional time
steps for memory retrieval. Watter et al. (2001) also reports the participants’
average response times following each stimulus on 1-, 2- and 3-back tasks,
which is also roughly linear in n. This is compared to the average number of




































Figure 4.16. Correlation between human response time per stimulus
and the average number of steps the model takes per stimulus. The
trend line is defined by y = 0.011x− 2.042, with R2 = 0.9888.
n-Back model’s response time correlates well with the human response time
data, with R2 = 0.9888. These results are relatively robust to variations in
kWM and kISM.
To demonstrate that our n-Back model is capable of switching between
versions of n-Back without relearning any of the instructions, experiments were
run in which the value presented to the n-input layer changed mid-trial. Input
sequences were constructed in the same way as described at the beginning of
this section, with one third matches, no lures, and a preamble of preparatory
inputs. For the first fifteen stimuli following the preamble, the n-input layer
was given an input of n1. Beginning with the sixteenth stimulus, the value of
the n-input layer was set to n2 6= n1.5 No parameters were adjusted or weight
matrices were externally modified between the first and second phases of each
trial; the only difference was the value of the n-input layer.
Figure 4.17 shows some representative results when mid-trial changes in n
occur. Each graph shows the accuracy at each position in the input sequence,












































Figure 4.17. Accuracy when changing the value of n during a trial. The horizontal
axis is the serial position within each sequence (following the preparatory period),
and the vertical axis is the average accuracy of responses to that stimulus across all
trials. Values of n were switched beginning with the 16th stimulus. [Top] Switching
from n1 = 1 to n2 = 3 (dark crosses) and vice-versa (light circles). The average
accuracy for the n=1 and n=3 conditions are shown as dotted and dashed lines,
respectively. [Middle] Switching between n=2 and n=4. [Bottom] Switching between
n=3 and n=4. (Note that the vertical axis does not begin at 0.0.)
128
averaged over 1000 trials. Prior to changing the value of n, the model performs
as expected: at the average accuracy for n1. After the switch the model’s
accuracy is indistinguishable from trials in which the model was run at n2
for the entire trial (call this the baseline n2 accuracy). Thus there is no long-
lasting performance penalty associated with having had to switch versions of
the task. However, although the transition between values of n is quick, it is not
perfect. Whenever n is decreased, there is a brief transitional period in which
performance is below, but monotonically rises to, the baseline n2 accuracy. This
gradual increase in accuracy occurs because some patterns added to working
memory are never unlearned during the transition period, resulting in increased
interference. The only exception to this pattern is whenever transitioning to
n2 =1, in which case the model’s accuracy jumps to the baseline n2 accuracy
level as soon as the new value of n is input. We believe this is possible because
the attractor for the 1-back stimulus is strong enough, having been decayed
only once, to overcome any problems introduced by insufficient unlearning of
other stimuli. In contrast, and unexpectedly, when n is increased there is a
sharp drop in accuracy below the baseline n2 accuracy. This occurs because
when n2>n1 some patterns which are needed have already been unlearned.
This premature unlearning problem is only temporary, however, as the patterns
which experience too much unlearning decay as more stimuli are added to
working memory. After several stimuli the model is behaving as if it was never
forced to switch between versions of the task.
In summary, the galis n-Back model makes several testable predictions
about the average accuracy following a mid-trail change from n1 to n2. First,
after a brief transition period the accuracy is always the same as the baseline
n2 accuracy. Second, if n2 < n1, there will be a rapid monotonic rise in
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accuracy to the n2 baseline value. Third, if n2 > n1, there will be a sudden,
sharp deterioration in accuracy below n2’s baseline value, followed by a rapid
monotonic rise to n2’s baseline value. To our knowledge, data does not yet
exist that can support or refute these predictions.
In order to investigate the sources of model errors, 100 runs of Model C
were executed for n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} according to the same procedures outlined
at the beginning of this section. The n=5 case was not evaluated because it
was already performing no better than chance, as explained earlier. For each
time step, the action chosen by the control module was recorded. This was
compared to the correct responses; for instance, for n=3, actions 1, 2, 5, 4,
3 (action numbers are listed in Table 4.4) should occur in that order for each
stimulus. We then computed the Levenshtein distance6 between the actual
and ideal responses (Navarro, 2001). A value of zero indicates a perfect match,
meaning the control module never selected an incorrect action during that
trial. The errors made by runs with non-zero distances can be attributed to
failures of the control module. Errors made during a run with zero Levenshtein
distance (no controller errors) were generally due to a failure of the working
memory, such as a recalled pattern which is too noisy to be properly identified,
or a failure to advance to the previously trained item. (It is possible that the
6 Levenshtein distance is a measure of string distance in which the two strings do not
need to be the same length. It is a count of the number of symbols which must be
added, removed or modified to produce one string from the other, and thus is a natural
fit for this situation as we are interested in the number of actions which are missing,
duplicated or erroneous. Formally, it is defined recursively as leva,b(|a|, |b|) where
leva,b(i, j) =

max(i, j) if min(i, j) = 0,
min
 { leva,b(i− 1, j), . . .leva,b(i, j − 1), . . .




working memory could correctly recall a pattern and the compare module fails
to correctly judge it, but testing the components individually revealed that
this was hardly ever the case.) Both control and working memory errors are
due to incorrect associations in the respective Hopfield networks, and can be
linked to Hopfield nets’ limited capacity and stochastic recall process (Ma,
1999; McEliece et al., 1987). It is possible that these errors could be reduced
by employing different learning rules which have been shown to increase the
capacity of Hopfield nets (Storkey, 1997; Storkey and Valabregue, 1999).
The proportion of runs having control errors can be seen in Fig. 4.18(a).
As n increases so does the prevalence of control errors, since the length of the
instruction sequence required is greater. The overall accuracy for all trials is
compared to the accuracy only for those networks which made no control errors
in Fig. 4.18(b). The proportion of responses which were incorrect as a result of
malfunctions in the control module, working memory module, or both is shown
in Fig. 4.18(c). Even though more errors can be made by the control module
as n increases, the number of errors made by the working memory increases
even faster. As a result, a larger proportion of errors can be attributed to
mistakes in the working memory at higher n. Increasing error rates at higher
values of n are to be expected since errors in both the control module and
working memory can occur at any step during processing and higher values of n
necessarily include more processing steps, allowing more errors to accumulate.
Runs in which the control module made errors can be subdivided into
two groups: those making “pathological” and “non-pathological” errors. The
pathological set were those that completely failed to output a particular action
for the entire trial, for instance, a network which throughout was never able to
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Figure 4.18. (a) The proportion of runs in which the control module
made one or more errors for n∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. (b) The accuracy of model
outputs for all runs (darker bars), and for those runs where no control
errors were made (lighter bars). (Note that the vertical axis does
not begin at 0.0.) (c) The proportion of model responses which were
incorrect due to malfunctions in the working memory, controller, or
both.
Levenshtein distances over 50. The non-pathological networks were those that
made occasional errors, but were able to respond perfectly to a majority of
stimuli. These networks tended to produce Levenshtein distances between one
and ten.
We believe these pathological conditions are caused either because the
attractor basin associated with the un-recalled action is either too small or
too close in state-space to another basin. Either of these situations can
occur simply as a result of having randomly chosen the bit patterns for the
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internal representation of that action. This could be resolved by selecting semi-
orthogonal patterns to represent each action, or ensuring there is a minimum
Hamming distance between internal representations.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Testing the GALIS Hypothesis
The work described here with the n-Back task demonstrates for the first time
that the galis framework is capable of supporting executive functioning more
typically associated with symbolic AI systems. This executive behavior allows
galis-built models to exercise control over their own working memory. This
control is a function not only of the structure of the network, as is usually
the case, but also of the activity patterns learned by the instruction memory
that make it possible to “program” a network to a novel extent. For example,
after an initial training phase is complete, the galis n-Back model performs
n-Back tasks for varying values of n without any direction from the user about
how or when to modify its memory, activate outputs, etc. This independence
is maintained even when the model switches between different versions of
n-Back dynamically within trials. This was made possible by using attractor
networks with asymmetric learning that control the sequential opening and
closing of gated connections between model components. It was not necessary
to rely on symbolic production rule-based systems, complex models of spiking
neurons, locally encoded information, or biologically implausible learning rules.
Parameters did not need to be re-tuned in order to match human performance
on 1-, 2- and 3-back versions of the task, although adjusting the working
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memory decay rate did lead to a better fit. There is also a theoretical argument
for why lesser amounts of decay are desirable for larger values of n, namely,
people may implicitly adjust decay in an attempt to change the size of their
memory buffer (Altmann and Gray, 2002; Weems et al., 2009). The number of
time steps the model takes for each stimulus is also highly correlated with the
response times of human subjects. No modifications of any kind were necessary
to capture this relationship in response times.
Importantly, testable predictions were made regarding 4- and 5-back as well
as for intra-sequence changes to n. Although human participants find 4- and
5-back difficult, some studies test such lengths under certain conditions, and
research is ongoing on training regimes which may allow humans to perform
at such levels with practice (Harbison et al., 2011; Jaeggi et al., 2010). The
method presented here for modeling n-Back could be falsified if human subjects
failed to produce the observed patterns in accuracy changes when switching
values of n within trials. I am not aware of any studies in which human subjects
have been required to change n midstream, as opposed to between trials or
blocks of trials, but if such studies were carried out one would expect to see
the patterns evident in Figure 4.17.
One key point is that an important part of the behavior of the galis n-Back
model, the value of n, is encoded in the contents of its adaptive instruction
memory rather than the model architecture or in hand-coded connections. No
changes to the model were required to perform five different versions of n-Back;
changing the inputs to the model is sufficient to effect different behaviors in
the model. Additionally, there are only a few major architectural differences
between this model and a previously implemented model of the much simpler
Store/Recognize task. These consist primarily of adjusting output — and to
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a lesser degree, input — system to accord with the particular requirements of
the task (e.g., two rather than three output nodes) and introducing one new
component, the context module. This new component could be generally useful
for a variety of tasks, not only n-Back, since it acts much like a very simple
Program Counter in a CPU. In addition to the context module, the compare
module present in both of these models is also a dedicated piece of architecture,
hand-designed by the modeler. This does decrease the generality of the model,
but I would note that this component is one which is also useful in a large
variety of situations, and so while it is specifically tailored to one purpose, this
purpose could generally be useful for a spectrum of future tasks.
4.4.2 GALIS as a general purpose framework
The behavior-as-software approach used in the galis framework is a novel
approach among neural network models. In a sense, the ability to store
temporal sequences of “instructions” in a control module and gate the activity
throughout model regions based on these instructions gives galis models the
ability to act in a “computer-like” fashion. Further, I predict that changing
the information learned by the control module will enable galis models to
be adapted to other tasks. In other words, I believe that building models of
other similar tasks will require mostly changes to the neural software and only
minimal changes to the neural hardware as I will demonstrate in the following
chapters.
The use of both attractor networks and gating help to overcome one of
the primary challenges of working memory: the need to balance stability with
plasticity (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Each pattern stored in both the working
memory layer and the attractor networks of the controller gains stability from
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being represented as the minimum of an attractor basin. However, the states
of these networks can still be rapidly updated by introducing biasing inputs
from external sources or adjusting nodes’ thresholds. Similarly, gating can
be used both to stabilize a network by, for instance, closing off its external
inputs, or to rapidly destabilize a network by allowing inputs or triggering
weight updates (O’Reilly et al., 2002). This is reminiscent of the D1 and D2
forms of attractor dynamics present in the prefrontal cortex (Durstewitz and
Seamans, 2008). Attractors dominated by D1-type dynamics have deep basins,
aiding robustness of working memory but increasing preseveration, while those
dominated by D2 dynamics have shallow attractors, allowing fast switching and
high flexibility, but making maintenance more difficult. Differing activation
of the relevant dopaminergic systems can shift the attractor systems between
modes, similar to the way that opening and closing gates governing biasing
inputs can reform the attractor networks in galis.
Of course, the galis framework currently has some limitations, and will
evolve in its details as it is used for additional tasks. These limitations include
requiring learned instruction sequences to be determined by the modeler.
Despite this issue, I think the current system of basing behavior on stored
patterns in memory is a valuable stepping-stone towards more autonomous
systems. If behavior can be stored in memory then it can be more easily modified
than if it was built into the architecture. And if it can be modified, I believe
it can be generated autonomously during learning. In other words, galis
moves away from systems whose behavior is a function of their construction
and towards ones whose behavior is based on instruction, with the eventual aim
of not needing to provide those instructions explicitly. I am optimistic that the
instruction patterns of the ism can be modified online by the model because
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the instruction memory operates by the same paradigm as the working memory
layer, which I have shown can be modified by the model online. Future work
needs to allow galis to modify instruction sequences during task performance,
improving as it gains experience, and generate instruction sequences from the
ground up, as is done in Chapter 6. This would enable galis models to
proactively adjust their own behavior during trials rather than carrying out a
predetermined sequence of reactions to the environment.
A second shortcoming of the current galis approach to storing instructions
is the inability of temporally asymmetric attractor nets to store sequences in
which the same item is repeated a given number of times without resorting to
storing multiple tokens each representing the same type. There is a diverse
assortment of attractor net methods for storing sequences (e.g., Farrell and
Lewandowsky, 2002; Koene and Hasselmo, 2007) which are being explored to
resolve this issue, in addition to looking into other neural approaches to serial
memory (e.g., Botvinick and Plaut, 2006; Kremer, 2001; Monner and Reggia,
2012).
Finally, while galis is not intended as an accurate model of the brain,
it is loosely inspired by the organization of cerebral cortex, especially frontal
regions. For example, the control module’s rule-like behavioral sequencing
captures roles believed to be played by lateral prefrontal cortex (Bunge, 2004;
Tanji et al., 2007), and the compare module’s pattern matching activities can
be related to the performance and detection of incongruent stimuli functions of
the anterior cingulate cortex (Brown and Braver, 2005; MacDonald et al., 2000).
An important direction for future research will be to further bring galis into
alignment with known neuroscientific data.
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5
Visuospatial Processing and Binding
5.1 Introduction
The cognitive control capability of the galis framework was evaluated in
the previous chapter using two sequential memory tasks. Specifically, it was
applied successfully to learn to perform simultaneously five versions of the
classic n-Back task that is widely used in psychological testing. Not only did
the resulting n-Back model function correctly, but its accuracy and response
times correlated strongly with those of human subjects performing the same
task (Sylvester et al., 2013). While this was encouraging, the n-Back task is
relatively limited in terms of cognitive operations; for example, it does not
involve any spatial information.
The goal of this chapter is to extend the galis framework to a much
more challenging task that, for the first time, involves incorporating spatial
relationships and addressing the binding problem concerning two different types
of visual information (Feldman, 2013). Specifically, it presents a model for a
card matching task in which an agent uncovers pairs of face-down cards, trying
to select pairs that have matching patterns on their faces. This task makes
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heavy use of visual information processing, working memory of the location
of specific previously-uncovered cards, attention mechanisms, and binding
of visual patterns to the spatial locations in which they occur. The trained
card matching system addresses this latter challenge by taking inspiration
from the ventral “what” and dorsal “where” visual pathways of the human
brain (Baizer et al., 1991; Ungerleider and Haxby, 1994) and how they provide
integrated information to prefrontal cortical regions. Binding the general
location information provided by the dorsal pathway with the appropriate
detailed object-specific information provided by the ventral pathway is a
significant challenge (Reynolds and Desimone, 1999), and is a key focus of the
task-specific model presented here. Computational experiments show that the
galis card matching system not only performs the task successfully, but that
it does so in ways that are again reminiscent of observations of human subjects
performing this task.
Like the n-Back model, discussion of the methods used in this chapter
has been divided into two sections. A comprehensive informal overview is
provided in the next section, with further technical details being provided in
Section 5.3. The final two sections cover the results of experiments with the
model, comparing it to both a symbolic alternative and human subjects, and a
discussion of the findings.
5.2 Methods
Here I apply the galis approach for the first time to a more complex spatial
memory task known by many names including “Pairs,” “Pelmanism,” and
“Concentration,” but which I will refer to here as the “card matching task.”
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It is played by first randomly placing several pairs of cards face-down on a
tabletop. The player turns over two cards each round, one at a time, with the
goal being to uncover matching pairs of cards so that they can be removed
from the table. Play proceeds until all cards have been removed.
The requirements of the card matching task expand on the cognitive control
tasks described in the preceding chapters by placing stimuli patterns in a
spatial environment. That is, the model is not just attempting to remember a
set of abstract stimuli in the æther, but must successfully bind together what
was seen with where it was seen in the environment. The binding of multiple
features is an ongoing challenge for neural models. This task also requires that
a system make judgements about the contents of its own memory. In other
words, it is not enough to just store a series of stimuli, but the model must
be able to make strategic decisions based on inspection of its own memory of
what cards have been seen previously and their locations.
In this implementation of card matching each card is 9 by 13 pixels. The
backs are a uniform dark grey, and the fronts are bichromatic patterns such
as horizontal stripes, crosses, or diagonals (see Figure 5.1). Depending on the
experiment either four, six or eight pairs of matching cards (i.e., eight, twelve
or sixteen cards in all) are arrayed on the table top, initially all face down.
The images on the fronts of cards consist of monochromatic, low-resolution
simplifications of national flags. For instance the 5-shaped card in Figure 5.1
is derived from the flag of Scotland, while the striped card could alternately
represent the flag of Italy, Ireland or France.
The galis model for card matching is composed of seven modules as
illustrated in Figure 5.2. These are the Visual, Location, Object, Motor,
Working Memory, Conflict, and Controller modules. Their functions are
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Figure 5.1. A depiction of the visual environment for the card
matching task during play. On the left is a view of the full environ-
ment. Here there are 10 cards still present, two of which are face-up
showing an 5 and a vertically-striped pattern. The middle part of
the illustration shows an expanded view of these two cards as well as
one of the face-down cards. On the right a 4×4 section of the board
has been blown up to show how each of the four “colors” used in
the visual field is encoded as an 8 bit binary string. In this example,
the white areas on the faces of cards (upper left of detailed area) are
encoded as 11010000 and the black areas on the faces of cards are
encoded as 0101111.
explained in the remainder of this section. Technical details can be found in
Section 5.3.
5.2.1 Visual System
The Visual System consists of the Primary Visual, Location, and Object
modules. The Primary Visual module provides input to the model (Figure 5.3).
Its visual field consists of a 55×67 grid of grayscale “pixels.” Each may take
one of four values: light grey, representing the surface of the tabletop; dark
grey, representing the back of a card; white and black, which together make
the patterns on the front of the cards. Each of these values is represented by a






















Figure 5.2. Overall architecture of the galis model for the card
matching task. Its seven modules form three functional systems, the
visual, executive and motor systems. Each system is indicated by an
enclosing dashed-line box. See Figures 5.3 and 5.4 for more detailed
views of the visual and executive systems, respectively.
The Visual module’s output is sent to two different regions for further
processing. This is inspired by the parallel visual pathways present in the
mammalian brain which connect the visual cortex to the prefrontal cortex via
both the parietal/dorsal/where and temporal/ventral/what cortices. In this
model, the Location and Object modules can be seen as simplified analogs
to the parietal and temporal cortices, respectively (Baizer et al., 1991). The
former is responsible for broad but low-resolution vision — identifying that
there is an object at a particular location, but not particular features of that
object — while the latter provides a detailed but narrow view — thus being
able to discern details of an object but remaining ignorant of its location. The
two visual pathways influence each other, with the Location module helping to
guide the attention of the Object module, and the Object module providing
detailed information about the visual field that the Location module lacks. This














Figure 5.3. The model’s visual system. Here there are 8 cards
depicted in the environment. All are face-down except for one in the
bottom row, which is striped. The region of the Location module
corresponding to this card is the most active. A Location node
along the left edge is also highlighted, along with its topographically
corresponding receptive field in the Visual module. The state of
the Object module reflects that it is attending to the sole face-
up card. Two of its nodes and their receptive fields are shown.
The smaller rectangles between the Visual and Object modules are
depictions of the incoming weights to these two nodes, as set by
the Location module. One can view these as a cross-section of the
connections, with just one of the many incoming links to each node
being open/active.
The Location module is the same size as the Visual module: 55×67 pixels.
Rather than using 8 binary nodes to represent each pixel, each pixel is congruent
with a single node with values in [0, 1]. This value roughly represents the salience
the model gives to that location in the visual field. Nodes’ activations are
determined by the logistic sigmoid of the sum of both bottom-up input from
the Visual Module and top-down input from the Executive System. For the
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former of these inputs, each node is connected topographically, with a receptive
field in the Visual module of a 5×5 square. The second input is from the
Executive System. This input is gated so that when it is closed the attention
of the model emerges from the interaction of the Visual and Location modules.
When it is open, it serves to control visual attention from the top-down. This
is of particular use when there are two cards face-up. Using only the bottom-
up attentional mechanism both will be equally salient. The addition of the
top-down element allows the Location module’s focus to be directed to the
card chosen by the Executive System.
The Location module also has two outputs. The first leads to the Executive
system, providing it with a coarse view of the visual field so that it may
determine object locations at a top level. The weights on these outputs, called
Wloc, form a random bipolar matrix of size 3685×1024. This has the effect of
assigning each node a random 1024 bit code. This pattern is then stored in
the Working Memory to track where a card was seen.
The second output from the Location module is used, as mentioned previ-
ously, to control the receptive field of the Object module (see Figures 5.2 &
5.3). The Object module can access the visual field in finer detail, but at the
cost of a limited scope. The Location module determines where the Object
module should focus its limited field-of-view. I view this as an example of
gating. The output of the Location module is able to open and close activity
flowing from the Visual to the Object module. Thus, Wobj acts like a mask,
only allowing the portion of a Object node’s receptive field which corresponds
topographically to a card of interest to pass through. Activity in some portion
of the Location module (which manifests as a rectangularly-shaped spike of
activation) moves the focus of the Object module to attend to the area in the
144
visual field corresponding to the spike of activity. So, for example, if there is
high activity in the upper left of the Location module then the connections
between the upper left of the visual field and the Object module are opened
and the rest are closed. This gating is essentially an example of higher-order
nodes (Lipson and Siegelmann, 2000). The gating is implemented via“fast
weights,” in which one network’s output (from the Location module) is used to
adjust the weights of another network (the Object module).
The Object module is 9×13 pixels, each of which uses 8 binary nodes to
encode “color” values, for a total of 936 nodes. Other sizes for the Object
module were tested. Sizes smaller than the cards result in too much detail
being missed and make it difficult to accurately judge whether two cards match
each other or not. Tests with an Object module larger than the cards did not
show any increase in accuracy, but did significantly increase computational
overhead. Since the focus of this work is not principally about perception, I
opted to make the Object module to be the same size as the stimuli.
The Object module is guided to focus on a particular region of the input
plane by the Location module using a combination of the bottom-up information
from the Primary Visual module and top-down information from the Executive
System. Its output proceeds upstream to the Working Memory region with
one-to-one connections, so that the model can form a memory of the visual
appearance of cards it has seen.
5.2.2 Executive System
The Executive System consists of three modules (see Figure 5.2): Working
Memory, a Controller, and a Conflict module. It is inspired by functionalities
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generally associated with prefrontal cortical regions of the brain. The Executive
System’s structure is shown in more detail in Figure 5.4.
5.2.2.1 Working Memory
The role of the Working Memory system is to store knowledge of which cards
have been observed and where they were observed by integrating and learning
the outputs of the Location and Object modules. This allow the model to
choose pairs of cards intelligently based on its past experience (much as a
person does) rather than blindly guessing at the locations of potential matches.
The working memories used to remember external stimuli in previous galis
models were unitary: they were capable of storing a sequence of binary patterns,
but each pattern stood alone, without reference to any features such as its
location in space (Reggia et al., 2009; Sylvester et al., 2010). Using the same
approach that galis already uses to store instruction sequences, I now employ
an auto associative network to effectively link representations of seen objects
(i.e., overturned cards) and the locations at which they appeared.
Training of Working Memory is accomplished with standard one-shot Heb-
bian learning, which occurs whenever the Working Memory training gate is
open. This establishes the learned pattern as an attractor in the Working
Memory’s state space. This pattern can then be recovered when the network
is in a state sufficiently close to it: either a noisy or corrupted version of the
original pattern, or — more importantly for our purposes — when a part of the
pattern in missing.
For example, if the 5-shaped “Scotland” card depicted in Figure 5.1 is
observed in the topmost row and leftmost column of cards in the environment


























Figure 5.4. Architecture of the model’s executive system. Thick
arrows represent full internal connections. Thinner gray lines represent
gating outputs from the Controller. Note that the size of layers is not
to scale.
top-left corner). This string becomes an attractor state of the Working Memory
network via one-shot Hebbian learning. This will allow the full pattern to be
recovered from either portion. That is, by setting the “what” nodes to “5” and
allowing the memory to update, the “top-left corner” portion can be recovered,
and vice-versa. This is analogous to the way that the entirety of an image
learned by an auto-associative memory can be recovered when presented with
only a portion of the original image.
Every time the Working Memory is trained its prior weights undergo weight
decay. This reduces the interference between patterns in memory, and allows
for older memories to be supplanted by more recent ones. Adjusting the amount
of decay can be used to affect the length of sequences that a memory like this
stores: lower levels of decay allow longer series at the cost of more interference,
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while higher levels of decay are better suited for shorter series (Winder et al.,
2009).
The model’s Working Memory also includes a “register” layer to allow the
comparison of one pattern to another. These allow operations on multiple
operands. The register layer is the same size as the main wm layer, and is
linked to it by one-to-one, gated connections allowing patterns to be read into
and out of this extra buffer.
5.2.2.2 Controller
The Controller is at the core of the Executive System. It is trained to direct
the operation of the rest of the model by opening and closing the nine gates
which govern the flow of activity, thereby allowing the entire system to function
autonomously. The nucleus of the Controller is a discrete attractor network
called the “Instruction Sequence Memory” (ism). This is a memory unit whose
purpose is to store the instructions for performing card matching rather than
external stimuli as is the case with the main Working Memory component. As
with the preceding chapters, this galis model’s behavior is determined in
large part by sequences of patterns that have been stored in its ism, which shift
the control of the network’s behavior away from its architectural construction
and towards its informational content.
Input to the ism comes from a subcomponent called the Encoder, which is
a hetero-associative network that is responsible for converting the Controller’s
input into a selection of which instruction sequence the ism will process. The
ism’s output is sent to the Decoder, which translates between the patterns
stored in the ism and the actual values which are sent to each gate. These
hetero-associative sub-components serve dual purposes. The first is noise
148
reduction. This is possible because each specializes in either storing inputs or
outputs, while the ism is required to represent both inputs and outputs as
well as the links between them. The second purpose is to decouple the size of
inputs from outputs. For example, the Controller has nine outputs: one for
each gate. However, more than nine nodes are needed to store a distributed
representation of the six actions used for the card matching task in Hopfield-
type attractor networks (Storkey, 1997). The Encoder and Decoder make it
possible to translate between representations of differing sizes.
The structure and function of the Controller is unchanged from the galis
instantiation of Section 4.3, where it was used to model performance of the
n-Back task. I mention this not only to refer the reader to a more detailed
description, but also to draw attention to the fact that the identical Controller
architecture, when trained on a different set of instruction patterns, was used to
perform this very different task — i.e., the controller provides a general purpose
mechanism for cognitive control.
The ism is trained prior to task execution on the necessary sequences of
steps the model must take to perform the card matching task. Each of the eight
rows in Table 5.1 are represented by a binary string, and each of these strings is
stored as an attractor state of the ism using one-shot Hebbian learning. These
eight actions are linked together into three different sequences using temporally
asymmetric weights. Each of these sequences correspond to the appropriate
response to there being either zero, one or two cards face-up. Depending on
the number of cards which are face-up — as judged by the Conflict Module —
the Controller executes one of the three action sequences detailed in Table 5.1.
The ism’s outputs are the nine gates distributed throughout the rest of the
model (see Figure 5.4). They are:
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1. the Working Memory Training gate (gtrain), which controls when the
weight matrix of the Working Memory layer undergoes training;
2. the Motor Output gate (gmotor), which allows the model to gesture to a
location on the board to choose a card using the output of the Motor
module;
3. the Location-to-Working Memory (gloc,wm) and Object-to-Working Mem-
ory (gobj,wm) gates, which allow the Working Memory state to be influ-
enced by that of the current Location and Object Module states;
4. the Register-to-Working Memory (greg,wm), which governs the effect of
the register on the “what” and “where” portions of the Working Memory
layer;
5. the Working Memory-to-Register gate (gwm,reg ), which does the reverse;
6. the wm-to-Location gate (gwm,loc), which allows the “where nodes” of the
Working Memory to affect the Location Module, causing the Executive
System to drive attention in a top-down way;
7. the Register-to-Self gate (greg,self ), which allow the new register states to
be dependent on their current state (opening this allows maintenance of
a pattern, while closing it allows rapid updating), and;
8. the Encoder Update gate (gconf) which governs the inputs to the control
module, so that it can decide whether it begins a new sequence of
instructions.
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Table 5.1. Learned instruction sequences stored in the control module’s ism.
Sequence Action
1. Zero cards face-up 1. update wm to retrieve a stored pattern
2. load wm contents into register
3. load register contents into wm
(excite object connections, inhibit location connections);
enable top-down attention
enable output from motor module
2. One card face-up 4. load object module contents into wm;
load location module contents into wm
5. load wm contents into register;
train wm on current pattern
3. load register contents into wm
(excite object connections, inhibit location connections);
enable top-down attention
enable output from motor module
3. Two cards face-up 4. load object module contents into wm;
load location module contents into wm
6. train wm on current pattern
This set of gates is manipulated in order to act out the set of six different
actions the Controller takes in execution of card matching. These six actions
are combined in different ways to create the three sequences in Table 5.1.
When there are no card face-up in the environment, the Controller attempts
to determine if it knows the location of a matching pair of cards. This is
accomplished by retrieving a pattern stored in Working Memory and storing it
in the Register. The Working Memory is then updated again, but its attractor
landscape is perturbed by input from the Register. The connections between
“what” nodes are set to be strongly excitatory, while those of “where” nodes are
mildly inhibitory. This has the affect of causing the network to shift to a new
attractor with the same “what” sub-pattern (i.e., representing the same card
image), but a different “where” sub-pattern (i.e., known to be at a different
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location). This “where” sub-pattern is then passed to the Motor Module
for output and to the Location Module to provide the top-down portion of
attentional control.
When one card is visible (face-up), the first step is to open the Location-to-
Working Memory and Object-to-Working Memory gates so that the Working
Memory’s state will represent the environment being witnessed. The wm
Training gate is then opened, so that this observation is added to the Working
Memory’s knowledge. Next, a check is run to see if there is a card in memory
when matches the one currently being observed. This operates using the same
method as in the zero-cards-up case, except here the card we are hoping to find
a match for is the one which is currently visible rather than a random card
chosen from memory contents as in the zero-card case. To accomplish this the
visible card is stored in the Register, and the wm is updated with excitation
on the “what” connections and inhibition on the “where” connections from the
Register. If a second location for this card has been trained then it will become
the new state of the wm network because the inputs from the Register are
pushing the Working Memory state into the corresponding attractor basin. If
a second location is not known there will be no basin in the region of attractor
space the Working Memory is in, and so it will transition into some other
attractor. While this attractor may be close in the state space of the wm
network, from the point of view of locations in the external environment it
appears to be a randomly guessed location. This has the desired affect of
making the model guess a location to explore. In either case, the “where”
sub-pattern which results from this update is passed to the Motor module for
output and back to the Location module.
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The model’s actions when there are two cards face-up are very simple (as
they are for a human player). If the two cards match then they are removed
from the environment. If not, the only action required is to add the newly
observed card to Working Memory. (Because the card which was already
face-up was added to Working Memory when it was first revealed, i.e., while
executing Sequence #2 in Table 5.1, there is only ever a single observation
that needs to be remembered.) This is accomplished in the same way as with
the beginning of the one-card-up case: open the gates allowing the Object
and Location Modules to load their activity in the Working Memory and then
update the Working Memory weights on this newly observed pattern.
5.2.2.3 Conflict Module
The Conflict Module’s purpose is to gauge the level of disagreement in the
Location Module about where to focus attention. This gives an indication of
how many cards are face-up in the visual field. When no cards are face-up,
the Location module will have minimal activity, resulting in very low conflict.
When one card is face-up, it’s location will be the single dominant source of
activity, also resulting in low conflict. However, when two different card faces
are visible, each location will vie for attention, causing internal disagreement
about which to encode. The Conflict Module monitors for that disagreement,
and reports it to the Controller. This behavior is inspired by the mismatch
detection functions of the anterior cingulate cortex (Brown and Braver, 2005).
By informing the Control Module about how many cards are face-up, the
Conflict Module allows the Controller to choose which of the three sequences
described in the previous section it will execute. The connection from Conflict
to Control Modules is gated; the signal to open the gate is only sent at the
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termination of each of the three instruction sequences. This results in the
gate being open the next time step, which allows the Controller to assess
which sequence it should begin running. While this gate is closed, no input is
received by the ism, which allows it to continue running the current instruction
sequence without interruption.
The inputs to the Conflict Module come from 512 randomly selected pairs of
nodes in the Location Module, with each pair providing one bit of the eventual
output. The desired output differs depending on the distance between the two
nodes in a pair. Nodes which are topologically close in the Location Module
should have similar states; indeed there is no inherent conflict in neighbors
agreeing with each other. If nearby nodes have different states that is an
indication of conflicting representations. In contrast, nodes which are far apart
are not in conflict if they are both inactive, but are in conflict if they are both
active as this represents the attempt to encode two disparate locations at once.
The Conflict Module’s final output is effectively the proportion of pairs of nodes
which are either nearby but in different states or far apart but both active.
5.2.3 Motor System
The Motor System is intentionally very simple, consisting of only a single
module (Figure 5.2), as detailed motor control is not being studied here. This
Motor Module is roughly analogous to the premotor cortex. It consists of
two layers (Figure 5.4), both of which are the same size as the Visual and
Location Layers (55×67). The first layer has inputs from the Working Memory
which are encoded using the same methods as the top-down mechanism linking
the Working Memory to the Location module — i.e., Wloc
T (cf. Langner et al.,
2013). The second layer is connected topographically to the first, with each
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node being linked to 5×5 rectangle of nodes below it, each with a fixed and
equal weight. This blurs the first layer’s representation of the output space,
allowing a smoother and less volatile output.
When the controller has signaled that output should be allowed (i.e., by
opening the output gate), the node with the maximum activity is interpreted
as being a “gesture” to that particular location on the table top. If that
node corresponds to an area in the visual field where a card is present, it is
interpreted as the model “pointing” to that card, which is then “flipped” to
reveal its identity.
5.2.4 Experimental Methods
I compared galis experimentally to two other ways of performing the card
matching task. The key measure of performance used is the number of rounds
required to remove all cards. First, in order to assess galis’ similarities to
and differences from people, data was collected from human subjects as they
performed a web-based version of the card matching task that I developed.1
The 34 participants played a total of nine times, three each with either 8, 12
or 16 cards on the board. This gave us 102 recorded trials for each of the three
conditions. The ordering of trials was randomized for each subject to minimize
biases due to ordering effects. The images used on the human subjects cards
were randomly selected each trial from 10 pairs of national flags. To remove
any potential influence of disparate hues and to better match the monochrome
inputs of the neural model, all of the flags were composed of red, white and
blue only (e.g., those of the United Kingdom, the United States, etc.).
1 This can be accessed at http://www.jsylvest.com/cards/.
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The second point of comparison for galis’ neurocomputational approach
is a top-down symbolic algorithm. To achieve this, I implemented a symbolic
AI system to play a simplified version of the card matching task. In this AI
system I have removed all the aspects of vision and spatial processing, and
instead represent each card as a pair of integers: one for the location of the
card, and one for the pattern on the card. The symbolic model pursues the
following strategy: At the start of each turn, the model checks to see if it
knows where a matching pair of cards are. If it does, that pair is removed
from the board. If not, it randomly selects a card from a location which is not
in its memory. If the location of the matching card is in memory, the pair is
removed, otherwise a second random location is chosen (and if by chance the
two randomly selected cards match, they are removed). Any time the model
sees an overturned card, the card is added to memory.
In order to make the performance of the symbolic system more comparable
to that of humans, I introduced a modifiable decay factor to its memory. On
each turn of play, items in memory may be deleted with a probability equal
to a decay rate δS. When δS =0.0 there is no decay, and the symbolic model
plays perfectly. (That is, on average does as well as is theoretically possible
given random card placement and selection). When δS=1.0 the symbolic model
has no memory at all, and plays by random guesses. Intermediate values of
δS allow us to produce intermediate behaviors, while extreme values allow us
to compare galis to theoretically optimal performance (δS =0) or random
performance (δS =1).
The galis results presented below are averages from 200 simulation runs
of the model. In each case the model’s ism was pre-trained on the necessary
instructions, which were identical for all three task variants. With 8 and
156
12-card variants, the locations of the cards was randomly chosen from among
the positions used for the 16-card case.
5.3 Further Details of the Card Matching
Model
Because one of the aims of galis is to enable the construction of generalizable
models that do not need major architectural changes to complete different
tasks, many of the details of the model constructed for Card Matching are
unchanged from those used for n-Back. (See Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, as well
as Sylvester et al. (2013).) Elements which have been changed or added, such
as those used for visuospatial processing, are covered below.
5.3.1 Location Layer
The weights on the bottom-up connections (Wvis) from the Visual to Location
modules are trained using one-shot Hebbian learning. It uses extensive weight-
sharing, so that every node has a different receptive field but identical incoming
weights. Each node has the same role: recognize if its receptive field is
“interesting” — i.e., it is looking at a portion of the front of a card, as opposed
to the back or the table surface. Because each node has the same purpose, each
node can have the same weights. So, for example, the weight on a connection
to a node in the Location module from the top-left node in its receptive field is
the same regardless of which node is being considered or where its receptive
field falls in the Visual layer. This makes training much more efficient. The
training patterns are a selection of possible 5×5 patterns which appear on
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cards (12.5% of the total possible patterns are used for training). Through
this process nodes learn to turn on when they detect patterns from the faces
of cards, and remain off when their input field is the table top. This produces
a rectangular surge of activity in the Location module which corresponds
topographically to that of face-up cards in the Visual module. (In Figure 5.3,
this is the horizontally-striped card in the center-right of the bottom row.)
The weights on the these top-down connections are merely the transpose of
the weights on the counter-flowing, bottom-up connections discussed immedi-
ately below. The final state of the node is just the sum of both the bottom-up
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(5.1)
Here li is a node in the Location Layer, R(i) is the receptive field of node i,
gwm,loc is the gate governing top-down attention, Wloc(:,i) is the set of weights
out from node i to the Working Memory, and ~a is the state of the nodes in
Working Memory which store location data.
The output from the Location module to the Executive system is thus
the average of each node’s code string, weighted by the nodes’ activity. As
a result, overlapping spikes of activity produce similar outputs, despite the
randomness of each individual node’s representation. This system also has the
desirable by-product of reducing the dimensionality of the spatial encoding
from that needed by the Location module (3685) to that used by the Working
Memory (1024). The overall effect is similar to that of Random Matrix
Transformations (Achlioptas, 2003; Johnson and Lindenstrauss, 1984; Rahimi
and Recht, 2007, 2008). Finally, this approach has the added advantage of
being easily invertible: Wloc is used to translate between the encoding used the
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Location Module to that used by the Working Memory, providing bottom-up
visual attention; Wloc
T is used for the reverse translation, allowing for top-down
attention control.
5.3.2 Object Module
Every node oi in the Object module has a receptive field of 47×55 nodes in
the Visual module. At any one time, each Object module node should only
be accepting input from one of those Visual module nodes. Furthermore, each
node should be accepting input from the node in the same location in it’s
field — i.e., if one node is attending to the middle of the top row of its receptive
field, so should the others. Each spike of activity in the Location module
therefore translates into a single active point in a 47×55 grid. These pairs of
active regions in the Location module with their correlating points of focus in
the visual field are used as training patterns for the hetero-associative Hebbian
learning which is used to actually form the weights Wobj controlling the Object
module’s focus.










where σ is the logistic sigmoid function, Ni is the receptive neighborhood of
node i, xj is the state of a node in the Visual module, loc is the set of nodes in
the Location module, lk is the state of one of the nodes in the Location module.
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5.3.3 Working Memory
Nodes in the registers update according to the simple rule:
ri = sgn(greg,self ri + gwm,reg si) (5.3)
where si is the state of the topographically corresponding node in the primary
Working Memory layer. It can be seen that the new state of a register is either
the persistence of its current state or a switch to the state of the primary
wm layer, depending on whether the register-to-self gate (greg,self ) or the wm-
to-register gate (gwm,reg ) is open. That is, depending on the the gate signals
the register will either maintain the current state, or load a new one from
wm. This crystalizes the dichotomy between stable maintenance and rapid
updating (Goldman-Rakic, 1987).
The updated states of nodes in the primary wm layer are the result of a
sum, weighted by the appropriate gate values, of the current state, the state
of the register, and the output of the visual system. For nodes which encode
“what” information, this latter value is the simply the state of the Object Layer.
For nodes encoding “where” information, it is the state of the Location Layer,
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(5.4)










for “where” nodes. Here oi is the ith node of the Object module, lk is the
kth node of the Location module, greg,wm is the gate on the register-to-wm
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connection, gobj,wm is the gate on the Object-to-wm connection, and gloc,wm is
the gate no the Location-to-wm connection.
5.3.4 Conflict Module
The amount of conflict present in the Location module’s activity is estimated
based on a sampling of the conflict between 512 pairs of nodes. It is of course
possible to define the overall conflict to be a function of the entire module’s state,
but this global calculation is both computationally expensive and unnecessary.
Only a small fraction of the pairwise conflicts are needed to get an accurate
assessment of the number of locations that are presently being represented.
The desired output of a node in the Conflict Module differs depending on
the topological distance between its two input nodes in the Location module.
Nodes which are close should be expected to have similar states; indeed there
is no inherent conflict in neighbors which are both on or both off. Nodes which
are far apart are not in conflict if they are both inactive, but are in conflict
if they are both active as this represents the attempt to encode two locations
at once. The goal then, is to output x1 ⊕ x2 if nodes i and j are within some
topological distance d of each other, and to output x1 ∧ x2 if they are not.
To accomplish this, each pair of nodes is connected by a network like that
shown Figure 5.5, with the weights wAC and wBC set according to the distance
between x1 and x2. (We use a Chebyshev distance equal to 7.5 to differentiate
between “near” and “far.”) More formally, if ‖i, j‖∞ > 7.5 then wAC = 1 and













Figure 5.5. Wiring of a pair of nodes in the conflict module. There
is only one link from A to C and one from B to C, with the weights on
these links depending on the distance between x1 and x2. The weights
labeled on the dashed lines are used for nodes near each other, while the
weights on the dotted lines are used for nodes which are far.
5.4 Results
The decay rate of the symbolic AI model was calibrated prior to evaluating
this galis model. The effect of decay rate on this model’s performance
can be seen in Figure 5.6. In all three task versions, both the average and
the standard deviation of the number of rounds needed to complete the task
increased superlinearly with the decay rate. Results from 200 runs of the
symbolic model showed the closest fit to human subjects for the n=8, 12, and
16-card conditions when the symbolic decay rate δS = 0.475, 0.40, and 0.30,
respectively. This is consistent with analogous findings in past computational
studies where decreased decay was correlated with increased working memory
span (Altmann and Gray, 2002; Reggia et al., 2009; Winder et al., 2009).
The galis system successfully solved every card matching task on which it
was tested. The number of rounds it needed to complete the task, averaged over
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Figure 5.6. Performance of the symbolic model on all three card
matching task versions with varying decay rates. Note that as decay
increases, both the expected performance as well as deviation in
performance increases. Based on 200 runs of the symbolic model for
each value of the number of cards n. Error bars represent standard
deviations.
200 runs, was 8.7, 13.0 and 21.2 for 8-, 12- and 16-card versions respectively.
This compares to mean human scores of 7.9, 13.5 and 18.9. This was achieved
with a decay rate δN =0.125, so it was not necessary to adjust the parameters,
structure or instructions of the model in any way to perform in all the three
conditions. If the symbolic model was similarly limited to a single choice
of decay parameter δS then there was no significant performance difference
between it and the neural methods used by galis. This was possible despite
operating in a much more complex environment than previous galis models.
Results with galis (200 runs for each value of n) are shown in Figure 5.7.
These are compared with both the results from human subjects and from three
instances of the symbolic model — one with no memory decay (δS = 0), one
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without any memory (δS=1), and one with δS=0.375, which was the decay value
which provided the best fit to the human results across all three task conditions.
The mean number of rounds it took galis to complete the task increased as n
increased, consistent with human performance and with expectations. We find
no statistically significant difference at the p=0.05 level between the galis
model’s performance and that of human subjects or the best-matching symbolic
model on both the 8- and 12-card conditions. The galis model performed
somewhat worse than humans on the more challenging 16-card version, as did
the best-matching symbolic model. In this task condition the neural model
slightly out-performed the symbolic model, but not at a significant level.
As expected based on the symbolic model and previous studies of attractor
network-based working memory, a decrease in working memory decay rate δN
was helpful as the problem size grew larger. The galis models were able to
match human performance on n=8 and n=12 with a decay rate of 0.125 — i.e.,
adjusting this parameter was not necessary to fit data from both task versions —
but optimal performance was observed when δN =0.15 and 0.10, respectively.
That is, a marginally lower decay rate increased memory capacity to allow for
additional cards to be recalled. The associated and unavoidable trade-off is
that reduced decay leads to increased interference between items in memory.
The best performance on the n=16 condition occurred with δN =0.025. This
low level of decay was still unable to increase capacity sufficiently to match the
human responses. Any lower values lead to dramatically more interference and
worse performance, while higher values produce too much decay and worsen
performance.
In order to investigate the causes behind the galis model’s less accurate



































Figure 5.7. Mean and standard deviation for human subjects, as
well as symbolic and galis models on the card matching task for the
n=8, n=12 and n=16 conditions. For all three n conditions the decay
rate of the galis model was 0.125. Results from the symbolic model
are shown when it experiences no decay to its memory, a decay rate
of 0.375, and complete memory decay. By adjusting the decay rates
of both models it was possible to produce better fits to the human
data, but the values used here provided the best fit across all three
n conditions without varying the decay rate. The difference between
the human results and those of the galis model and the best-fitting
symbolic model are significant only in the n=16 condition.
we constructed histograms of the performance for both humans and the neural
model. These, along with a kernel density estimate (KDE) for smoothing, are
shown in Figure 5.8. As can be seen in the right subplot for n=16, the difference
between human and galis performance is largely due to a thicker right-hand
tail on the distribution of galis results. Without these few outlying runs,
which required over 40 rounds to complete, there was no statistically significant
difference from the human results.
Figure 5.9 shows a similar plot with the bars omitted for the n=16 variant,
with human performance, galis results, and results from the symbolic model
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Figure 5.8. Histogram of human (red) and galis (blue) perfor-
mance on 12-card and 16-card task versions. Also given is a curve
showing a smoothed estimation of each histogram using gaussian
kernel density estimates (ode). Human results are the solid red lines,
and galis results are dashed blue lines.
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with two different decay rates. When δ=0.35 there was no significant difference
between the performance of the symbolic and galis models, and both were
worse than the human level. The symbolic model was able to decrease the
numbers of rounds needed by lowering its decay rate to 0.3. This slight
parameter shift was all that was needed to cause the symbolic model to go
from matching the galis model to the human performance level for n=16
(but not for other values of n). This indicates a partial cause behind the galis
model’s inability to match human results on this task version: galis’ decay
rate was already set very low, making further decreases futile.
It helps to understand the causes of these worst performers — as well as why
they have a significant effect only when n=16 — to consider what happens if
locations are guessed completely at random. The chance of randomly picking a
matching pair of cards in any given turn in which there are c cards on the board
is 1
c−1 . The number of turns needed to randomly uncover the first matching
pair is thus given by a geometric distribution with p = 1
c−1 , which has an
expected value of 1/p = c− 1. Once the first pair is found, the number of cards
decreases by two, and the process is repeated. An entire game of matching
n cards without any memory can be modeled as the sum of a sequence of











As a result of this process, adding an extra pair of cards causes the expected
number of rounds needed to complete the task to grow quadratically. Impor-
tantly, it also causes the standard deviation of the rounds needed to grow
quadratically. Not only does the average number of turns increase with number
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Figure 5.9. Kernel density estimates on the 16-card task for human
subjects and the galis model compared to the symbolic system with
two different decay rates. When δS =0.3 the symbolic system and
human performance match, and both outperform the galis model.
Increasing the symbolic system’s decay rate to δS = 0.35 shifts its
performance curve to the right, causing it to be statistically similar to
that of the galis model. Note also that the performance distribution
of the symbolic model displays the same positive skew as do humans
and galis models, and that the skewness increases with higher decay
values.
of cards, but the chance of a poor-performing outlier increases greatly as well.
This is the pattern we observed when moving from n=12 to n=16.
The assumption that a player’s choices are being made randomly is, of
course, incorrect. But note that the player will behave more like a random
guesser in early turns, since little is known about the cards. It is exactly those
early turns when the most cards are still present — i.e., i is close to n/2 — that
will dominate the series of random variables Xi above. Furthermore, the more
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rounds that are played the more patterns that will be added to working memory,
and the more the limited capacity of working memory becomes a constraint.
Poor initial performance in a run can create a feedback loop: as more turns
elapse, interference between patterns in working memory increases, causing
difficulty in recall, causing more turns to elapse, and so on. Small perturbations
in the agent’s working memory capacity may therefore result in a very different
distribution of outcomes due to this positive feedback. The galis networks
had the decay in their working memory set as low as possible for the n=16
task. This produces a concomitant increase in interference, causing them to
behave more like a randomly-guessing agent.
Figure 5.10 shows an observation of this pattern. The blue area in the
middle of the plot shows a non-parametric estimate of the average performance
of 100 simulations with n=16 (Hsiang, 2013). Two particular runs of the galis
model are shown in red. The dotted line shows one run with a final score of
17, while the simulation represented by the solid line took twice as many turns
to finish. The difference is entirely due to the inability of the latter to find the
first matching set of cards among the 8 pairs on the board. After this hurdle is
cleared the remaining pairs are identified even more rapidly than they are in
the high-performing example. This early plateau pattern was characteristic
of the few poor-performing simulations that made the galis model’s results
not precisely match those of human subjects when n= 16. Examination of
these outlier runs showed that the controller was working precisely as it was
trained to do, but that by chance the same location cards were frequently
being re-picked early on. In other words, the algorithm in Table 5.1 does not
adequately anticipate this possibility, allowing it to occur in a few percent of
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Figure 5.10. A visually-weighted regression of the model’s aver-
age performance over time in 100 runs of the 16-card task variant
(blue), along with the performance curves of one high and one low-
performance runs (dotted and solid red, respectively). The shading
represents the width of the confidence interval surrounding the perfor-
mance, as determined by a nonparametric bootstrap estimate (Hsiang,
2013).
the simulations and thus biasing the model’s performance overall to take a bit
longer than humans do in this case.
Because the model has no trouble performing as expected once clearing
the early plateau, we do not believe the Control Module is the cause of this
behavior. (If it was to blame, we would expect the incorrect behavior to persist
throughout the run.) In order to verify this we compared the action chosen
by the control module in each time step to the action it should have taken
in that situation. The model should execute actions #1, #2 and #3 when
there are no cards face-up, then #4, #5, and #3 when one card is face-up,
followed by #4 and #6 when two cards are visible, at which point the cycle
should repeat. We were able to construct a list of the actions actually chosen
by the Controller by recording which action’s representation was closest to the
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state of the ism at each time step. To do so, we compared the state of the
ism to the representations of the rows of Table 4.1. We then calculated the
Levenshtein distance (Navarro, 2001) between the list of the correct actions
and the actions chosen by the model.2 A Levenshtein distance of zero indicates
a perfect match between two strings, meaning the Controller never selected
an incorrect action during that trial. Non-zero values were very rare in the
sample. In the 100 simulations shown in Figure 5.10, only six occurred, and
the maximum Levenshtein distance observed was four.
This leaves two potential, and related, sources of error. The first is typical
Working Memory errors: the model incorrectly remembers stimuli by falling
into spurious attractors or otherwise returning an erroneous pattern as a
result of attractor networks’ stochastic updating process (Ma, 1999). The
second is a problem with the algorithm “programmed” into the model itself —
i.e., programmer error. Qualitative analysis of the runs with low-performance
indicate that there is a preponderance of the latter. There is a specific undesired
behavior that recurred: the model would select from the same small set of
locations for many rounds consecutively rather than exploring the full set of
cards. Each time a card is turned over the Working Memory is trained to
remember what was witnessed and where. But repeated exposures to the
same cards causes the associated basins of attraction to grow larger and larger,
crowding out the areas of the state space accorded to other locations. This
results in it being more likely that those repeated cards will be chosen again,
as they now have larger basins of attraction that before. This also creates a
feedback loop from which the model has difficulty breaking out.
2 See Chapter 4, note 6 supra.
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5.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I provide a substantial test of the basic galis hypothesis by
applying it to a challenging card matching task. Performing this task requires,
among other things, the ability to deal with representing external entities and
their locations in space, the ability to support a robust working memory of
previously seen cards, the ability to bind together distinct pieces of information
about the environment, and the ability to exert top-down attention control and
action selection. Such abilities are readily achieved with traditional top-down
AI symbolic systems, but have proven to be extremely challenging for neural
architectures (Martinet et al., 2011; Trullier et al., 1997), and go far beyond
what has been attempted with galis previously.
The results presented here provide significant support for the galis hy-
pothesis. Specifically, not only could the neurocognitive architecture learn to
perform the card matching task, but the number of steps (card selections) it
made during problem solving qualitatively increased with problem difficulty in
a fashion similar to that seen when we had a group of human subjects solve this
problem. At times, the model’s performance and the performance we observed
with the human subjects we studied matched quantitatively. Where this match
deviated significantly (with the larger number of cards), analysis indicated the
most likely reason for this deviation was the author-generated instructions the
system was trained to perform not some failure of the underlying principles.
We also examined the influence of working memory decay on the system and
found that while adjusting the rate was not required in order to match the
behavior of human subjects, doing so did allow closer fits. Decreasing working
memory decay allowed for handling larger number of stimuli, which corrobo-
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rates previous studies of working memory decay as well as corresponding to
the effect of varying decay rates on the behavior of the symbolic model we
built. At the most challenging task condition, a zero lower bound was reached
with the decay rate, making further increases in the model’s memory capacity
infeasible.
This neurocognitive system is composed entirely of components based on
neural network methods that use distributed sub-symbolic representations.
The finding that this system can perform cognitive control operations of the
sort performed by traditional AI symbolic problem-solving methods is both
encouraging and highly significant. Such cognitive control abilities are widely
recognized to be challenging for neural computational methods. In a sense, this
approach provides a synthesis of continuous neurocomputational representations
and symbolic AI representations. Even though the galis approach uses only
neural information processing, the fact that it allows one to “program” a
neural network with a sequence of high-level instructions creates a similarity
to the traditional von Neumann architecture computer. Further, even though
the attractor networks operate in a high-dimensional, continuous state space,
each attractor within that space exists as a discrete entity (Simen and Polk,
2009), and the use of gating allows for hard-cutoff binary distinctions to be
made (open vs. closed communication channel, active vs. quiescent region,
update working memory vs. maintain its current contents, learn vs. don’t learn,
etc.). As a result, galis networks offer a balance between the continuous
nature of neural networks and the discrete nature of symbolic systems. Gating
also has the further benefit of providing a way to balance the dual needs of
maintaining stability of a network’s state and for being able to rapidly switch
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states (O’Reilly et al., 2002), a key requirement that has long been recognized
as important in biological cognitive control systems (Goldman-Rakic, 1987).
The work here can be compared to several past related studies of neural
systems for working memory and cognitive control. As described in Chap-
ter 3, neural networks have been widely used to model cognitive control (e.g.,
Botvinick and Plaut, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2006; Pascanu and Jaeger, 2011; Ponzi,
2008; Verduzco-Flores et al., 2012). Many of these, such as c-sob (Lewandowsky
and Farrell, 2008), concentrate almost exclusively on the working memory as-
pect of cognitive control and rely on the modeler to make decisions about when
to update weights or how to produce output. They also interact with their
environments in a very limited way in the sense that they are exposed to stimuli
in a set order, and produce one response in reaction to each — often yes/no;
rarely are there more than four discrete answers to choose from — at which
point the next input is provided regardless of the accuracy of the response.
The galis model presented here must reach its own decisions about which of
up to 16 cards to observe when, and the environment in which is must perform
the remainder of the task is heavily influenced by its prior performance.
In many past models, the issue of appropriately binding a stimulus to the
conditions of its observation is often side-stepped. Part of the stimuli provided
to models is often constructed explicitly to contain the relevant information
on time or space (e.g., Chatham et al., 2011). This is the difference between
observing, for example, a book on a desk and remembering that the book is on
the desk, as opposed to remembering being told the sentence “the book is on
the desk.”
Successful use of the galis framework to perform a card matching task,
and its previous use to perform simpler n-Back matching tasks in the preceding
174
chapter, is very encouraging. However, much further work is needed to assess
this approach and extend it to even more challenging problems. Since neither
sophisticated image processing or motor control were a focus of this work,
expanding such portions of the system to, for example, deal with color and
invariance to input transformations, would of course be important future
research areas. In addition, “programming” a neural network as we have done
here is a fairly new pursuit, and one that would benefit from finding new




Learning, Improvement & Task Switching
6.1 Introduction
The galis model from the previous chapter demonstrates the approach’s
ability to co-process visuospatial information and use it to execute a complex
task. This was done using an algorithm which is stored as a set of instructions
in one of its memory layers. One of the primary limitations to its performance
was this stored program itself, rather than the network per se. This limitation
is addressed here with a network capable of improving on its performance and
learning to adjust the representation of its own instructions during execution.
The goal of the work described in this chapter is to allow galis models
to learn procedural knowledge from their experiences and to improve on tasks
from exposure to them. Sub-symbolic systems are typically fairly adept at
improving from experience via incremental weight changes. While galis does
learn to store information — e.g., its working memory, as well as learning its
initial instructions — the galis models in the preceding chapters do not adapt
these instructions based on their experience during task execution. galis
models so far have been limited to being only as good as the instruction set
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their creator provided them with. The work in this chapter overcomes this
limitation by combining the rapid, one-shot learning used thus far in galis
for external episodic memories and instruction sequences with the gradual
improvement more typical of neural networks. Here this capability is referred
to as instruction refinement to differentiate it from the instruction learning
that has been discussed since Chapter 4.
In addition to instruction refinement, the ability of galis models to bind
“what” and “where” information from their environments is expanded upon to
now also include the binding of multiple features — such as number, color and
shape — concurrently. The model must attend to one of these features while
inhibiting the others, which presents a more complex cognitive control problem
than attempted in the previous chapters. The model of the previous chapter
could recognize having seen a ‘5’ image on a card, but here the model must
remember that it saw an image with three red crosses on it, and must also be
able to remember where else it has seen cards with red shapes of any kind, or
crosses of any color.
In order to facilitate rapidly switching between which of these features
is attended to and which inhibited, there is a third variation on instruction
learning used here. Instruction refinement makes small, permanent changes to
the controller’s weights, while more drastic but temporary changes are needed
to shift the network into a new set of behaviors in response to negative feedback
from the environment. These three types of learning used for instructions in
this galis model are summarized in Table 6.1.
The chapter begins with some further background and motivation of the
problem. In order to test galis’ ability to improve with experience, a model is
built which performs the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (wcst). This test and
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Table 6.1. Types of learning used in the galis wcst model.
Instruction learning Instruction refinement Rule set switching
Purpose: initial memory contents iterative improvement rule changes









the methods used in the model which executes it are described in the following
section. Finally, results on the wcst are presented which show that galis
is not only capable of performing the wcst, but also of improving over time,
and in learning to distinguish between useful instruction sequences for the task
and spurious ones.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 The Wisconsin Card Sort Test
The wcst is one of the primary tests of cognitive control (Greve et al.,
2005; Strauss et al., 2006). It is widely used to study executive functions and
the pre-frontal lobes (Barceló and Knight, 2002), for example in studies of
schizophrenia (Everett et al., 2001) and adhd (Romine et al., 2004). It comes
in various forms (Berg, 1948; Milner, 1963; Nelson, 1976), but all are performed
using a deck of cards whose images differ in three dimensions, each of these
which has four possible values. (In this implementation, these are shape, color
and number, as is standard; see Table 6.2.) The test is conducted by placing
four “base” cards in a row, and presenting the participant with a series of cards
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Table 6.2. wcst input features and values.
number color shape
1 red rgb(1,0,0) square n
2 blue rgb(0,0,1) cross :
3 cyan rgb(0,1,1) triangle s
4 yellow rgb(1,1,0) circle l




Figure 6.1. A sample visual field for the wcst. The four cards
depicted on the left are basis cards showing one red square, two blue
crosses, three cyan and four yellow circles. The stimulus card on the
far right depicts three blue circles, and could match the 2nd, 3rd or
4th bases depending on whether the active dimension is color, number
or shape, respectively. (Best viewed in color.)
from the deck, one at a time. The participant’s task is to match the current
stimulus card to one of the four base cards, but they are not told what rule
should be used for the matching. Figure 6.1 depicts the low-resolution version
of the wcst that the galis model sees. Each stimulus card could match with
three of the four basis cards depending on the currently active dimension. The
active dimension must be attended to while the other two must be inhibited.
Participants are not even informed that there are three potential rules: they
may believe they should be matching based on most overall similarity, or any
more complicated rule of their devising such as choosing the card with the
same shape if the stimulus is red, but the same number if it is any other color.
During the course of the test the relevant dimension will change without
the participant being informed. Depending on the version of the test, this
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switch usually occurs after a prescribed number of consecutive correct responses
(typically six to ten). The most common measure of performance is the number
of rules shifts or “sets” one is able to complete before the deck is emptied.
The only feedback participants receive is “correct” or “incorrect” following
their response to each new stimulus. Using only this binary reward/punishment
signal, the agent must determine whether they are attending to the correct
feature. This creates two potential errors: either continuing to attempt to
apply the same rule after it is no longer working (called “perseveration”), and
switching away from a rule while it is still in effect (called “distractibility”
or “failure to maintain set”). The wcst is often referred to as a test of set
shifting ability, or the ability to switch from one mental frame to another,
changing the features of the environment which are being attended to and which
inhibited (Boone, 1999). One of the principal challenges of cognitive control
is to work with mental constructs which are flexible enough to adapt quickly
while simultaneously remaining robust to unwanted change. This is evident
in the wcst, where a failure to meet the first criteria results in perseverative
error, and a failure to meet the second results in a distraction error (Stemme
et al., 2007).
6.2.2 Model Overview
The use of the wcst as a testbed for this stage of galis’ development is
quite a challenge. The principal demand of wcst is to be able maintain a
stable focus on one feature dimension while also being able to rapidly switch
between features when necessary. This requirement is made more difficult
by the addition of gradual improvement, creating a trichotomy between not





















Figure 6.2. Model architecture for the Wisconsin Card Sort Test.
Solid lines represent the direct flow of activity between layers. Dotted
lines represent gates. The names of the Control Module’s weight
matrices appear next to the layer they operate on.
changes slowly. All of this must be accomplished on the basis of nothing but a
binary reinforcement signal from the environment.
The galis model for performing the wcst is composed of seven modules,
as illustrated in Figure 6.2. These are the Visual, Location, Object, Motor,
Working Memory, and Controller modules. Many of these components are
extremely similar to those used in previous galis models; further information
can be found in earlier chapters as well as Sylvester et al. (2013) and Sylvester
and Reggia (2014). The remainder of this section will concentrate on the
differences between this and those previous galis models.
6.2.3 Information Representation
Like the networks presented in the previous chapters, this model uses randomly
selected binary strings to represent different concepts in a distributed fashion.
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Each sequence of instructions has an identifier, as do the constituent actions
within those sequences. Each feature is represented by such a string, as well
as the particular values they can take. The set of these strings is referred to
as the model’s “codebook.” These are the patterns which are learned by the
model’s attractor networks, and the points in state-space corresponding to
these strings become the centers of the basins of attraction.
In prior chapters these strings were chosen randomly. As a result some
were more similar than others, resulting in deformations to the evenness and
uniformity of the attractor space. In order to ameliorate this issue, we instead
choose encodings using an iterative sampling process (Kulesza and Taskar,
2010, 2012; Usatenko et al., 2014). When new encodings are generated they
are rejected with some probability based on their distance from the already
adopted encodings. That is, the first entry in the “code book” is chosen at
random. The second is chosen, but is likely to be rejected if it is too close
to the first.1 The process is repeated until the codebook is full. While not
algorithmically elegant, it is more than sufficient because the number of points
being chosen is much, much smaller than the dimensionality of the space they
are in (Pan et al., 2007). The strings which identify features and their values
are 512 bits long. Those for sequences are 600 bits and those for actions 424
bits, matching the sizes of the appropriate areas of the ism.
1 Its likelihood of being rejected actually increases if it is too close to the prior selections or
too far, i.e., too close to a prior selection’s complement. This is because auto-associative
memories form spurious attractors around the complements of the patterns they are
trained on. Each attractor should be far away from the others, and also far from the
unwanted doppelgängers that they entail.
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6.2.4 Visual System
The Visual System comprises the Primary Visual, Location and Object layers.
The Primary Visual layer provides the principal input to the network. This
comes in the form of a visual field of 15×80 pixels. (Figure 6.1.) Each pixel is
represented by three nodes: one each for red, green and blue intensity. Cards
are 13×13 pixels, with three colors per pixel, each having a real value in [0,1].
As in the preceding chapter, the galis Visual System is inspired be the
dual pathways of the of the mammalian brain, which connect the visual cortex
to the prefrontal cortex along parallel pathways. The first of these is the
parietal or dorsal pathway, which focuses on information about where objects
are, and the second is the temporal or ventral pathway, which specializes in
what objects are (Ungerleider and Haxby, 1994). Within this galis model,
these pathways are represented by the two layers to which the Primary Visual
layer sends its output: the Location and Object layers.
The Location layer is responsible for judging where a stimulus is being
observed, but not for any details about its appearance. The Object layer is
responsible for more fine-grained observation of stimuli. It provides details
about the appearance of objects, but is capable of processing only a small
region at a time, which results in it being ignorant about where the stimulus
it is attending to is located. The information from both of these must be
reintegrated by the Executive System.
The Location layer combines bottom-up with top-down influences to deter-
mine where in the visual field the model should attend. It directs the model’s
attention to a particular location by gating the connection between the Primary
Visual and Object layers: only those connections between the two that link the
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attended-to location are opened. As this system is identical to that described
in the previous chapter it will not be discussed further here.
Though the Location layer is identical to that of Chapter 5 and Sylvester
and Reggia (2014), the Object layer has been greatly modified to allow it to
do feature-extraction before communicating with the Executive System. To
accomplish this the Object module now consists of two layers: a Self-Organizing
Map (Kohonen, 1998) which learns to extract features from the visual scene,
and an output layer which forms a consensus of the nodes of som. The som is
trained prior to executing any wcst trial. (In essence we assume that the
subject of a wcst trial is already capable of discriminating between squares
and triangles, between yellow and blue, etc.) A 40×40 rectangular grid of
nodes is trained using the standard som learning algorithm with all cards in
the deck as inputs for 3000 epochs. A subset of a trained som is depicted in
Figure 6.3. The nodes of the som output to a second layer of 1536 nodes (512
each for shape, color and number). This layer provides the ultimate output
consisting of the Object module’s opinion of the value of all three features of the
current visual input. The Object module is agnostic about which matching rule
is currently in effect — indeed, it is unaware that any matching is even going
on. It merely passes its determination of shape, color and number upstream to
the controller to do with as it will.
The weights wij from a node i in the Visual layer to a node j in the som
are trained according to the standard competitive learning som algorithm
mentioned above. This results in a som node’s activation being determined
by aj =
∑
iwijsi, with si being the state of node i and aj that of node j. The
weights from nodes in the som to the Object output layer are determined
analytically based on which features the som node responds most strongly to.
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Figure 6.3. Detail from an example Object layer som, with each
node labeled with what the card that would make it maximally active
would look like. For example, the node in the upper left corner has
learned to represent four cyan squares, while that in the lower right
corner has learned to represent three blue crosses. (Best viewed in
color.)
The procedure is more straightforward with an example: if a node responds
more strongly to red more than any other color, squares than any other shape,
and two items more than any other number, its outgoing weights will be set as
the distributed encodings chosen as in §6.2.3 for red, square and two. Formally,
this can be expressed as wj = cp such that










Here cp is the one of the four entries in the codebook for a feature-value, and
Sq is the set of all cards in the deck with that value. (In the case of color, we
might have c1 be the 600-bit code for red, c2 be the code for blue, etc., and thus
S1 is all the red cards, S2 all the blue cards, etc.) The rightmost summation
above is the activation of som node j in response to all of the pixels in card
λ. The left summation then yields node i’s activity as a result of all — for
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example — red cards. We set the desired weight to be the codebook entry cp
for whichever feature-value causes j to be maximally active.
The ultimate output of the Object layer is a summation of the outputs of
each node in the som, weighted by their activity in response to the current







where σ(·) is the logistic sigmoid function. This process gives single, consensus
view of the value of the visual input for each feature. These three values are
later combined based on the state of the three visual gates to create a single
512-bit value which is passed to the Executive System. Once again, an example
may help clarify: if the only nodes in the som with non-zero activation respond
most to two red squares and two red circles then the final output will be the
distributed encoding for two, that for red, and an affine combination of the
encodings for square and circle.
6.2.5 Working Memory
The wcst is a game of full information with respect to the visual environment.
All four base cards and the stimulus cards are in view at all times. The memory
which is required is that of the agent’s own recent actions and the feedback to
them. As a result, the Working Memory layer is pre-trained with the relevant
attractors. A new component called the “Epi-Memory” is used by the model
to form a memory of its own recent actions, discussed below in §6.2.6.
The role of the Working Memory is to link features to locations. The
card matching model linked “what” and “where” strings together in a single
auto associative memory in the same way that the ism links sequence and
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action identifiers together. Here the Working Memory of the card matching
model is expanded to link not just what with where, but number, color and
shape with where. To accomplish this the network is divided into two sections
conceptually (i.e., the network is fully connected but we interpret the two
halves as representing two different things), just as was done for the what and
where portions when modeling card matching. The first portion identifies a
feature dimension — number, color, shape and location — while the second
identifies a particular value of one of these features. Using one-shot Hebbian
learning sixteen attractors are created in the network, one for each feature-value
pair. Then these attractor states are linked together using asymmetric Hebbian
learning. For example, given the board depicted in Figure 6.1, the attractor for
(color; red) would be linked to the attractor representing (location; position #1),
as would those for (shape; square) and (number; one). This ‘linking’ is identical
to that discussed in prior chapters to connect one element in a sequence to
the succeeding element. Until now this technique has been used to link, for
example, an observation at time t− 1 to an observation at time t, but there
is no reason that the heteroassociative bond between these two patterns can
only be formed when patterns are temporally related. In total, there are 16
attractors learned using the symmetric weights of WWM, which are linked
together into 12 sequences of 2 elements each using the asymmetric weights of
VWM (Figure 6.4). These two weight matrices used within the Working Memory
layer are equivalent to the symmetric and asymmetric weights introduced and
then refined in Chapters 3 and 4.
Due to the ability of an associative memory to recall full patterns from
partial ones, it is possible to recover a full state such as (color; red) given only





















Figure 6.4. A schematic of the associations between feature-values
and locations. Solid, horizontal lines show associations between a
dimension and one of its possible values that have been made using
the symmetric weights of WWM. Dashed, vertical lines show the
associations that have been formed between the resulting attractors
using the asymmetric weights of VWM.
update of the network will then be able to recall the representation for (location;
position #1), and this value can be passed to the Motor Layer to allow it to
gesture at the basis card in the first (leftmost) position (see Figure 6.1).
6.2.6 Controller
The Controller is responsible for storing the instruction sequences the model
uses. It is composed of the same three components as the previously presented
galis models — Encoder, ism and Decoder — with the addition of one more
component to enable instruction refinement and rule switching, which is termed
the “Epi-Memory.” This section will concentrate on the new Epi-Memory
component, and the reader is referred to Chapters 4 & 5 for details on the
remainder of the controller, as these have not changed.
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The Epi-Memory is used to keep a record of the actions recently taken
my the Controller. Rather than keeping a record of the sequence of visual
stimuli, as for instance the n-Back model’s Working Memory layer did, the
Epi-Memory records the internal state of the ism. It is the same size as the
ism (1024 nodes), and forms a sequential memory using the same attractor
network techniques as the other memories in the model: asymmetric weights,
dynamic thresholds, and weight decay (See Chapter 3). When the model
receives feedback this memory is then used to retrieve the recent actions taken
and either strengthen their representations in the Controller — in the case of
positive feedback — or weaken them — in the case of negative feedback.
6.2.6.1 Gates & Instruction Set
The galis model for the wcst is governed by the following gates (see
Figure 6.2).
• Three dimension gates, one each that controls the relative contribution
of shape, color and number encodings from the Object layer. If all are
closed, the Executive system will not “see” anything; if just the shape
gate is open it will only perceive the shape of the object being viewed,
etc.
• A motor output gate, that when open allows the Motor layer to gesture
to the basis card that the model has chosen as match to the current
stimulus.
• An encoder update gate as in previous models.
• A gate to control the top-down attention in the Location layer, as in
Chapter 5.
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Table 6.3. Instruction sequences stored by the control module.
Sequence Action
1. Attend to number 1. process feedback & update som
2. open number gate
3. retrieve location from WM
4. output
2. Attend to color 1. process feedback
5. open color gate
3. retrieve location from WM
4. output
3. Attend to shape 1. process feedback
6. open shape gate
3. retrieve location from WM
4. output
• A gate on the reinforcement signal that opens when the model the ready
to accept process feedback.
• A gate to govern the updating of weights in the Controller, in the same
way that previous models had gates to update weights in the Working
Memory.
A gloss of the instruction sequences used, similar to those in previous chapters,
is given in Table 6.3. There are three similar sequences, differing only in which
of the visual gates is opened and therefore which feature dimension the model
will be using to determine a match. This makes the algorithm used simple to
understand but difficult for the model since there is a high degree of overlap
between the sequences.
The first step is to process the feedback signal from the environment in
the wake of the model’s previous answer. If the feedback gate is opened the
internal weights of the Control Module will be updated as described in the next
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section. Next, one of the three visual gates is opened, which allows the Object’s
layer’s decision on the value of the corresponding feature to be sent as input
to the Working Memory. Next the working memory is updated which causes
the location of the basis card that matches the stimulus card in the chosen
dimension to be retrieved. Finally this location is output to the environment
and the cycle repeats.
6.2.6.2 New Varieties of Instruction Learning
There are two new facets of learning being used here. The first is rule shifting,
which is a temporary change in the controller’s weights to enable it to change
which instruction sequence it is executing in response to negative feedback. The
second is instruction refinement, which involves repeated, marginal changes to
the controller’s weights to produce increasing performance over time.
Rule Shifting. In order to enable shifting between attentional sets and improv-
ing with experience, two new weight matrices have been added to the controller:
UISM and UENC. These act as “fast weights” to change the dynamics of the
ism and encoder, respectively. By dividing the responsibility between the fast
and standard/slow weight matrices it is possible to make rapid but temporary
changes to the behavior of a network without affecting its behavior in the long
term (Gomez and Schmidhuber, 2005; Hinton and Plaut, 1987; Reggia and
Edwards, 1990; Schmidhuber, 1992; Tieleman and Hinton, 2009). For instance,
if a network has learned to store a set of patterns using Hebbian learning on
matrix W, then one could temporarily remove a pattern from the network’s
memory by doing Hebbian learning of that pattern on a matrix U and using
W −U as the connection weights when updating the network. By setting U
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back to zero the network can be returned to the state is was in at the outset
without affecting its memory of the pattern in question or any others.
Bounded Hebbian learning is used to train the fast weights (Gerstner and
Kistler, 2002). This scales the magnitude of weight changes to prevent them
from overwhelming the existing weights. Following positive feedback, recent
ism states are retrieved from the Epi-Memory just as recent stimuli were
retrieved when carrying out n-Back. A recent state x is then used to update
UISM according to:






∣∣uISMij ∣∣) (xixj − δij) (6.3)
where kU is decay rate of U and φ and ψ are parameters to control the
boundedness of the weight updates.2
Like the n-Back and Card Matching models, the ism’s state is updated
twice per time step: once using the asymmetric weights VISM to move the state
to a new attractor, and then again using the symmetric weights WISM to settle
the state more fully in the new attractor basin. When the ism is updated
according to its input equations
aISM = sgn [VISM · aISM − θISM] (6.4)
aISM = sgn [(WISM + UISM) · aISM − θISM] (6.5)
it will be more likely to enter states which have recently received positive
feedback, which thereby makes distraction errors less common. The supplemen-
tary, bounded learning works when the model is behaving correctly because
it deepens the basins the network is already in. The intuitive explanation is
2 The experiments described here use φ = 0.3 and ψ = 0.2, but the results are not
particularly sensitive to the specific values, especially if the product φ · ψ is small.
192
“what you just did worked; do it more in the future,” or more tersely “don’t
shift rules now.” In a changing environment like that of the wcst what has
worked in the recent past is no guarantee of future success, hence these changes
being made to the decaying, temporary UISM and UENC.
What is needed after incorrect responses is to switch rules by moving to a
different basin. To do this anti-Hebbian learning is used in UENC to temporarily
remove the sequence which provided the incorrect answer. This is done by
uENCij = (1− kU)uENCij −
1
n
(xixj − δij) (6.6)
Since
∣∣uENCij ∣∣ is typically negligibly small, the above can be viewed as the
same bounded Hebbian learning process as Equation 6.3, but with bounding
parameters φ = −1 and ψ = 1. The fast weights for the encoder are combined
with that network’s standard weights during state update, making it unlikely
to remain in a sequence of actions which is yielding negative feedback.
aENC = sgn [(WENC + UENC) · aENC] (6.7)
Note that the Card Matching model of the previous chapter accomplished
the temporary suppression of a state using activity from the Register layer to
provide countervailing biasing inputs. The idea was that this would “push” the
network out of one attractor basin and thereby allow it to enter another. This
was largely effective, but occasionally this resulted in moving the network out
of the current attractor but into a spurious attractor that is the complement
of the intended, trained pattern. Using fast weight matrices to temporarily
unlearn the attractor state in question is a more effective method since it
does not require that the biasing influence be so precisely matched against the
influence of the network’s weights.
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Instruction Refinement. The system for long-term improvement via instruction
refinement is very similar to that for set-shifting. In the case of positive feedback,
a bounded Hebbian learning rule is applied to WISM and WENC to enlarge basins









∣∣wISMij ∣∣) (xixj − δij) (6.8)
and the same is used, mutatis mutandis, for WENC. Because these modifications
to the model’s instructions are permanent they are made more gradually, so
smaller values of φ and ψ are used than with the changes to UISM described in
Equation 6.3.3 Following negative feedback the same system is used on WISM
and WENC, but with a negative learning rate to weaken the associated attractors
instead of strengthen them (cf. Tieleman and Hinton, 2009). By repeated
marginal strengthening of the attractors which result in positive feedback and
weakening of those which result in negative feedback the network is able to
fine-tune its representation of is instructions to support increasing performance
levels as as time passes.
6.3 Results
Experiments were initially run using a reduced deck of cards, in which only those
cards which differ from the basis cards in exactly one dimension appear (Dehaene
and Changeux, 1991; Milner, 1963). Those cards that are in the deck appear
twice, giving a total of 48 cards. The correct dimension was switched after 6
consecutive correct responses. Tests using the full deck and a double deck —
3 The work here uses φ = 0.03 and ψ = 0.01. Once again the particulars of this choice
are not significant, but it is important that the product of these two parameters be
sufficiently small.
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both common versions of the test — were also run. These did not produce any
meaningfully different results but did require significantly more computational
time simply due to the increased number of cards to be processed per trial, so
I present results based on reduced deck tests.4
Models were run on the test from the beginning 12 times consecutively.
Between rounds all the layers of the controller had their states reset to random
values, and all fast weights U and dynamic thresholds θ were reset to zero.
(Note that the changes made to WISM and WENC via instruction refinement
were not reset or undone.) A total of 100 trials of 12 consecutive tests each were
run for models with instruction refinement activated and without. The mean
number of sets completed by the models are shown in Figure 6.5. Without
epi-learning, there is no improvement from the first to the twelfth trials. With
epi-learning, however, there is improvement as the model gains experience. This
improvement is significant at the p < 0.05 level as judged by a Kruskal-Wallace
test. While the improvement in performance may appear modest, the number
of sets completed increased from 3.86 to 4.97, a 29% increase.
Figure 6.6 shows a histogram of the number of sets completed by the
instruction refinement model in the first test compared to the last. The shift in
performance is evident: the number of trials which completed four sets or less
decreases while the number completing five or more increases. It is also worth
noting that variation in the number of sets completed across trials decreased
steadily as the models gained experience, indicating a less erratic behavior as
time went on. The standard deviation was 1.02 for the first round both with
4 For a discussion of the applicability of the reduced test in comparison to the full version
in human subjects, see Smith-Seemiller et al. (2001); the authors report on meta-analysis
that concludes short form scores are highly correlated with those on the long form,
though less so for very young or old subjects.
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Figure 6.5. Mean number of 6-card sets completed by galis models
both with and without instruction refinement capability, averaged
over 100 trials. (Note that the vertical axis does not begin at 0.0.)
and without instruction refinement; without instruction refinement, this value
remained roughly constant at 0.98, but with instruction refinement it decreased
to 0.76 after 12 rounds.
In addition to testing the model’s ability to refine its representation of the
three “correct” instruction sequences it was given, I also ran experiments to
judge the galis model’s ability to distinguish between useful and not useful
instruction sequences. This was done by training the model on an additional
sequence which was similar to the three given in Table 6.3, but instead of
opening one of the gates from the Object layer to attend to a particular feature,
all three were opened one third of the way. (Note that human subjects are not
told they should be matching based on only one feature at a time. The rule
“select the basis card with the highest overall similarity to the stimulus” is a
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Figure 6.6. Distribution of the number of sets completed by net-
works with instruction refinement on their first test and their twelfth.
Experience reduces the number of poor performing trials and increases
the number of high performing trials.
perfectly valid option, despite never being correct. This is the rule which the
new, fourth instruction sequence encodes.)
The addition of this supernumerary sequence resulted in an initial drop
in performance. This should not be surprising: not only does the model now
have an extra, incorrect option to choose from during every rule shift (Dehaene
and Changeux, 1991), but there is the added problem of a more crowded
attractor space. Performance thus drops for both algorithmic and neural
reasons. Figure 6.7 shows the average improvement from this initial state over
the course of 15 games: by the end of this period the networks have improved
from an initial performance of 2.8 sets completed per game to 3.7. This final
performance level was not significantly different from the initial performance
when only the three correct instructions were trained, presumably indicating
that the model successfully learned to ignore the unnecessary sequence.
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Figure 6.7. Mean number of 6-card sets completed by galis
model over 100 trials, when the controller has been trained on the
three correct instruction sequences listed in Table 6.3 as well as one
extraneous sequence. (Note that the vertical axis does not begin at
0.0.)
To further explore this adaptation, I also tracked how often each of the
four sequences was selected by the control module over the course of a test.
Figure 6.8 shows the number of times each was selected during the first and
fifteenth games in 100 trials. Though the extraneous instruction sequence
was selected less often than the three correct sequences in the first game of
each trial, this difference was not statistically significant. By the fifteenth
trial, all three of the correct sequences have increased their likelihood of being
acted upon. This comes at the expense of the fourth sequences, which occurs
only two thirds as often as it did before the model gained experience. It is
now significantly less likely to be selected by the model than the other three
sequences, showing that the model learned to differentiate between useful and
useless instructions.
198





























Figure 6.8. The proportion of time steps each of the four instruc-
tion sequences (#1–3 correct; #4 superfluous) were selected by the
controller, averaged over 100 trials. From game 1, when the model
has no experience, to game 15 the likelihood of executing all three
of the correct instruction sequences increases, while the likelihood
of selecting the superfluous sequence #4 decreases. (Note that the
vertical axis does not begin at 0.0.)
6.4 Discussion
Here we have demonstrated that galis can not only store the instructions
for a task in its memory, but can also autonomously adapt the contents of
that memory to allow better performance. One of the benefits of the galis
approach — the ability to “program” a neural network — can also be viewed as
a potential weakness. To wit, these programs must be determined a priori by
the modeler rather than deduced by the network. While this galis network
does not derive its instructions itself, it does collaborate with the modeler
in improving upon the instructions it is given. It does so by reinforcing the
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attractors for instructions that it has experienced as being useful and dampening
those not found to be so. This is important for several reasons. Firstly, galis
models can be susceptible to choices of patterns which result in attractor
basins being too close together. Instruction refinement in the controller makes
the network more robust to this situation by strengthening attractors which
result in positive performance. Secondly, the instructions do not need to be
fined-tuned, only sketched out because the model itself is capable of performing
this tuning operation. Thirdly, because the model can learn to ignore irrelevant
patterns, the modeler has the flexibility to offer instructions which may be
useful, and have the network discover for itself which of them actually are.
This self-directed improvement was possible within the bounds of the galis
framework, using regions of attractor memories, linked with gating. The fast-
weights concept used in rule switching is closely tied to gating, as discussed
in Chapter 5. Both are strategies which allow one network to influence the
behaviors of others. The two concepts are largely congruent; you could describe
all of the opening and closing of gates as the modification of (very) fast weights
on those gated connections and vice versa.
It was also possible in the context of a demanding cognitive control task
which requires careful balance between stability and plasticity. In addition
to incorporating the abilities to not change (stability) and change quickly
(plasticity), the work here also adds the ability to change slowly (instruction
refinement).
Incremental improvement is one of the areas that neural networks often
have an advantage in compared to their symbolic counterparts. By introducing
this previously-lacking ability to galis it has become a stronger potential
link between the two paradigms.
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Alternatives to bounded Hebbian learning should be explored further. Initial
explorations of other options, including Storkey learning rules (Hu, 2013;
Storkey, 1997; Storkey and Valabregue, 1999), were inconclusive so it was
decided to remain with Hebbian-based rules to provide continuity with the
rest of the model. Nevertheless, more rigorous testing of alternatives may
be fruitful. Further work should also be done on galis learning to ignore
irrelevant instruction sequences. Currently this is only possible for a small
number of such supernumerary sequences as any more cause the attractor space
to be too crowded to perform at a high enough level to receive positive feedback,
which is a requirement for undergoing the instruction refinement process. Other
memory paradigms with higher capacities, or indeed the same paradigm but
with a larger computational substrate, may allow a larger set of instruction
sequences to be learned as candidates. Other possibilities include introducing
new sequences as old ones decay away, or initializing different networks with




This chapter concludes this dissertation by summarizing the work done on
neural models of executive behavior and highlighting the original contributions
made to the field. It also covers the limitations of this work in addition to
possible future directions for it.
7.1 Significance and Summary
The fundamental issue addressed in this work is whether there is an identifiable
core set of of general-purpose, region-level functions and interactions that
can be used for cognitive control in large-scale neurocognitive architectures.
The hypothesis is that the galis framework provides such a set of three
key functions and interactions: a region-and-pathway architecture inspired
by the organization of the human cerebral cortex and biologically-plausible
hebbian learning, neural regions that each serve as an attractor network that
is able to learn temporal sequences, and neural regions that not only learn
to exchange information but also learn to turn on/off the functions of other
regions. The idea of simulated cortical regions that can gate one-another’s
activations, learning and communications is particularly novel.
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Most machine intelligence systems fall into one of two general groups:
systems that take a symbolic, top-down approach, and those that adopt a
neural, bottom-up approach. The divide between these two strategies is both
long-standing and, at times, quite contentious. This is regrettable because
the two different strategies are in many ways complementary rather than
competitive: each of the two approaches has its own relative strengths and
weaknesses. For example, while neural systems excel at problems that involve
pattern matching, incremental learning, low level control, fault tolerance, or
processing noisy data, they are less adept at handling higher cognitive functions
such as goal-directed reasoning, natural language processing, meta-cognition,
and planning. Top-down symbolic methods are largely antipodal.
In the cognitive modeling domain, the current limited abilities of neural
architectures to capture critical aspects of high-level cognition puts them at a
tremendous disadvantage when trying to to model the processes underlying
human cognitive control. This limited ability of neurocomputational methods
to support high-level cognition is somewhat unexpected in that the human
brain handles such issues routinely, establishing that neural computations
clearly have the capacity to do so. It also hampers progress in understanding
intelligence, as we are unable to connect our knowledge and experience of
intelligent behavior at the macro level with our vast and growing body of
information about the operation of the brain at the micro level (Reggia et al.,
2014). I believe that a bridge between symbolic and neural approaches will be
very advantageous, and that the galis framework is one way to advance this
reconciliation. To the extent that it and other related research is successful
it may even contribute to a better understanding of the general mind-brain
problem (ibid.).
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The complementarity between the symbolic and neural paradigms has
been recognized in the past and leveraged effectively in a number of cognitive
architectures (e.g., Sun and Naveh, 2004). However, attempts to graft one
approach on to the other have been largely unsuccessful (e.g., Jilk et al., 2008)).
Conversely, more recent attempts to synthesize the two have been meeting
with growing success and interest (Beck et al., 2008; Dayan, 2007; Holyoak and
Hummel, 2000; Stewart et al., 2011). In many ways this mirrors the recent
shift in other domains to hybrid discrete-continuous systems, such as vector
space methods in natural language processing and information retrieval (Le,
2012; Smolensky et al., 2014; Socher et al., 2012)
This dissertation focuses on a potential avenue to attempt to bridge this
gap through the creation of neural networks with memories not only of their
external environment but of internal actions and procedures. galis makes use
of multiple interacting networks, many of which are attractor-based memories,
and which influence each other’s operation through the use of gated connections.
This results in biologically plausible neural networks which nevertheless exhibit
behaviors typical of both symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches. The use of
distributed representations, high dimensional attractor spaces, non-linear inter-
actions between layers and one-shot Hebbian learning are all characteristic of
neural approaches. In contrast, each attractor basin is a discrete unit, gates can
be used for binary operations (opened/closed, excite/inhibit, update/maintain),
and finally “programs” of behavior are stored creating a type of data-code
equivalence.
Attractor networks with gating strike a balance between the continuous
nature of typical neural networks and the discrete nature of symbolic systems,
potentially narrowing the gap between what is possible with systems of each
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paradigm. While galis attractor networks operate in high-dimensional,
continuous space, each attractor within that space can be seen as a discrete
“object” (Simen and Polk, 2009). I believe this dual nature of attractor networks
presents an underexplored opportunity to produce symbolic-like behaviors using
sub-symbolic systems without losing desirable functionality of the sub-symbolic
paradigm, such as easy partial pattern matching.
Sequential attractor nets also help to avoid many scaling problems. Because
the attractors are sequential rather than fixed points, multiple items can be
active “simultaneously” in the same layer (Winder et al., 2009). In fact, the
structure of the instruction memory allows multiple sets of multiple items to
be activated. This obviates the need to dedicate a network to each possible
action by allowing them to be effectively superimposed on a single layer.
Cognitive models built using these galis techniques have been able to
perform psychological evaluation tasks as well as more familiar tasks, and they
do so at the level of human participants despite the high demand these tasks
put on executive functioning.
7.2 Contributions
The work described here makes several contributions to the field.
• The first contribution of this dissertation is the extension of Hopfield-like
attractor networks to process sequential rather than fixed-point attractors.
This is accomplished with temporally asymmetric weights, which allow
the network to act as both be auto- and hetero-associative memories.
This new network construct was used to build a model of serial working
memory which performed multiple versions of the Running Span task at
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levels comparable to human subjects, and exhibited some of the same
behavioral patterns such as the recency effect.
• The second contribution presented here is successful combination of mul-
tiple networks of this sequential attractor type to create models capable
of several cognitive control tasks. This required a method to store not
only multiple patterns in the same memory concurrently, but multiple
sequences of multiple patterns concurrently, and to do so in a way that al-
lowed the model to store both information about its external environment
and information about its task and how to perform it. Such a model was
capable, through the manipulation of gated connections between other
regions, of using the contents of working memory to autonomously carry
out two different cognitive control tasks: the Store/Recognize and the
n-Back tasks. Both of these tasks require a network to learn to carry out
its own learning of the external environment. In the latter task — n-Back,
which is a widely studied benchmark in cognitive psychology — the model
was able to switch between task versions without any adjustment to its
structure or parameters, even if it was instructed to switch in the middle
of task execution. It was also able to match human performance not only
in terms of accuracy but also response time.
• The hetero-associativity of asymmetric weights is useful not only for
learning sequences, but also for learning links between any elements. This
played a major role in the third contribution of this dissertation, in which
the galis system was enhanced to include visuospatial processing and
the binding of different features in a scene. This allows galis models to
interact with a visuospatial environment rather than passively accepting
206
a stream of amorphous stimuli. The structure of the visual system is
inspired by the dual “what” and “where” pathways of the brain, balances
bottom-up and top-down attentional control, and does so via continued
use of the gating paradigm. The galis model that demonstrated this
was tested against results that I collected from human subjects on a card-
matching memory test. It was able to match human performance on two
versions of the problem, and exceeded the performance of a comparable
symbolic model on the more difficult test condition.
• The final contribution was the demonstration that galis models with
stored instructions are capable of improving their performance as a result
of experience with a task. This capability for incremental improvement is
one of the major divides between symbolic and sub-symbolic models, and
the ability to learn an algorithm like a symbolic system but make marginal
improvement through time like a neural network is a significant step
forward in narrowing the gap between the two paradigms. This instruction
refinement capability was tested on a challenging cognitive psychology task
called the Wisconsin Card Sort Test. The wcst requires the binding of
multiple visual features, which was possible using the combined symmetric
and asymmetric weights of the sequential attractors I developed. It also
requires the shifting of attention and inhibition between those features,
which was possible by gating inter-region connections, as well as forming
a memory of the agent’s own earlier actions, which was possible using
the same techniques which my prior models used for memories of stimuli.
The model created for the wcst was able to meet all of these require-
ments the first time it executed the wcst, but was able to do so even
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better after it had played several times. This required that the model
make incremental improvements to its own internal representations based
on nothing more than a binary feedback signal. Further, these improve-
ments came through marginal adjustments to its weights which were
originally formed through rapid, one-shot learning procedures. One of the
fundamental challenges of the wcst is satisfying the dichotomy created
by the stability-plasticity dilemma. The addition of incremental improve-
ments to the mix means that the galis model essentially satisfied a
trichotomy by striking a balance between not changing, making rapid,
punctuational changes, and making slower, more marginal changes.
The work I have contributed to the discipline revolves around the theme
of basing neural network behavior on its own memory contents rather than
exclusively on network structure. In other words, the theme of my research has
been that the storing of programs in neural networks the way they’re stored
in computers will be effective for implementing cognitive control mechanisms.
This is a unique approach in neural networks research, and one that may be
viewed as analogous to the shift from special, purpose-built calculating devices
to general purpose, von Neumann-type computers. Like that shift, this has
the potential to make neural networks more powerful and more re-usable, as
well as to provide all of the other benefits that can be derived from shorter
development cycle times.
7.3 Limitations and Future Work
From my perspective, there are currently three principal limitations to the
galis approach. The first is a sensitivity to errors made while recalling
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patterns from memory. If a modeler instructs a symbolic system to first look
up a location in memory and then output the result he can be confident that,
for example, these steps will not happen in the reverse order. If an episodic
memory is formed of three events A,B,C occurring in that order, we may be
confident a symbolic system will not elide B and skip from A to C. (Note that
the same is most certainly not true of biological intelligent systems: modern
cognitive psychology includes substantial study of biases, errors and weaknesses
in human cognition.)
Models created using the galis paradigm do not offer the same confidence.
There are several potential ways of dealing with this. The work discussed here
was built up from the foundation of Hopfield networks. Other, less abstract
models of the brain which incorporate spike timing might be more robust to
this problem, albeit at the cost of increased computational effort. If more
computational energy is to be expended, it is possible that the simple expedient
of using larger sequential attractor networks of the same type described here may
alleviate this limitation, as capacity increases with network size. The approach
used here does recall the correct patterns in the aggregate, so the development
of ensembles of sequential attractors that collaborate on recollection of the
sequence (perhaps using the same representations and weights but operating
from different initial conditions or perhaps each with their own representations
and hence weights) should reduce the error rates during recollections. Finally it
is worth further testing of these sequential attractor networks with other, similar
learning rules such as the Storkey rules (Hu, 2013; Storkey and Valabregue,
1999; Swingler, 2012).
The second limitation of my work is that, although galis models can
store the algorithm for solving a problem, they cannot develop that algorithm
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on their own. The weak link in the chain is the choice of algorithm made by
the person designing the system. The ability to hone an instruction set as
demonstrated in Chapter 6, while short of being able to generate one from
scratch, is a significant move in the right direction and is demonstrative of
galis’ ability to move beyond the explicit instructions given to it by the human
modeler. Still needed is the ability to winnow down the useful instructions
from a much larger set. This mainly requires a larger initial memory capacity,
and the ability to introduce its own instructions or links between them rather
than only modifying those that are given.
Related to this would be the addition of a more sophisticated meta-cognitive
capability (Cox et al., 2011; Haidarian Shahri et al., 2010; Perlis, 1997). The
reinforcement learning-like capability and epi-memory of Chapter 6 opens the
door for more sophisticated self-monitoring by the network. This might enable,
for example, the model to break out of the unwanted repetitive behaviors it
occasionally exhibited with the 16 card trials of Card Matching.
Finally, the structures that can be formed using symmetric and asymmetric
weights are somewhat limited. The techniques I have introduced in this
dissertation allow multiple sequences of multiple elements each to be stored on
the same substrate concurrently. This is even possible with a many-to-many
mapping between elements and sequences, i.e., each sequence contains multiple
elements, and each element may be a member of more than one sequence.
However symbolic AI systems benefit from the ability to use arbitrarily complex
data structures. Adapting techniques that can create more complex data
structure, such as Holographic Reduced Representations (Harris, 2002; Plate,
2003b), Vector Symbolic Architectures (Levy and Gayler, 2008), or Extended
Sparse Distributed Memories (Snaider and Franklin, 2012) would give galis
210
models the ability to implement much more complex algorithms and build
more detailed representations of their environments.
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Barceló, F. & Knight, R. T. (2002). Both random and perseverative errors underlie
WCST deficits in prefrontal patients. Neuropsychologia, 40(3):349–356.
Barnard, P. J. (1985). Interacting cognitive subsystems: A psycholinguistic approach
to short-term memory. In Young, A., editor, Progress in the Psychology of
Language, volume 2, pages 197–258. Erlbaum, London.
Barnard, P. J. (1999). Interacting Cognitive Subsystems: Modeling working memory
phenomena within a multiprocessor architecture. In Miyake, A. & Shah, P., editors,
Models of Working Memory: Mechanisms of Active Maintenance and Executive
Control, chapter 9, pages 298–339. Cambridge University Press.
Barnard, P. J. & Teasdale, J. D. (1991). Interacting cognitive subsystems: A systemic
approach to cognitive-affective interaction and change. Cognition & Emotion,
5(1):1–39.
213
Barto, A. G. (1995). Adaptive Critics and the Basal Ganglia. In Houk, J., Davis,
J., & Beiser, D., editors, Models of Information Processing in the Basal Ganglia,
pages 215–232. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Beck, M., Kiani, F., & Bar, B. (2008). Find article from neuron. Neuron.
Beiser, D. G. & Houk, J. C. (1998). Model of cortical-basal ganglionic processing:
Encoding the serial order of sensory events. Journal of Neurophysiology, 79(6):3168–
3188.
Berg, E. A. (1948). A simple objective technique for measuring flexibility in thinking.
The Journal of General Psychology, 39(1):15–22.
Bi, G. & Poo, M. (1998). Synaptic modifications in cultured hippocampal neurons:
Dependence on spike timing, synaptic strength, and postsynaptic cell type. Journal
of Neuroscience, 18(24):10464–10472.
Bi, G. & Poo, M. (2001). Synaptic modification by correlated activity: Hebb’s
Postulate revisited. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 24:139–166.
Blum, K. I. & Abbott, L. F. (1996). A model of spatial map formation in the
hippocampus of the rat. Neural Computation, 8(1):85–93.
Boone, K. B. (1999). Neuropsychological assessment of executive functions: Impact
of age, education, gender, intellectual level, and vascular status on executive test
scores. In Miller, B. L. & Cummings, J. L., editors, The Science and Practice of
Neuropsychology, pages 247–260. Guilford Press.
Botvinick, M. & An, J. (2009). Goal-directed decision making in prefrontal cortex:
A computational framework. In Koller, D., Schuurmans, D., Bengio, Y., & Bottou,
L., editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 21, pages 169–176.
Botvinick, M. M., Niv, Y., & Barto, A. G. (2009). Hierarchically organized behavior
and its neural foundations: A reinforcement learning perspective. Cognition,
113(3):262–80.
Botvinick, M. M. & Plaut, D. C. (2002). Representing task context: Proposals based
on a connectionist model of action. Psychological Research, 66(4):298–311.
Botvinick, M. M. & Plaut, D. C. (2006). Short-term memory for serial order: A
recurrent neural network model. Psychological Review, 113(2):201–233.
Braver, T. S. & Cohen, J. D. (2000). On the control of control: The role of dopamine
in regulating prefrontal function and working memory. In Monsell, S. & Driver,
J., editors, Attention & Performance: Control of Cognitive Processes XVIII,
chapter 31, pages 713–737. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bressler, S. & Menon, V. (2010). Large-scale brain networks in cognition. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 14(6):277–290.
Brown, G. D., Preece, T., & Hulme, C. (2000). Oscillator-based memory for serial
order. Psychological Review, 107(1):127–181.
214
Brown, J. & Braver, T. (2005). Learned predictions of error likelihood in the anterior
cingulate cortex. Science, 307:1118–1121.
Bunge, S. (2004). How we use rules to select actions: A review of evidence from
cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 4:564–579.
Bunting, M. F., Cowan, N., & Saults, J. S. (2006). How does running memory span
work? Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59(10):1691–700.
Burgess, N. & Hitch, G. J. (1999). Memory for serial order: A network model of the
phonological loop and its timing. Psychological Review, 106(3):551–581.
Burgess, N., Jeffrey, K., & O’Keefe, J. (1999). Integrating hippocampal and parietal
functions. In Burgess, N., Jeffery, K. J., & O’Keefe, J., editors, The Hippocampal
and Parietal Foundations of Spatial Cognition, pages 2–29. Oxford University
Press.
Chakravarthy, S. & Ghosh, J. (1996). A complex-valued associative memory for
storing patterns as oscillatory states. Biological Cybernetics, 75:229–238.
Charniak, E., Riesbeck, C. K., McDermott, D. V., & Meehan, J. R. (2013). Artificial
Intelligence Programming. Psychology Press, 2nd edition.
Charron, S. & Koechlin, E. (2010). Divided representation of concurrent goals in
the human frontal lobes. Science, 328:360–363.
Chartier, S. & Boukadoum, M. (2006). A bidirectional heteroassociative memory for
binary and grey-level patterns. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 17(2):385–
96.
Chatham, C. H., Herd, S. A., Brant, A. M., Hazy, T. E., Miyake, A., O’Reilly,
R., & Friedman, N. P. (2011). From an executive network to executive control:
A computational model of the n-back task. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
23(11):3598–619.
Cho, S. & Reggia, J. A. (1993). Learning competition and cooperation. Neural
Computation, 5(2):242–259.
Choo, F.-X. & Eliasmith, C. (2010). A spiking neuron model of serial-order recall. In
Cattrambone, R. & Ohlsson, S., editors, 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society, Portland, OR.
Cohen, J. D. & O’Reilly, R. C. (1996). A preliminary theory of the interactions
between prefrontal cortex and hippocampus that contribute to planning and
prospective memory. In Brandimonte, M., Einstein, G. O., & McDaniel, M. A.,
editors, Prospective Memory: Theory and Applications, pages 267–296. Erlbaum,
Mahwah, NJ.
Cohen, M. X. (2008). Neurocomputational mechanisms of reinforcement-guided
learning in humans: A review. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience,
8(2):113–125.
215
Compte, A., Brunel, N., Goldman-Rakic, P. S., & Wang, X.-J. (2000). Synaptic
mechanisms and network dynamics underlying spatial working memory in a cortical
network model. Cerebral Cortex, 10(9):910–923.
Conway, A. R., Cowan, N., Bunting, M. F., Therriault, D. J., & Minkoff, S. R. (2002).
A latent variable analysis of working memory capacity, short-term memory capacity,
processing speed, and general fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 30(2):163–183.
Courtney, S. M., Ungerleider, L. G., Keil, K., & Haxby, J. V. (1996). Object and
spatial visual working memory activate separate neural systems in human cortex.
Cerebral Cortex, 6(1):39–49.
Cowan, N. (1988). Evolving conceptions of memory storage, selective attention,
and their mutual constraints within the human information-processing system.
Psychological Bulletin, 104(2):163–191.
Cowan, N. (1995). Attention and memory: An integrated framework. Oxford
University Press.
Cowan, N. (1999). An embedded-processes model of working memory. In Miyake, A.
& Shah, P., editors, Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance
and executive control, pages 62–101. Cambridge University Press.
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 24:87–185.
Cowan, N., Elliott, E. M., Scott Saults, J., Morey, C. C., Mattox, S., Hismjatullina,
A., & Conway, A. R. A. (2005). On the capacity of attention: Its estimation
and its role in working memory and cognitive aptitudes. Cognitive Psychology,
51(1):42–100.
Cox, M. T., Oates, T., & Perlis, D. (2011). Toward an integrated metacognitive
architecture. In AAAI Fall Symposium Series: Advances in Cognitive Systems.
Dayan, P. (2002). Matters temporal. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(3):105–106.
Dayan, P. (2007). Bilinearity, rules, and prefrontal cortex. Frontiers in Computational
Neuroscience, 1(1):1–14.
de Garis, H., Shuo, C., Goertzel, B., & Ruiting, L. (2010). A world survey of artificial
brain projects. Neurocomputing, 74:3–29.
Dehaene, S. & Changeux, J.-P. (1989). A Simple Model of Prefrontal Cortex Function
in Delayed-Response Tasks. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 1(3):244–261.
Dehaene, S. & Changeux, J.-P. (1991). The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: Theoretical
analysis and modeling in a neuronal network. Cerebral Cortex, 1(1):62–79.
Dehaene, S. & Changeux, J.-P. (1997). A hierarchical neuronal network for plan-
ning behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA,
94(24):13293–8.
Dehaene, S. & Changeux, J.-P. (2000). Reward-dependent learning in neuronal
networks for planning and decision making. Progress in Brain Research, 126:217–
216
229.
Dehaene, S., Kerszberg, M., & Changeux, J.-P. (1998). A neuronal model of a global
workspace in effortful cognitive tasks. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the USA, 95(24):14529–34.
Diesmann, M., Gewaltig, M.-O., & Aertsen, A. (1999). Stable propagation of
synchronous spiking in cortical neural networks. Nature, 402:529–533.
Dougherty, M. R. & Hunter, J. E. (2003a). Hypothesis generation, probability judg-
ment, and individual differences in working memory capacity. Acta Psychologica,
113(3):263–282.
Dougherty, M. R. & Hunter, J. E. (2003b). Probability judgment and subadditivity:
The role of working memory capacity and constraining retrieval. Memory &
Cognition, 31(6):968–982.
Doya, K. (1999). What are the computations of the cerebellum, the basal ganglia
and the cerebral cortex? Neural Networks, 12(7–8):961–974.
Durstewitz, D. & Seamans, J. K. (2008). The dual-state theory of prefrontal cortex
dopamine function with relevance to catechol-o-methyltransferase genotypes and
schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry, 64(9):739–49.
Durstewitz, D., Seamans, J. K., & Sejnowski, T. J. (2000). Neurocomputational
models of working memory. Nature Neuroscience, 3(11supp.):1184–1191.
Eliasmith, C. (2005). Cognition with neurons: A large-scale, biologically realistic
model of the Wason task. In Bara, G., Barsalou, L., & Bucciarelli, M., editors,
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, pages
624–629, Stresa, Italy.
Eliasmith, C. (2013). How to build a brain: A neural architecture for biological
cognition. Oxford University Press.
Eliasmith, C. & Anderson, C. H. (2003). Neural Engineering: Computation, repre-
sentation and dynamics in neurobiological systems. MIT Press.
Eliasmith, C., Stewart, T. C., Choo, X., Bekolay, T., DeWolf, T., Tang, Y., &
Rasmussen, D. (2012). A large-scale model of the functioning brain. Science,
338(6111):1202–1205.
Elman, J. L. (1990). Finding structure in time. Cognitive Science, 14(2):179–211.
Engle, R. W., Conway, A. R. A., Tuholski, S. W., & Shisler, R. J. (1995). A resource
account of inhibition. Psychological Science, 6(2):122–125.
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working
memory, short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A latent-variable
approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 128(3):309–331.
Everett, J., Lavoie, K., Gagnon, J.-F., & Gosselin, N. (2001). Performance of patients
with schizophrenia on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Journal of Psychiatry
and Neuroscience, 26(2):123.
217
Farrell, S. & Lewandowsky, S. (2002). An endogenous distributed model of ordering
in serial recall. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(1):59–79.
Feldman, J. (2013). The neural binding problem. Cognitive Neurodynamics, 7(1):1–11.
Forgy, C. L. (1982). Rete: A fast algorithm for the many pattern/many object
pattern match problem. Artificial Intelligence, 19(1):17–37.
Frank, M. J. (2005). Dynamic dopamine modulation in the basal ganglia: A
neurocomputational account of cognitive deficits in medicated and nonmedicated
Parkinsonism. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 17(1):51–72.
Frank, M. J., Loughry, B., & O’Reilly, R. C. (2001). Interactions between frontal
cortex and basal ganglia in working memory: A computational model. Cognitive,
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1:137–160.
Gayler, R. W. (2003). Vector Symbolic Architectures answer Jackendoff’s chal-
lenges for cognitive neuroscience. In Slezak, P., editor, ICCS/ASCS International
Conference on Cognitive Science, pages 133–138, Sydney, Australia.
Gazzaley, A. & Nobre, A. C. (2012). Top-down modulation: Bridging selective
attention and working memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2):129 – 135.
Gers, F. A. & Schmidhuber, J. (2000). Recurrent nets that time and count. In
Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, pages
189–194.
Gers, F. A., Schmidhuber, J., & Cummins, F. (2000). Learning to forget: Continual
prediction with LSTM. Neural Computation, 12(10):2451–71.
Gerstner, W. & Kistler, W. M. (2002). Mathematical formulations of Hebbian
learning. Biological Cybernetics, 87(5–6):404–415.
Gerstner, W., Ritz, R., & van Hemmen, J. L. (1993). Why spikes? Hebbian
learning and retrieval of time-resolved excitation patterns. Biological Cybernetics,
69(5–6):503–515.
Goel, V., Pullara, S. D., & Grafman, J. (2001). A computational model of frontal
lobe dysfunction: working memory and the Tower of Hanoi task. Cognitive Science,
25(2):287–313.
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1987). Circuitry of primate prefrontal cortex and regulation
of behavior by representational memory. Handbook of Physiology — The Nervous
System, 5:373–417.
Gomez, F. & Schmidhuber, J. (2005). Evolving modular fast-weight networks for
control. In Proceedings 15th International Conference Artifical Neural Networks,
Part II: Formal Models and Their Applications (LNCS 3697), pages 383–389.
Springer.
Greve, K. W., Stickle, T. R., Love, J. M., Bianchini, K. J., & Stanford, M. S.
(2005). Latent structure of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: A confirmatory
factor analytic study. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 20(3):355–364.
218
Guigon, E., Dorizzi, B., Burnod, Y., & Schultz, W. (1995). Neural correlates of
learning in the prefrontal cortex of the monkey: A predictive model. Cerebral
Cortex, 5(2):135–147.
Gurney, K., Prescott, T. J., & Redgrave, P. (2001a). A computational model of
action selection in the basal ganglia, I: A new functional anatomy. Biological
Cybernetics, 84(6):401–410.
Gurney, K., Prescott, T. J., & Redgrave, P. (2001b). A computational model of
action selection in the basal ganglia, II: Analysis and simulation of behaviour.
Biological Cybernetics, 84(6):411–423.
Haarman, H. & Usher, M. (2001). Maintenance of semantic information in capacity-
limited short-term memory. Psychonomic Bulletin, 8(3):568–578.
Haidarian Shahri, H., Dinalankara, W., Fults, S., Wilson, S., Perlis, D., Schmill,
M., Oates, T., Josyula, D., & Anderson, M. (2010). The metacognitive loop: An
architecture for building robust intelligent systems. In AAAI Fall Symposium
Series: Commonsense Knowledge.
Harbison, J. I., Atkins, S. M., & Dougherty, M. R. (2011). Performance gains in
an adaptive n-back working memory training task. In Proceedings 50th Annual
Meeting Psychonomic Society, pages 120–125.
Harris, H. (2002). Holographic reduced representations for oscillator recall: A model
of phonological production. In Gray, W. D. & Schunn, C. D., editors, Proceedings
of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum.
Hasselmo, M., Bodelon, C., & Wyble, B. (2002). Proposed function for hippocampal
theta rhythm. Neural Computation, 14:793–817.
Hayashi, Y. (1994). Oscillatory neural network and learning of continuously trans-
formed patterns. Neural Networks, 7:219–231.
Hazy, T. E., Frank, M. J., & O’Reilly, R. C. (2007). Towards an executive without a
homunculus: Computational models of the prefrontal cortex/basal ganglia system.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362(1485):1601–13.
Henson, R. N. (1998). Short-term memory for serial order: The start-end model.
Cognitive Psychology, 36(2):73–137.
Henson, R. N. & Burgess, N. (1997). Representations of serial order. In 4th Neural
Computation and Psychology Workshop: Connectionist Representations, pages
283–300. Springer Verlag.
Henson, R. N., Norris, D. G., Page, M. P., & Baddeley, A. (1996). Unchained
memory: Error patterns rule out chaining models of immediate serial recall. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A(1):80–115.
Hinton, G. E. (2002). Training products of experts by minimizing contrastive
divergence. Neural Computation, 14(8):1771–1800.
219
Hinton, G. E. & Plaut, D. C. (1987). Using fast weights to deblur old memories. In
Program of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pages
177–186.
Hochreiter, S. & Schmidhuber, J. (1997). Long short-term memory. Neural Compu-
tation, 9(8):1735–80.
Hockey, A. & Geffen, G. (2004). The concurrent validity and test–retest reliability
of a visuospatial working memory task. Intelligence, 32(6):591–605.
Holyoak, K. J. & Hummel, J. E. (2000). The proper treatment of symbols in a
connectionist architecture. Cognitive dynamics: Conceptual change in humans
and machines, pages 229–263. NOT CITED YET.
Hopfield, J. J. (1982). Neural networks and physical systems with emergent collective
computational abilities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
USA, 79(8):2554–2558.
Hopfield, J. J., Feinstein, D. I., & Palmer, R. G. (1983). ‘Unlearning’ has a stabilizing
effect in collective memories. Nature, 304(5922):158–159.
Horn, D. & Usher, M. (1991). Parallel activation of memories in an oscillatory neural
network. Neural Computation, 3:31–43.
Horn, D. & Usher, M. (1992). Oscillatory model of short term memory. In Moody,
J. E., Hanson, S. J., & Lippmann, R. P., editors, Advances in Neural Infromation
and Processing Systems 4, pages 125–132. Morgan Kaufmann.
Hoshino, O., Usuba, N., Kashimori, Y., & Kambara, T. (1997). Role of itinerancy
among attractors as dynamical map in distributed coding scheme. Neural Networks,
10(8):1375–1390.
Houghton, G. (1990). The problem of serial order: A neural network model of
sequence learning and recall. In Dale, R., Mellish, C., & Zock, M., editors, Current
Research in Natural Language Generation, pages 287–319. London Academic Press.
Houk, J. C. (2007). Biological implementation of the temporal difference algorithm for
reinforcement learning: theoretical comment on O’Reilly et al. (2007). Behavioral
neuroscience, 121(1):231–2.
Hsiang, S. M. (2013). Visually-weighted regression. SSRN 2265501.
Hu, X. (2013). Storkey learning rules for Hopfield networks. viXra, 1309.0130.
Ingber, L. (1995). Statistical mechanics of neocortical interactions: Constraints on
40 Hz models of short term memory based on persistent spiking. Physical Review
E, 52:4561–4563.
Jacobs, R. A., Jordan, M. I., & Barto, A. G. (1991a). Task decomposition through
competition in a modular connectionist architecture: The what and where vision
tasks. Cognitive Science, 15(2):219–250.
Jacobs, R. A., Jordan, M. I., Nowlan, S. J., & Hinton, G. E. (1991b). Adaptive
mixtures of local experts. Neural Computation, 3(1):79–87.
220
Jaeger, H. (2001). The “echo state” approach to analysing and training recurrent
neural networks. Technical Report 148, German National Research Center for
Information Technology.
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W. J. (2008). Improving
fluid intelligence with training on working memory. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the USA, 105(19):6829–6833.
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Shah, P. (2011). Short- and long-term
benefits of cognitive training. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
108(25):10081–10086.
Jaeggi, S. M., Studer-Luethi, B., Buschkuehl, M., Su, Y.-F., Jonides, J., & Perrig,
W. J. (2010). The relationship between n-back performance and matrix reasoning:
Implications for training and transfer. Intelligence, 38(6):625–635.
Jilk, D. J., Lebiere, C., O’Reilly, R. C., & Anderson, J. R. (2008). SAL: An explicitly
pluralistic cognitive architecture. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence, 20(3):197–218.
Johnson, W. B. & Lindenstrauss, J. (1984). Extensions of Lipschitz mappings into a
Hilbert space. Contemporary Mathematics, 26(189–206):1.
Jones, M. & Polk, T. A. (2002). An attractor network model of serial recall. Cognitive
Systems Research, 3(1):45–55.
Jordan, M. I. & Jacobs, R. A. (1994). Hierarchical mixtures of experts and the EM
algorithm. Neural Computation, 6(2):181–214.
Kak, S. (1993). On training feedforward neural networks. Pramana, 40(1):35–42.
Kak, S. (1998). On generalization by neural networks. Information Sciences, 111(1–
4):293–302.
Kak, S. (1999). Better web searches and prediction with instantaneously trained
neural networks. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 14(6):78–81.
Kak, S. (2002). A class of instantaneously trained neural networks. Information
Sciences, 148(1–4):97–102.
Kaplan, G., Sengör, N. S., Gürvit, H., Genç, I., & Güzeli, C. (2006). A composite
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